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ABSTRACT
For decades, advocates of equity-oriented development have
urged the use of low-cost, labour-intensive, local resource-
using (indigenous) technologies. Successive development
approaches - from Village-Aid of the fifties, to the more
recent "basic needs" - have each had their appropriate
technology components. "Appropriate technologists" have
designed an impressive array of such technologies. Yet Third
World governments have consistently preferred expensive,
import-intensive technologies. Why is this so?
From a study of Pakistan, the thesis argues that social,
economic, and institutional factors and the interests
underlying them, often naturally lead to the selection of
import-intensive technologies over indigenous ones. These
factors include unequal income distribution patterns, import-
substitution policies, and heavy investment in large-scale
construction. The preferences of upper-income groups,
conditions in large cities and in centralised construction
agencies also favour import-intensive technologies.
Furthermore, the belief that indigenous technologies are
economically inefficient and otherwise "backward' is
widespread, deep rooted and seldom effectively challenged.
Also lacking is a simple yet rigorous methodology to evaluate
alternative technologies especially those practiced in the
small-scale, informal sector, where much construction and
materials production takes place.
Advocates of indigenous technologies have a twofold task.
First, to demonstrate that such technologies are not
inherently backward or inefficient, relative to import-
intensive ones. Second, to design indigenous technology-
promoting programs that use the leverage in competing
objectives and interests to influence technology choice.
The study is based on 100 cases and interviews as well as on
secondary data. The main construction and materials production
processes practiced in Pakistan are considered. Detailed
case-studies are drawn from a largely rural district. People
government officials, community leaders,
materials entrepreneurs, builders, and house owners.
The thesis develops a simple computer model, based on cash
flow and cost-benefit techniques, to evaluate construction and
materials production processes. This "technology evaluation
model" assesses alternatives against a range of both equity
and efficiency criteria.
Some typical construction and materials production
technologies are analysed in detail. The results suggest that
indigenous technologies can be both more equitable and
efficient. For example, even with their heavier maintenance
considered, projects using the indigenous technology can cost
only sixty percent of the import-intensive alternative.
Ninety-seven percent of the investment in construction using
indigenous technologies remains in the district to create jobs
whereas half of the investment in import-intensive contruction
is leaked out of the district. Profits are lower in the
import-intensive production processes.
Furthermore, construction projects using indigenous
technologies offer more scope for community participation and
for strengthening local institutions.
A program to develop indigenous processes in Pakistan should
be routed through the social sector instead of the housing and
physical infrastructure sector, through small towns and rural
areas instead of the big cities, and through the 1o c a 1
government instead of centralised construction agencies.
The social sector funds more building construction than any
other sector. Construction is a major activity of 1o c a 1
government in the small towns and rural areas. The pressures
to select import-intensive technologies are generally weaker
in such areas and in the local government structure than they
are in large cities and in the centralised construction
agencies. Not least the central government and the local elite
would benefit and should hence support such a program.
To encourage appropriate technology choices at the 1o c a 1
level, certain specific incentives would be needed such a s
letting cost savings accrue to the local government.
The program must be designed to encourage "learning by doing."
Most important, the program should make indigenous
technologies a natural preference of decision makers rather
than rely on futile appeals or short-lived impositions.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Alan Strout
Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Urban
Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
BASIC ISSUES, DEFINITIONS, AND THESIS OUTLINE
i. Basic Issues
For decades, advocates of equity-oriented development and
appropriate technology have argued for low-cost,
low-complexity, and local resource-using (indigenous)
technologies. Yet the record of such technologies being
developed and applied on any significant scale remains
dismal. Why is this so?
The arguments of such advocates can be summarised as
follows. The technologies' low-cost malkes them more
affordable to the poor and also reduces the costs of
government-funded programs; thus the coverage of such
programs increases. Their low-complexity allows locals to
participate in the program. Participation ensures these
programs are better adapted to local needs and gives locals
more control, while costs are further reduced by the savings
resulting from self-help. The use of local resources
generates employment and incomes by stimulating demand for
local labour and industries (Schumacher, 1975; Turner and
Fichter, 1972; Kindleberger, 1977; Singer, 1977; Soysa,
1979; Friedmann, 1979; Ganesan,. 1980; Rondinelli, et. al.,
1983).
Appropriate technology components of successive development
approaches have been urged by leading international aid
agencies or authorities on development: village agricultural
and industrial aid (V-aid) by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) in the early fifties;
"intermediate technology" by Schumacher and his group in the
sixties; "basic needs" and the more recent "informal sector"
approaches by the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
and the World Bank in the seventies and eighties.1
Development projects whose agenda include the promotion of
such alternative technologies have been tried. Architects,
engineers and other "appropriate technologists" have
identified and designed an impressive array of such
technologies. In almost every case where the carrot of
external funding or the political purpose of the projects
has been weak or has waned, the host Third World countries
have continued to favour more expensive, more complex, and
import-intensive technologies. All these despite the
emphasis [by governments] on the objectives that the
1. A pioneer in this field, although unacknowledged in the
development literature is the Egyptian architect, Hasan
Fathy. Since the early forties he was using and promoting
the use of low-cost, local technologies in building
construction and was urging support for small (now called
"informal sector") industries, for a retrospective, see
Richardson, et. al., 1985.
adoption of indigenous technologies are supposed to promote
such as: increased coverage of community facilities and
housing, participation, employment and income distribution.
Are these govenments right to make an apparently
contradictory technology choice?
All the advocacy and all these attempts notwithstanding, we
know little about indigenous technologies and much about
import-intensive ones. More glaring, we know almost nothing
about the inner dynamics of technology choice in a Third
World country. What is it that influences technology choice?
Answers lie in filling this gap. This study helps do so.
We address three questions. Do indigenous technologies
relative to their import-intensive counterparts better
promote the development objectives mentioned above? If so,
what explains the widespread preference for import-intensive
technologies in the Third World? What, if anything can be
done about it, in particular, what can be done to promote
certain technologies rather than others?
To examine the above questions, we take the case of Pakistan
(map in Figure i), focus on a rural district - Sahiwal -
and the construction and materials production technologies.
prevailing in the area (Figures 2 and 3 show the
administrative structure and a district map,
respectively.2
In addressing the above questions, the study takes the
position that we need to take into account the range often
competing objectives to be achieved, each objective having
2. Indigenous technologies are those that use local
resources - financial, managerial, material and labour.
Import-intensive technologies are those that use non-local
resources.
Generically what is "local" is that which is within the area
where we wish to promote specific development objectives.
This area could be for example the country, a district, a
settlement, or a neighborhood. Here we are concerned first
with the country, second with the rural district, and third
with the rural sector within such a district.
The rural sector includes settlements that directly
influence and are influenced by the agricultural sector.
Small towns whose primary functions are administrative,
commercial, and social services for the surrounding rural
population are thus considered part of the rural sector.(World Bank, 1978a).
Such small towns, say between 10 to 25,000 in population are
the settlement focus of this study. In them will reside most
of the services mentioned above, they serve as important
links between the rural areas and the larger cities, the
transition nodes between the rural and urban economy. It is
in these towns that much construction activity in the rural
sector takes place and is required to develop the rural
areas (World Bank, 1978a). This is also true for Sahiwal
district. Cost comparisons in this study are based on wages
and prices recorded in such small towns in the district.
Construction directly influencing shelter and settlement -
roads, water supply, buildings - are our concern here rather
than that of national infrastructure such as electrification
and dams. Within shelter and settlement construction our
examples are drawn chiefly from buildings. However, the
points made relate to small-scale infrastructure as well:
neighbourhood or rural feeder roads, culverts, irrigation
ditches, small bridges, water supply, etc. Both types of
construction involve the same agencies, entrepreuners of
materials production and supply, materials and labour.
its own criteria for making technology (and other) choices.
This competition is manifest at different levels: in
conflicting approaches to development; in policies and
practices of the economic, institutional, and social spheres
in specific national and local contexts; in social groups
and individuals with preferences (criteria) guided by what
they perceive as their best interests.
To address the questions of this study, we first have to
make explicit the following: the dominant development
objectives and their influence in the country under study;
the criteria against which we judge the technologies; the
extent to which these criteria may conflict with the
development objectives, and the potential tradeoffs in
selecting between alternatives - that is, which objectives
are promoted at the expense of which others, which group or
area is gaining at the expense of which other? We then have
to examine these tradeoffs and the characteristics of the
technologies against the dominant interests and social and
institutional structures within the society. Finally, we
need to identify whether and how these interests and
structures or some part of them can help promote or hinder
the development of the more appropriate technologies.
We pursue this theme in Chapter 2 where we discuss how
different development approaches bear on the definition and
selection of appropriate technologies. Here let us first
clarify how and why our dichotomy for comparison - the
indigenous versus import-intensive - differs from others
frequently used to discuss similar issues.
2. Why "Indigenous* Versus "Import-Intensive"? Comparing
Alternative Dichotomies
Our choice o the terms indigenous and import-intensive to
describe the alternative technologies and the sectors they
represent is a deliberate one. Similar studies variously
dichotomise alternative technologies as traditional versus
modern, capital- versus labour-intensive, formal versus
informal and higher versus lower standards.
While these definitions overlap, each alternative falls
short of accurately representing technology choices and may
therefore distort the issues at hand.
The terms traditional and modern are value laden relative to
Third World countries rightly and desperately striving to
modernise. From the outset using these terms biases against
the choice associated with the traditional.
The terms capital- versus labour-intensive are widely used
in the construction literature. Yet these terms are
misleading in their description of the construction process
and of the choices involved, particularly when referring to
construction in Third World countries. Materials are left
6
out of this formulation and, consequently, so are the
choices between indigenous and import-intensive materials.
Small-scale construction and materials production - the
majority of construction activity in Third World countries -
uses very little capital; machinery is a very small
proportion of total costs. The choice in such cases is not
between capital and labour but rather between materials and
labour. For both labour and materials, the choices can be
further categorised into local (indigenous) and non-local
(imported), that is, from within and outside the area.3
Similarly, while the characteristics of the terms formal and
informal sector also apply to the indigenous and
import-intensive dichotomy (characteristics discussed in
appendix A), the single overriding implication is not
entirely accurate. The procedures and practices of so-called
formal sector forms may be highly informal as in the ways
patronage, influence, and corruption shape the distribution
of contracts, while those of the informal sector may be
highly formalised by years of traditional practice as in the
assignment of responsibilities to the different family
members in a family enterprise.
3. For excellent discussions on construction technology,
limited only by the use of this formulation, see Stewart,
1977; Tendler, 1979).
Hany of the issues alluded to here are more usually
presented in other studies as a choice between higher and
lower construction standards. This distinction correctly
highlights the importance of standards and the institutional
factors involved in setting them, but it is also a limiting
one.4
First, the majority of house builders are not constrained so
much by the lack of government permission to use affordable
technologies (and materials) as they are by the lack of such
materials and technologies that also provide adequate
shelter. A focus on standards begs the question of how to
identify, develop, and make available such technologies.
Second, like the traditional versus modern dichotomy, lower
construction standards has negative connotations for a
modernising nation. Advocating lower standards as the major
policy measure may be focusing on an issue that is not
central. At the same time, because of its negative
connotations, more central issues that could otherwise be
presented in a more positive light may be undermined.
It can be misleading, for example, to imply that we need to
lower construction standards to specify timber beams in
place . of girders. If well treated by the traditional water
4. For a state-of-the-art discussion on standards and
institutional factors see Gakenheimer and Brando, 1985.
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immersion method or by other more sophisticated processes,
timber beams may be of a higher standard than girders that
may rust shortly because these were rerolled faultily from
scrap iron.
Thus a more basic concern may be promoting indigenous
materials and technologies; whether this would involve a
lowering of standards (sometimes it may not) would be
secondary.
Emphasis on using indigenous resources also appeals to the
nationalist sentiment, which otherwise may oppose the
negative connotations of a possible lowering of standards.
Such factors as self-esteem, be it national or individual,
cannot be dismissed especially in relation to construction
projects. The visibility of such projects makes those
associated with them very sensitive to the image the
projects convey.
The issue of standards is important, as we shall discuss; so
are the issues of capital- versus labour-intensive, the
formal and informal sector, and so on, but these may not be
the overriding issues in the relation between technology and -
shelter, settlement, and development. Instead, how well we
develop and apply our indigenous resources and how soon we
can do without import-intensive ones may be the central
concern.
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For our purposes therefore, the most objective, measurable,
and directly relevant distinction is the extent to which the
practice - whether of construction or materials production -
involves indigenous or import-intensive inputs.
As we shall see, this distinction directly determines the
magnitude of local employment, incomes, and community
participation possible in a given technology. It also mainly
governs cost, especially in the construction sector where
the transport of bulRy materials can add so much to cost.
Not all construction practices adopting indigenous methods
are necessarily cost-efficient, however. In this study
examples of imported materials, such as steel becoming
cheaper than timber, are discussed as are the issues of
subsidies, proximity to ports, etc., that affect cost-
efficiency.
A more fundamental value of the term indigenous is that it
can incorporate flexibility, trandition, and change without
associations about the direction such a change should take.
It only requires that the change draw largely on the
indigenous resources - cultural, physical, economic, etc.,
of the area and the people experiencing it. It also has a
conscious bias for the source of inspiration to change to be
indigenous. For example, the indigenous agri-waste kiln
technology discussed in this study is in fact "imported"
from a neighbouring province. It is, however, a technology
that is "internalised." That is, it depends on inputs
already available in Sahiwal district, our case area; hence
it qualifies.
In principle, the indigenous and import-intensive dichotomy
could likewise account for changes over time. A specific
skill or machinery previously imported could, through
training and the promotion of the requisite industry, become
"internalised," that is, be produced locally using local
inputs and thus become an indigenous input. But determining
whether such a process would take place or not for any
construction or production process that at the time of
analysis is largely import-intensive, is a complex and
contentious task. In our quantitative analysis, we have
taken a rather static approach to this question and hence
have not resolved it satisfactorily.
Another limitation of the distinction is in applications to
largely single-resource economies like the oil-rich but
desert countries of the Middle East. In such cases, the
single resource has to buy imported inputs, including those
of construction, to meet the diverse needs of the
population. On the other hand, it may be that the message to
such economies is that the single resource should be applied
to developing, as far as possible, others within the country
so that imports are reduced. As oil prices plummet, the
latter lesson gains credibility. Our treatment of the
indigenous and import-intensive distinction, does not take
this issue into account. Apart from these reservations, the
indigenous and import-intensive distinction serves well.
Unlike conventional practice, drawing the distinction along
indigenous and import-intensive lines places most large,
domestically-owned construction companies in the
import-intensive sector, if most of the inputs they use are
imported. As for their effects on the country - relative to
local employment and incomes, for example, such
domestically-owned companies may not differ much from those
of foreign-owned firms. The definition thus extends beyond
simple ownership to critical questions of resource use and
distribution of resulting income flows.
Not least, the distinctions of indigenous versus
import-intensive are probably the most relevant in this
decade when the foreign debt burdens of many Third World
countries threaten to cripple development, and foreign
exchange becomes the scarcest of commodities. The
development of local resources and self-reliance (not to be
confused with isolation and self-sufficiency), again becomes
an important issue.
3. Outline of the Study
In sum, the study demonstrates that the adoption of
indigenous technologies in construction and materials
production projects can result in substantial benefits.
These include large savings in construction costs, creation
of jobs and incomes, and the strengthening of participation
and local institutions. Factors that promote import-
intensive technologies include upper-income demand, heavy
public investment in large-scale infrastructure, the
modernity image of import-intensive construction, the
characteristics of construction agencies, and a deeply
rooted and widespread belief in these technologies' greater
efficiency relative to the indigenous alternatives.
A programme to develop the indigenous technologies needs to
break away from the channels conventionally emphasised in
the construction field. That is, at least for, the programme
should focus on the social service sector 5 instead of
the physical infrastructure sector, on small towns and rural
areas instead of big cities, and on local government instead
of centralised construction agencies. Specif ic incentives
will have to be designed into the programme to encourage the
selection and development of such technologies. Once thus
5. In Pakistan, the social service sector includes health,
education, social welfare, culture and tourism. The physical
infrastructure sector includes water and power, transport
and communications, and physical planning and housing.
established and improved in use, such technologies with
modifications may be introduced for the low-income in the
larger cities.
In chapter 2 we discuss the problem of defining and
analysing appropriateness in technologies. Each development
paradigm - the marKet, reform, and power structure - has its
own set of criteria to do so; these criteria often compete.
Similarly, competing objectives and criteria contend in the
"real world" - from the level of national policies down to
individuals making choices.
The lack of a methodology to evaluate alternative
technologies against an adequate range of criteria,
especially for small-scale, informal activities typical of
construction and materials production makes it more
difficult to objectively assess alternative technologies.
Development of appropriate technology has met with limited
success because efforts have neither taken such competition
fully into account nor evaluated the technologies with
sufficient rigour.
A methodology to undertake such assessments - a "technology
evaluation model" - is developed here. This simple computer
model is based on cash-flow and cost-benefit techniques and
is designed to be understood and applied with relative ease.
It compares the performance of construction and materials
production technologies against a range of equity and
efficiency criteria. These criteria include cost-
effectiveness in construction and maintenance, productivity,
employment and income effects, the latter measured spatially
and by social and income groups.
Approximately 100 case studies and interviews provide the
quantitative and qualitative information on which this study
is based. The case studies and interviews cover the major
construction and materials production methods and
include range of views: from top government officials to
sun-brick makers.
In chapter 3 we examine the forces at the national level -
the implicit technology policies - in Pakistan that have
favoured import-intensive technologies. We then discuss
recent trends that can be co-opted in support of the
indigenous alternative. The spread of import-intensive
technologies has been stimulated by upper-income demand,
public investment in large-scale infrastructure construction
and its supporting import-intensive materials industries.
Import-substitution policies such as low interest loans to
finance capital investments further reinforce the selection
of import-intensive technologies.
Recent shifts in budget allocations to the social sectors
and, through these sectors, to construction in the rural
areas, combined with a renewed emphasis on rural local
government are channels for promoting indigenous
construction technologies.
In chapter 4 we compare the performance of indigenous and
import-intensive technologies relative to: a range of equity
and efficiency criteria; who gains and who loses from
alternative choices made, and whether the choice of
technology affects the objectives of promoting participation
and strengthening local institutions.
Sahiwal District (area: 3,500 square miles, 1980
population: 2.8 million) is the case-study area from which
examples of construction and materials production processes
are analysed. The construction technologies 'analysed in
detail are the indigenous sun-brick walls and timber roofs
compared to the import-intensive fired brick walls and
reinforced concrete roofs. The production technologies are
for brick kilns: the indigenous wall type agri-waste fired
Kiln compared to the import-intensive trench type, coal and
oil fired Kiln. Each set of alternative indigenous and
import-intensive technologies is typical of those adopted by
the lower-income groups, on the one hand, and by the
government (or the upper-income), on the other. The choices
do not suggest that one or the other specific type should be
adopted, rather they show in general the implications of
shifting from indigenous to import-intensive technologies.
The indigenous technologies can be both more equitable and
efficient than their import-intensive alternatives. For
example, the indigenous technology construction technology
costs Rs 18 per square foot compared to Rs 85 per square
foot for the import-intensive alternative. Even when the
more frequent maintenance of the indigenous construction
technology is costed, the indigenous technology,
undiscounted, is still sixty percent cheaper than its
import-intensive alternative. Agri-waste fired kilns offer
profit margins of about Rs 15 per Rs 100 worth of output
compared to only Rs 3 for the coal and oil fired kilns.
About half of the construction investment in projects using
import-intensive technologies are leaked out of the
district. In contrast, ninety-seven percent of the
investment in projects using the indigenous alternative
remain within the district to stimulate jobs and incomes.
While the low-income groups are the biggest losers, the
rural elite and the local govennment also lose from this
shift to import-intensive technologies through foregone
business opportunities and taxes
An analysis of price trends shows that prices increases of
inputs for import-intensive technologies are steeper than
they are for indigenous ones. Thus the above findings should
hold to an even greater extent at least into the near
future.
The technology comparisons vis-a-vis participation are set
within a discussion of the definitions and objectives of
participation ranging from community contributions that
transfer costs from the government to the community to
devolution of greater powers to local authorities. Projects
using indigenous technologies lower costs for both the
government and the local community while permitting the
community greater control over implementation. Such projects
also offer more opportunities for upgrading skills in the
technology and management of local level schemes.
Furthermore, local organistions can be established around
such functions as the annual- maintenance required in
indigenous technologies.
Chapter 5 addresses the question why, despite the above
benefits of indigenous technologies, import-intensive
alternatives are still preferred. The answer lies partly in
the national level income and policy conditions already
discussed in Chapter 3. In this chapter we note that
seemingly desirable characteristics of indigenous
technologies are either irrelevant or undesirable in the
large cities, to the upper-income, and to the centralised
construction agencies. Given that these spatial
environments, income groups, and agencies strongly influence
decision making, it is not surprising that import-intensive
technologies replace indigenous ones.
For example, spreading costs in annual maintenance such that
initial and overall construction costs are reduced may be
cost-effective (and appealing) to the low-income, but the
resulting recurring maintenance is an unacceptable
inconvenience to the upper-income. The competitive advantage
rural materials have in the small towns and rural areas is
lost in the large cities where cement and steel are readily
available. Increasing service coverage, local employment and
incomes may bring credit to local government institutions
and locally elected bodies, but the same benefits do not
appeal to the construction agencies whose functions are
limited to building. Finally, kiln entrepreneurs will be
reluctant to move to agri-waste Kilns so long as the
government, a major buyer, considers the bricks substandard
and will not buy them.
The above analyses from Chapters 3 to 5 suggest a policy
focus contrary to that conventionally proposed to promote
indigenous technologies and the indigenous construction
sector. Our efforts should focus, at least initially, on the
small towns and the rural areas rather than the large
cities, use the surprisingly large construction budget of
the social sector rather than that of the physical
infrastructure sector, and let the local government be the
major decision-making and implementing agency rather than
the centralised construction agencies.
In the final chapter 8 we reconfirm the appropriateness of
channelling the promotion of indigenous technologies through
the local government system and tapping the construction
budget in the small towns and rural areas. Such an
environment is more conducive to fostering such technologies
because it can be demonstrated that adopting these
technologies would promote the objectives of the local
government system and those of developing the rural areas.
It would also benefit the rural elite whose support would be
critical in any program to develop these technologies. The
increased demand resulting from government purchases would
do to more increase profit margins in the indigenous
production sector (and thus attract more entrepreneurs to
adopt the technology of these sectors) than other more
conventional (and costly) measures such as subsidising loans
and lowering taxes.
The chapter outlines specific measures to encourage the
selection and development of these technologies. These
measures include giving the local authorities the right to
choose construction standards. (but from a range of
specifications set by the central authorities to insure some
quality control), providing information on trade-offs
between alternative choices, and sharing the rewards such as
construction savings from -. selecting cheaper alternatives.
These rewards, whether money or credit for achievement,
should be shared among the central, local authorities, and
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communities so that tangible benefits are incentives to make
such choices.
The study ends with some "do's and don'ts" that a program
for the development of indigenous technologies should heed
and hints at some of the more .detailed problems that such a
program will have to face.
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CHAPTER TWO
DEPINING AND ANALYSING APPROPRIATENESS
Discussions on appropriate technology usually begin with
attempts to define it. Each definition emerges from some
implicit view of what constitutes development and how best
to achieve it.
Thus, Morawetz (1974) states that an appropriate technology
is one which maximises social welfare if factor prices are
shadow priced, implying that free market conditions would
result in appropriate technologties. To Schumacher (1975),
appropriate technology must be cheap enough for the rural
poor and, therefore, presupposes a society that places
sufficient value on the rural poor. And to Dickson (1975),
appropriate technology should instead be called *utopian
technology" since it requires a change in the power
structure before the technology can be practiced.
It is therefore useful to make explicit at the outset some
of the main positions underlying the various definitions.
The framework presented below attempts to do so. It suggests
how the particular position a theorist, practitioner, or
country favours can determine which development objectives
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gets priority. These objectives in turn set the criteria for
the technologies most appropriate to serve these objectives
and are employed to justify their promotion. Finally, the
discussion illustrates that although the approaches vary and
often conflict with one another, within their assumptions,
they appear perfectly - logical and correct in their
reasoning. Later we shall see how a similar analysis of
karticular agencies and even of individuals will clarify why
they choose certain technologies over others.
1. Development Paradigms and their "Appropriate"
Technologies (Table 1)
Three development paradigms are chosen. Each emphasises a
different determinant of development - the market, reform,
and power structure - and, consequently, technology; hence
the same terms are used to label each paradigm.
1.1 Market Forces: The *3fficiency" Approach
Exponents of market forces assume that overcoming scarcities
is the primary problem of development. They therefore
emphasise growth in the output of goods and services. Growth
occurs through capital accumulation, which results largely
from the savings and investment of upper-income groups.
Capital-intensive technologies that exploit economies of
scale and agglomeration (hence based in large urban centers)
are most efficient in using scarce resources to create
output. The expansion of capital creates work opportunities.
Therefore present consumption and employment may have to be
sacrificed for greater future consumption and employment
while investment is used in capital formation (Sen, 1970).
The industrialised countries through aid can make up the
savings gap and with multinational corporations can
transfer the most modern technologies to the Third World.
Such technologies, innovations, and development will spread
from the urban centers down to the rural areas (Hirschman,
1958). This implies that most of the required appropriate
technology already exists. It is largely a matter of
channelling it to the Third World countries.
Countries should produce those commodities in which they
have a comparative advantage. The export of such commodities
provides the foreign exchange to import those that other
countries can produce more cheaply. .
Technology analysis centers on the substitution between
capital and labour formalised in the two input-one output
production function (Kindleberger, 1977). Technical advance
occurs when fewer inputs can produce the same output, that
is, when capital or labour productivity or both are
enhanced.
An appropriate technology is therefore one with the most
productive (that is, output maximising) mix of capital and
labour. This results from the free flow of capital and
labour in r.esponse to prices and wages in an open market
(Solow, 1956). The appropriate technologies already exist.
What is required are the free market conditions to ensure
the technologies will be selected (Singer, 1982:6).
Conversely, inappropriate technologies result from
restricting the market and distorting prices through
policies such as taxes, subsidies, trade quotas,
preferential credits, wage and price controls, and
overvalued foreign exchange rates (Ranis, 1971; 1979).
1.2 Reform: The "Equity" Approach
Reformista emphasise more equal distribution of goods and
services. They argue that, in Third World countries where
capital is scarce and labour plentiful, people, at least
potentially, are the main productive resource. "Potentially"
because for some, underconsumption of basic needs and lack
of gainful employment retard their abilities and motivation.
Hence, the most effective and just route to development
is first to ensure that people can obtain their basic needs
- food, health care, education and shelter - and
income-generating employment. The former enhances people's
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motivation and productive capacity; the latter allows them
to use it. In doing so, they contribute to development and,
by their earned income, strengthen their effective demand
for basic needs and goods and services over and above basic
needs. Expanded domestic demand stimulates more production,
initiating a cycle of sustainable development.
"The application of labour-intensive technology and the
improvement of basic infrastructure will at the same
time promote the creation of effective demand (Stohr
and Taylor, 1981:65)."
When wealth and power are unequally distributed in society,
concentrating development in sectors already advanced
results in disparities increasing through "cumulative
causation" rather than decreasing through "spread effects
(Hyrdal, 1957)." Therefore, at least initially, efficiency
and productivity may have to be secondary to equity so that
a sustainable development can - be built up on an able,
willing, and earning population.
Appropriate technologies are therefore labour-intensive so
that investment in them can be channelled to the
lower-income workers. Such technologies primarily produce
basic needs and capital goods for the low-income domestic
market. The technologies and capital goods are small-scale,
affordable and manageable by low-income persons. Their
production should be encouraged for the informal, especially
rural sector where most of the population reside and where
most of the natural resources for such production is
available (Schumacher, 1975).
Inappropriate technologies in a zmarket system result from
the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Their effective
demand dominates the market and promotes technologies
serving their consumption, tastes, and profits. Appropriate
technologies are left undeveloped or fall into disuse.
Income distribution policies, along with import controls,
taxes, tariffs and subsidies, credit, technical assistance,
education and research and development on appropriate
technologies, should be used to correct this market bias and
promote basic needs and labour-intensive technologies (ILO,
1975; Singer, 1982).
1.3 The Power Structure: Self-Reliance/Dependency Approach
The power structure' line of thought may agree with the
reformists' prescriptions, but. it stresses that these
prescriptions cannot be effectively introduced till the
elite and unrepresentative power structures are removed
through political change.
This viewpoint draws on theories of imperialism and
dependency to argue that underdevelopment is the result of
the industrialised, primarily capitalist and western (core)
countries' domination of the les developed (periphery)
nations. This came about during colonial times through
direct conquest and rule. Now domination continues through
indirect economic, military, and cultural control exercised
in partnership with the local, unrepresentative elite who
are sustained in power by such ties.
During this period, there has b n a net siphoning of
resources - human, natural, and financial - from the
periphery to the core, stunting development and, sometimes,
underdeveloping the periphery. The deficient development of
appropriate and indigenous technologies is part of the same
phenomenon.
As Frank states:
"The industrialised countries have always suppressed
the indigenous technologies in the underdeveloped
countries...same is true on the national and local
level - the domestic metropolis promotes the
technology in its hinterland that serves its interests
and supresses the pre-existing ... artisan technology
that interferes with the use of the countryside's
productive buying capacity and capital for
metropolitan development (Frank, 1971:33).*
Core-periphery relationships are replicated within the
Third World countries: between urban and rural areas and
between less and more advanced regions. At each level, the
elites control decision making and resources and thus
promote technologies serving their interests, consumption,
tastes, and profits. Given these. conditions, aid, trade and
technology transfer from the core to the periphery are all
instruments to further exploitation, increase inequities,
and suppress appropriate technologies.
The most important characteristic of an appropriate
technology in this paradigm is that it enhances the self-
reliance of the poorer population groups and helps them
sever ties of dependency on the elites at each level, from
village to metropolis. A more representative leadership must
emerge to implement policies such as income distribution and
technical assistance in support of technologies producing
for majority needs.
At the national level, Third World countries should also
strive for self-reliance in collaboration with other Third
World countries to strengthen their collective bargaining
position relative to the industrialised countries (Amin,
1977).
To illustrate how such paradigms relate to a specific
approach on appropriate technology let us take the case
of the appropriate technology movement.
1.4 The Appropriate Technology Movement: Is Small
Beautiful?
Schumacher is a useful illustration not only because his
ideas are pervasive in the appropriate technology movement,
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but also because he seems to draw together the ideas of
others previously discussed to show a basic similarity in
their approaches to development. Above all, by examining the
shortcomings of the appropriate technology movement, we can
articulate the framework and methodology applied in this
thesis.
Schumacher's ideas can be summarised as follows.
Development does not start with goods, it starts with
people. Lack of capital and infrastructure are secondary
as causes of poverty to such things as lack of
education.
He argues that the "natural drift of things" concentrates
development in a few metropolitan areas of the modern
sector. This encourages migration at a rate faster than the
modern sector could absorb, thus creating mass unemployment.
Development should be channeled into the rural areas, where
the majority lives, and focussed on the district. Each
district would have an "inner cohesion and identity" and at
least one town as the district centre.
Workplaces would be created here that were cheap enough to
be replicable - in large enough quantities, simple enough so
that rural people could own, manage and work in them, and
use local materials to produce for local use (Schumacher,
1975:167-68; 173-77).
An "intermediate technology" is required, one "immensely
more productive than the indigenous technology" yet
"immensely cheaper than the sophisticated, highly capital -
intensive technology of modern industry - a $100 technology
between the $1 indigenous and $1000 modern technology
(Schumacher, 1975:180)."
The similarities of Schumacher's position with those of
others mentioned above are clear. With Myrdal (and others),
he sees "cumulative causation" increasing inequities, and
does not share the neo-classical faith in the eventual
"trickle down" of benefits or Hirschman's "spread" effects.
Like the advocates of the "informal sector," he urges
employment aimed at this sec-tor. Unlike them and in
agreement with the advocates of small town and rural
development, he emphasises rural areas and particularly the
rural district. The "inner cohesion and identity" he would
strive for within the district are similar to the
"functional integration" or "local economic circuits"
emphasised under various names by Rondinelli and Ruddle,
Friedmann, Stohr and Todtling, Santos and others. An
important manifestation are the rural industries with
forward and backward linkages within the district, those
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that Stohr and Todtling would ipurture with their "selective
spatial enclosure" policies (Stohr and Todtling, 1976).
The intermediate-type technologies are singled out as the
ones appropriate for such development (for example, see
stratifications of technology type corresponding to rural
settlement size in Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1978:105-7).
And for rural housers, it is almost self-evident that "local
materials for local use" makes sense (United Nations, 1978;
Soysa, 1979).
By the late seventies, the intermediate technology approach
was well-established in the academic and professional
fields. Kindelberger (1977) argues its appropriateness in
his basic textbook on economic development. Many development
organisations in Third World countries and international
bodies (the World Bank, United Nations and USAID, for
example) had studies and projects in its support. And' the
interest continues into the eighties (for a more detailed
discussion of how construction technology has been treated
in the regional development and housing literature, see
appendix A).
In writing Technologies and Basic Needs, Singer's point
of reference is intermediate technology, which he refers to
as "a reasonable balance between labour-intensive and
35
capital-intensive techniques to vachieve growth, employment
and basic needs (Singer, 1982:vi).9 In addition, a number of
studies, particularly on "appropriate" construction and
building materials have been done (see for example, UNIDO
1980; International Council for Building Research and
Studies and Documentation, 1983).
1.5 Problems with Appropriate Technology: How to Address
Conflicting Objectives, Criteria and Interests?
Reservations have been raised about intermediate technology.
As may be expected, those emphasising market forces accuse
intermediate technology advocates of ignoring these forces.
Equally predictable, those of the political left consider it
"utopian" until a power structure is in place to implement
it at a significant scale.
As we have seen, such objections can be argued either way
depending on the perspective adopted. A more concrete
problem is that, at any point in time and at any given
location, some combination or all three of the apparently
distinct realities reflected in these development paradigms
may be in operation. Therefore, a whole range of often
conflicting, competing objectives and interests (and hence
criteria of appropriateness) may- exist and actively vie for
dominance.
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Given that this is usually the case, it is critical to
analyse and prescribe fully aware. of how any proposal may be
perceived by and affect all ,those involved, how such
proposals stand up to criteria quite different from that of
the proponent, and not least, how others affected may
influence the success or failure of what is proposed.
The appropriate technology movement in its practice if not
its theory has been unable to transcend its own particular
world-view and deal with the complex reality discussed
above. Committed to the poor, the rural, the local and the
small-scale, they have been unable to devise technologies
and strategies that take account of factors which may
contradict their effort - local, national or international,
technical, social or especially in the political economy.
Thus achievements have been isolated events: a study showing
the feasibility of a specific production process or a small
experimental project never replicated at a scale significant
enough to make a difference.
Thus Haque dismisses the "market forces approach":
"The basic thesis of the continued exploitation of the
'peripheral' areas by the 'metropolitan' core ... is
now scarcely disputed. The %technocratic' approach
[emphasising) technological modernisation, managerial
efficiency, and growth is now in disrepute. The debate
is seen to be between the reformists and the
radical(s) (Haque, 1977:12)."
Yet he later concedes that the few experimental projects
based on a local level, self-reliant, and appropriate
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technology approach need "external forces to sustain" them
and especially national government support. The support is
often not forthcoming because national governments still
subscribe to the views he dismisses and market forces still
operate against, at least in part, what he proposes.
These problems are faced by all those who attempt to counter
the "natural drift of things" - those who work on
small-scale, informal activities, on developing small towns
and rural areas, or on providing adequate housing for the
poor, particularly the rural poor.
In Eckaus' words,
"..what can be done when the goals of development and
criteria for decisions about appropriate technology are
inconsistent and competing?: That is a complexity of
reality that cannot be escaped and for which there is
no resolution... An essentially political decision is
required in determining the extent to which one goal
will be pursued at the sacrifice of others (Eckaus,
1977:51)."
The conflicting paradigms of academics in disagreement and
the "inconsistent and competing criteria" observed by Eckaus
reflect the reality surrounding technology selection down to
the field.
Here too, each interest group emphasises the criteria that
suits it best. The low-cost housing architect argues for
lower housing standards to reduce construction costs;
government engineers claim lower maintenance make higher
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standards cheaper in the long-run. District officials push
measures for jobs in their areas; national planners caution
that such measures may adversely affect nationwide
employment. The entrepreneur looks to his profits; the
project analyst, to economic costs. The contractor favours
cement plaster; the teacher complains it crumbles and that,
unlike mud plaster, the pupils cannot help repair it. The
welfare economist emphasises income-distributing
technologies; the growth economist argues such measures
reduce national savings. And the local politician is unsure
whether his popularity rests better on the prestige of a few
expensively constructed schools or on that of many cheap
ones.
Sometimes the same terms mask different criteria. For the
conventional economist capital productivity is its
effectiveness in creating output. For some
employment-oriented government officials, it is
effectiveness in creating jobs. And for the materials
entrepreneur, it is irrelevant. Capital is too small a
proportion of his costs; total expenditures, mainly
materials and labour, concern him.
Thus underscored is the need for an analytical method that
can take into account such conflicting views and criteria.
Such a method would reveal the trade-offs between the
criteria and hence who is gaining or losing from specific
choices. From such an analysis we can be better informed on
what governs choice of technology, and what are "appropriate"
choices to make given our objectives. Not least such a
method helps us anticipate who will support and who will
opposed what is proposed. At present such a method does not
exist, especially for the small-scale construction field.
The foregoing problems translate into three operational
questions. First, how do we define -appropriateness (and
therefore design or promote such technologies) in a complex
world where many, often conflicting criteria, vie for
attention? Second, how do we test for appropriateness when
so far the methodological 'tools available are themselves
mainly appropriate for one type of relatively large-scale
and regularised activity? Third, can we promote policies to
support technologies that are contrary to national
objectives or prevailing interests?
In the next section we shall discuss the first two
questions, leaving the third for our case example of
Pakistan.
2. Analysing Small-scale Construction and Production
Processes: The Need for a Methodology
Most construction and materials production take place at a
small scale, often in the informal sector. In this sector,
however, there are very few empirical analyses of
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technologies that are of adequate rigour in their treatment
of the criteria to be considered and that use a method
simple and flexible enough to be widely applied.
Informal sector studies, including technology analysis tend
to be qualitative. Low-cost housing and materials industry
studies limit themselves to technical feasibility and
comparisons of cost minimisation. They rarely deal with
economic analysis or social issues and income distribution.
Economic analysis of construction technologies tend to focus
on capital-labour substitutions whose limitations we
discussed earlier.
Quantitative, economic studies to complement qualitative
analysis are essential if we are to test the conflicting
claims regarding the performance of small-scale, informal
sector technologies relative to their more modern
counterparts. Eckaus' 1977 survey of proposed "intermediate
technologies" found that virtually none had been subjected
to cost-benefit analysis (Eckaus, 1977). And in 1984, the
International Labour Organisation, a leading exponent of
informal sector technologies, admitted that economic studies
of such enterprises, was still the task ahead (ILO, 1984).
The problem is partly methodological. Quantitative and
economic analysis have been traditionally concerned with the
macro scale - spatially and organisationally. Techniques
have been too complex to be relevant to the technical
capacity of small-scale activities. Furthermore, as
mentioned, the capital-labour focus is too limiting (for a
fuller discussion on the methodological limitations of
studies on construction technology in the regional
development and housing fields, see appendix A).
2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis: Uses and Limitations
Among the existing techniques, cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
comes closest to being satisfactory for evaluating
construction technologies. It is the method urged by most
economists. Its extended version, not acceptable to all
analysts, attempts to add social criteria to the financial
and economic. Together these three aspects along with the
demand to capture and weigh all costs and benefits imposes a
rigour in analysis missing in other methods.
Although we draw on this technique, we find that its
conventional form has four main problems.
First, the complexity of its data requirements and
analytical procedure severely limits its application given
the technical skills typically available at the local level
in most Third World countries. Its use is largely limited to
international aid agencies, national planning ministries,
and large-scale projects.
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Second, the same complexity masks many variables, often
assumptions that may be incorrect, changed over time, or
arbitrarily arrived at in order to get a desired result.
Such variables as shadow prices or distributional weights
can critically alter the performance rating of the
technology. Yet they are so imbedded in the analytical
procedure that they are not easily detected.
Third, in attempts to simplify decision making, a single
number - rate of return, net present value - is sought as a
measure of project worth. Such simplification, coming at the
end of a complex procedure, further conceals potential
trade-offs among conflicting objectives and the distribution
of costs and benefits among the .various groups involved. The
decision maker chooses on the basis of that single number
which too often reflects the objectives and interests of the
more influential.
Fourth, complex enough as it is, CBA nevertheless treats
assessments important to local planning, such as the spatial
or income group distribution of; benefits and costs either
very summarily or not at all, leaving a more precise
assessment to other equally complex evaluation methods.
Finally, true to its neo-classical roots, CBA tilts choices
in directions not always acceptable to governments and
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analysts of other persuasions. Shadow pricing is essentially
an attempt to approximate open market conditions.
Accordingly, a product cheaper to import should not be
produced locally. CBA's-. emphasis on border prices and
foreign exchange adjustments signals its bias for open
market conditions. It also assumes that its spatial unit is
the country relative to the rest of the world. Consequently,
often ignored in CBA are criteria such as self-reliance and
how a local area fares compared to the rest of the country.
Given the above, it is not surprising that so few cost
benefit analyses have been done of small-scale technologies
and projects at the local level.
Thus, Schumacher commenting on. cost-benefit analysis notes
that it can never lead to an enlightened decision, (only)
self deception and the deception of others:
".. to undertake to measure the immeasurable is absurd
and constitutes but an elaborate method of moving from
preconcieved notions to foregone conclusions; all one
has to do to obtain the desired results is to impute
suitable values to the immeasurable costs and benefits(Schumacher, 1973:46)."
Strout, partly in agreement, is not quite as dismissive:
"Sophisticated project analysis appears to have failed
to provide relatively simple, bias explicit, and
tamperproof measures which allow upper echelon decision
makers to judge among competing projects. The next step
may be to worry less about extending the boundary of
things measurable and to worry more about restoring a
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degree of understandability and perhaps integrity to
the final analytical product (Strout, 1977:2)."
The methodology presented below is a preliminary attempt to
take this next step.
2.2 The Technology Evaluation Model
The quantitative methodology developed here draws on
costing, cash flow analysis (CFA), and CBA techniques. These
techniqueq are modifed and combined in two simple computer
models, a construction and production model, designed to be
applicable to small-scale building construction and
materials production technologies respectively. 1  (see
Tables 2 and 3 for Flow Charts of construction and
production models).
The costing techniques are applied in the the first steps of
the technology model. These steps provide a cost analysis
for building construction and maintenance, and a
profits-income-expenditure analysis for. materials production
and supply. These steps also measure basic criteria such as
1. The model is constructed on the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
program. In brief, the model consists of matrices consisting
of (1) arithmetic relationships, expressed as formulas,
between (2) basic values such as materials and labour
quantities and costs, (inputs) and (3) the information on
which decisions are made such as total building costs,
profits, income distribution, etc. (outputs). Once such a
model is constructed, any changes to the inputs will result
in immediate recalculation of all related outputs.
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capital and labour productivity and the employment effects
of the technologies.
The CFA captures the income flows (in financial, i.e.,
market prices) resulting from expenditures in alternative
technology choices. The income flows are broken down as
follows:
(1) by spatial units - between the project area (the
district) and the rest of the country, and between urban
(population > 25,000 ) and rural settlements within the
project area;
(2) by social groups - among upper- and lower-income groups,
and the local government (through taxes received) within the
project area. Upper-income groups include landowners,
materials' retailers, truckers, and proprietors of import-
intensive materials industries. The lower-income groups
include workers, sun-brick and roof-mat makers, and owners
of donkey carts transporting materials.
The CBA takes- into account the financial, economic and
social (income distribution) performance of the alternative
technologies and capital scarcities by applying discount
rates. Unlike the CFA, the social groups for which the
income effects are considered here are the project, the
consumer, the business groups, workers and the central
government (appendix B2 has a full discussion on CBA, the
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underlying concepts, its applications, and effects on
evaluation results).
The models address the above mentioned concerns about the
limitations of conventional technology evaluation methods in
the following ways.
First, sophistication and detail are sacrificed for direct
relevance, procedural clarity, ease of comprehension and
application.
Second, the models integrate into one procedure the major
types of analysis that may be required in comparing
construction and production alternatives. Analysis of:
construction, maintenance and production processes; cash
flows; financial, economic, income distribution, and savings
effects are all drawn together in four linked analytical
steps. Each step can also be applied independently.
Third, values that can critically alter the technologies'
performance rating and are sensitive to change or whose
validity may be questioned are clearly visible and open to
challenge. Likewise clear are the effects of changing these
values on competing criteria, objectives and interest groups
(see Table 4 for the criteria considered and their
associated analysis, and Table 5 for these criteria
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reformulated to reflect potential conflicts and associated
competing interest groups).
Fourth, no attempt is made to give distributional weights to
competing objectives and impute a single value to rate the
alternatives. The decision maker is presented with
unambiguous and explicit tradeoffs from among which he has
to choose.
Finally, the construction and production analyses sections
can be used as planning and management tools. For example,
in the production analysis we can compare whether increasing
the demand for the product or easier credit terms is more
effective in increasing the profitability of the enterprise.
Similarly, an analysis of the maintenance patterns of
alternative construction technologies can indicate whether
centralised or decentralised institutions should be given
responsibility for this task.
The main problems with wider use of the models are:
They assume microcomputers will become as ubiquitous as
calculators, a likely, but not assured event, especially in
the near future.
They deal only with criteria for which quantitative
information can offer useful insights. This includes social
criteria such as income distribution - spatially and by
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social group. However, other important criteria such as the
prestige associated with a modern building or management
training through "learning by doing" are not included.
Nevertheless, while the model is restricted to numerical
analysis, it offers, as we shall see, a rich body of
information lending precision to our analysis of the
economic and, perhaps more so, the social and institutional
influences on technology choice.
The models need further improvement. They were developed for
examples describing building construction and brick firing
production processes. They will need modification for
infrastructure construction and- other production processes.
Preliminary work, extending the production model to analyses
of timber industries, suggests such modifications should not
be difficult.
Finally, the models need to be even further simplified if
they are to be widely applied.
No doubt other shortcomings will arise during - examination
and use of the models, and improvements can certainly be
expected. The models are described and illustrated in detail
in appendix B.
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2.3 The Data Bane
The study is based on 100 cases and interviews as well as on
secondary data. The main building construction and materials
production processes in Pakistan are considered (see Table 6
for a list of the processes considered and appendix C for
their detailed description). - Detailed case-studies cover
such processes as observed during 1982-83 in Sahiwal, a
predominantly rural district.
Sahiwal district (area: 5,925 square kilometers; population:
2.1 million in 1980)) is located in the Punjab Province. It
is centrally located, has good road and rail links to the
rest of the country, and is well connected to sources of
materials used in construction such as cement, steel, and
coal to fire kilns. Thus differences in transport costs
between the materials used in import-intensive technologies
and those of local materials used in indigenous technologies
are less than they would be in other districts in Pakistan.
The district is one of the most developed in the country. In
a recent development ranking of districts, Sahiwal ranked
second relative to the percentage of villages with the least
distance from community facilities and services (Khan and
Iqbal, 1982:228)2.
Thus, the preference for and incidence of import-intensive
- technololgies is higher in this district than it would be in
most other districts. Further, the need for commmunity
facilities, their rate of construction, and the level of
public investment can be expected to be lower in this
district than in others. Inter-district comparisons were,
however, not done to confirm this expectation.
These characteristics of Sahiwal should bias our findings
more in favour of import-intensive technologies than would
be the case if the study were done in many of the other
districts in Pakistan.
Summary cash flow analysis is done for all the main
construction and materials production and processes
practiced in the district (see Tables 6 and 7 in this
chapter, and Tables IVI. to IV5 in appendix BI). Detailed
cash flow and cost-benefit analyses are done for four
technologies, a pair of alternatives each for construction
2. Findings of a study based on selected -twenty-two
indicators for inter-district comparisons. The indicators
were divided into two groups: those that show the
availability of inputs and facilities which affect levels of
production and employment (e.g., irrigation, water supply,
electricity), and those that show the distance from the
village of facilities or services (e.g., paved roads,
railway, primary and secondary schools, dispensary) that may
affect economic well-being and quality of life (Khan and
Iqbal, 1982:218-227).
and materials production. Alternative construction
technologies are the indigenous sun-brick walls with timber
roof compared to the import-intensive fired brick walls with
reinforced concrete (r.c.c.) roofs. Alternative production
technologies relate to brick kilns: the indigenous wall
type, agri-waste fired kiln .compared to the import-
intensive trench type, coal and oil fired one.
Each set of alternative indigenoius and import-intensive
technologies typifies those adopted by the lower-income
groups, on the one hand, and by the government (or the
upper-income), on the other. The choices are not meant to
suggest that one or the other specific type should be
adopted, but rather to compare in general the performance of
indigenous and import-intensive alternatives and to analyse
the implications of shifting from one to the other.
The secondary data analysed include government reports and
private -sector studies.
A range of people involved in and affected by construction
were interviewed. These included high-ranking government
officials, community leaders, engineers of Public Works
departments, contractors, retailers and producers of
building materials, masons, upper- and lower-income house
owners.
The quantitative analysis of the construction technologies
relies on a combination of government engineering
specifications and case studies. The quantitative analysis
of the materials production technologies relies exclusively
on case studies.
3. Summary
In this chapter we discussed the conflicting objectives and
criteria that define appropriate technologies and the
development paradigms that justify each conflicting
approach. We also discussed how different paradigms offer
different explanations for why certain technologies are
chosen over others and what should be done to encourage the
"appropriate" technology.
In our forthcoming analysis of alternative technologies in
Pakistan we shall see that reality does not fit into neat
and exclusive categories. All three paradigms are valid.
Certainly all three forces - the market, reform, and power
structure influence technology choice. Understanding how
these forces operate and their effect on technology choice
offers insights on how certain technologies can be promoted
in place of others.
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS AND THEIR
"APPROPRIATE" TECHNOLOGIES.
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through:
DEVELOPMENT
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MARKET :!Increase output so
-Growth :that current
oriented, !scarcities replaced
based onrneo - '.with abundance for
a classical :everyone.
a economics) aa
REFORMIST ::Share & improve
(Basic Needs, ::goods, services and
Employment 'quality of life for
oriented, ::everyone
influenced by ::
humanist
principles)
POWER :as above
STRUCTURE aa
(Self-Reliance/H
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theory
a oriented,
usinga
political - a
economy
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Capital a
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(capital main
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resource) through
savings & investment:
of upper - income
Developing abilities:
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productive
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access to basic
needs & income -
generating
employment
Decision making
taken by majorities
through political
change
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES
Characteristics : Location
Capital -
intensive,
producing capital
& export goods,
large-scale to
achieve scale
economies
Labour - intensive,
producing wage
goods for domestic
market, small-scale,:
affordable &
manageable by low -
income persons
Usually above, with
empnasis on
national & local
self-reliance
promoting
technologies
DETERMINANTS of an
Inappropriate
Technology Choice
Large urban centers
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agglomeration
economies &
proximity to import
& export
Where majority
reside, usually
rural areas, for
proximity to
resources &
markets, both
local.
as above
Government policies
restricting open
markets/free flow
of production
inputs &
innovations, &
distorting prices
Market dominated by
effective demand of
upper - income,
which promote
technologies
serving their
consumption, tastes
t profits
Local, national &
international
elites control
decisions &
resources,
and promote
technologies
serving their
consumption, tastes
& profits
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TABLE 1
POLICIES to Promote
Appropriate
Technologies
Remove
restrictions;
import controls,
taxes, tariffs L
subsidies, price,
wage controls, etc,
to approximate free
market conditions
Use import
controls, taxes,
tariffs &
subsidies, credit,
technical
assistance,
education & R & D
to correct market
bias
Representative
leadership
implementing income
- distribution plus
above policies with
emphasis on local,
national and
collective (Third
World) self -
reliance
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TABLE 4 ANALYTICAL METHODS AND CRITERIA APPLIED
ANALYTICAL STEPS I!CRITERIA EVALUATED !DESCRIPTION OF CRITERIA
I. Construction .,I) Spatial Efficiency Hnternal Space/Built Area
& Maintenance i
Analysis !,2) Cost Effectiveness 12.1) Space Achieved/Unit Expenditure
N! (Space & Employment I a) Internal Space/Rs.100 (in sf)
A&C.) Initial 1! AchieYed/Rs00 b) Rs/sf of Internal Space (in Rs)
Construction: !! Expenditures) 12.2) Employment Achieved/Unit Expnditure
A. By Construction! I a) Total Employment (Onsitein Man days)
Stage. ! I b) Unskilled Employment
C. By Inputs. 1
13) Labour Productivity han days/ sf of Internal Space Constructed
B.) Maintenance 1I) As above, but over
buildings' life-span Twenty Year Period
H2) Durability versus !Less Frequent versus Easier L Cheaper Maintenance
U maintainability
---------------------------------------------------------------
H. Production !All belowi a) physical output (1000 bricks)
Analysis 11peri I b) output value (Rsl00)
1I) Cost Minimisation Production Cost/Unit Output
U2) Profitability Net Return on Expenditures
I:
113) Capital Productivity :3.1) Capital Investment/ Unit Output
11(Capital Invested 13.2) Capital Investment/Unit Employment
UPer Unit of Output I a) Total Onsite Employment (Mandays)
HEmployment Achieved) b) Unskilled Employment
14) Labour Productivity !Man days per Unit Output
------ -------SI-----------------------------------------------------------
1lI.A. Cash-Flow HIncome recieved through !Distribution Per RsO00 Expenditures
Analysis HDistribution of II) Spatially a) Within & Outside District
NConstruction Expenditures !b) Within District: between Urban & Rural
12) By Income Group (within district):
1 : Among Upper & Lover Income, & local Government
S--------------------------------------------ft--------------------------------
1.B. Cost-Benefit HCost-Benefits in Present Values:Costs & Benefits (Income Distribution)
Analysis .Discounted at: Discounted over Project Life
(Financial, ) Financial (Market) Prices I) Project Costs borne, & Income received by
Economic & U !Owner (house owner or materials' entrepreuner)
Social Analysis) IH
"2) Economic (shadow) Prices 12) Project Costs borne, & Income recieved by,
S Society: le Income Gains & Losses among;
Hto also give: i)Project Owner ii)Consumer iii) Business
- 13) Incomse Distribution (materials' suppliers) iv) Worker vY Central Government1
-I1. Savings Net Savings from:
!AB. Analysis !A) Income Distributed :1) Income Distributed I Savings Propensities(using results of of Income Groups.
Cash-Flov & UB) Income Distributed ! 2) Net Effect after Construction Costs SavingsCost-Benefit :1 Construction Costs. or Losses also accounted for.
Analysis) 11 1
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TABLE 5 CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES, CRITERIA AND
INTEREST GROUPS
POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING:
OBJECTIVES ::CRITERIA INTEREST GROUPS
I Short Term versus
Long Term Costs
2 Durability versus
Maintainability
3 Private versus
Social Profit
4 Output versus
Employment
5 Income Distribution
versus Growth
6 Prestige versus
Low Cost
7 Illicit Income
versus Low Cost
:!Initial high construction costs
Hvs initial low construction but
||high maintenance costs
1:
:Less frequent, but skilued
:maintenance vs more frequent
|'but umkile aidnenmance.
:Individuals costs (at market
prices) versus actual costs to
:'society (at shadow prices)
::Capital Productivity (or sinising
!|expenditures) per unit output
:versus per unit employ sent
I ,
!Labour productivity (or sinising
|labour) per unit output versus
:employment creation
i i
:Income Distribution versus
:Savings & Investment'
:Income Distribution:
!a) Outside versus within district
I I
::b) In Urban versus rural areas
:c) Among Upper versus lower income
1versus government
::Increases with large scale,
::durability & modernity of project
Hlncreases with large scale of
::project, scarcity & regulated
:!supply of inputs
:Upper income &
:government agencies
versus lower income
|groups
:Project (ie house owner or
materials' entrepreuner),
:consumer, business ( materials'
:supplier) worker, & government.
:Growth oriented versus
:employment oriented planner.
House owner or materials'
entrepreuner versus worker.
:Growth oriented versus
:employment oriented
planner
:District versus rest of
the country
:Urban versus rural
:workers & materials'
:suppliers
:As left
Usually upper income groups,
|officials, & politicians.
!---------------------------------------------------------------I
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TABLE 6 CONSTRUCTION INPUTS AND COEFFICIENTS
DISTRIBUTION ====> I!External District IWithin District
4/ Il [Urban Rural lIncome
INPUTS Into:
d Il I g I i j
1 1.00 MATERIALS PRODUCTION I
ar0 .0 0 0
Water. 11 0.00 100.00 i 0.00 100.00
dClay. II 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
i Wood Fuel. 1: 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
Agricultural Waste 11 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
Coal. 1! 100.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
I Furnace Oil. 3/ II 80.00 20.00 1 19.80 0.20
12.00 CONSTRUCTION
Earth, Clay. II 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
I Straw, Dung, Grass. !1 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
I Sand. 1/ 11 0.00 100.00 ! 74.07 25.37
1 Aggregate. 1/ 11 80.00 20.00 1 19.80 0.20
Bricks il
- Sun-Baked. 2/ II 0.56 99.40 I 14.91 84.53
Agri-Waste Fired. 2/ 11 10.18 89.82 1 24.07 65.75
I Coal, Dil, Wood Fired 2/ i1 56.67 43.33 I 7.43 35.88
I Reed Mats. 2/ 11 29.94 70.54 1 46.71 23.83
1 Timber Beams, Battens. 2/b/1l 1.50 98.51 I 12.48 86.03
I Steel Girders, T Irons. 1/ 11 96.49 3.51 1 3.50 0.01
M ild Steel Rods. 1/ 1 91.33 8.67 1 8.67 0.00
' Cement. 1/ 11 93.62 6.38 1 6.21 0.18
Bitusin. 7/ 11 93.00 7.00 1 1.00 0.00
Polythene. 7/ 1I 93.00 7.00 1 7.00 0.00
13.00 TRANSPORT:aLlocal Firms 1 33.00 66.00 66.00 0.00
I (Trucks) b) Outside Firms 11 100.00 0.00 I 0.00 0.00
14.00 LABOUR li I
1 Highly Skilled. . ! 0.00 100.00 1100.00 0.00
Skilled. 1I 0.00 100.00 1 50.00 50.00
Unskilled. 1! 0.00 100.00 1 0.00 100.00
1 5.00 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION !! I
I Traditional (Indigenous) 2/11 2.04 98.01 1 17.10 81.08
I Intermediate 2/ 11 1
I Modern (Imported) 2/ 11 46.06 53.94 1 32.97 20.97
Local 1
Group 1voyt. I
!Upper Lower
1 100.00 0.00
I 100.00 0.00
i 100.00 0.00
1 100.00 0.00
i 0.00 0.00
1 18.38 1.62
1 50.00 50.00
i 50.00 50.00
1 78.87 21.10
1 18.38 1.62
1 31.88 67.56
1 43.62 46.20
1 15.26 28.07
I 22.32 48.32
1 74.09 24.42
1 3.37 0.14
1 8.43 0.24
1 5.97 0.41
i 4.00 3.00
1 4.00 3.00
33.00 33.00
1 0.00 0.00
i 100.00 0.00
i 0.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
1 29.39 68.75
I 24.75 29.19
1/ Based on summary calculations. Isee relevant figure)
2/ Based on detailed calculations. (see relevant figure)
3/ Based on production I supply figures of aggregate
4/ Inputs'Nithout superscript based on interview estimates
-/6 Coefficients averaged from different sawmill performances depending on ratio of battens to beas sales
Only battens sold 1.98 98.02 3.65 94.37 78.53 19.49 0.64
Only beans sold 1.01 98.99 21.30 77.69 69.64 29.35 0.33
Total 2.99 197.01 24.95 172.06 1 148.17 48.84 1 0.97
AVERAGE APPLIED 1.50 98.51 12.48 86.03 74.09 24.42 0.49
7/ Lahore.Rs28/kilo, Qabula Rs3/kilo.Source: Mohd. Ashraf, gabula merchant
Stocked only in urban shops. Taxed similar to girders. Labour handling included in Rs2/profits
8/ Following equipment not calculated: From outside the district; Power generator (diesel 59
electric), rotary band saw. From within district; hand tools, formwork.
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TABLE 7 BUILDING TECHNOLOGY TYPES:
SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS
WALL IFLOOR |FINISH
EXISTING TECHNOLOGY
A. Indigenous
Sun-baked brick in Timber beams, battens, Floor: packed earth, mud plaster & dung
mud-mortar. (13&1/2' :reed mats, grass and finish. Walls: mud plaster, dung
wall) Arched lintels learth fill. :finish. Roof: mud plaster, dung finish.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------------1
B. Intermediate
1. Fired brick facing
on sun-baked brick vall
(Ghilafi) in mud mortar
(13 1/2' vall). Arched
lintels.
'Timber beams, battens,
!fired brick, (clay)
itiles, earth fill.
!Floor: packed earth, mud plaster or
!brick paving. Walls: interior mud
qplaster & dung finish. Roof: interior
!mud plaster & dung finish.
2. Fired brick in mud :Steel girder, T-iron :Floor: packed earth, mud plaster or
mortar (9 1/2' wall). !battens, clay tiles, !brick paying. Walls:cement plaster or
Reinforced brick (RB). !earth fill. :pointing on exterior, cement plaster on
Flat lintels. |1Iinterior. Roof: mud plaster & dung finish:
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------------:
C. Imported
1. Fired brick in mud
mortar (9 1/2' wall) w/
or w/o damp proof course
(DPC). Reinforced brick
(RB) flat lintels.
2. Fired brick in cement
mortar w/ DPC (9 1/2'
wall). RB flat lintels.
3. Fired brick in cement
mortar w/DPC (9 1/2'
wall)> Reinforced cement
concrete (RCC) lintels.
4. As above.
Concrete reinforced
brick slab (RBC), w/ or
w/o DPC. Earth fill.
:Steel girder, T-iron
!battens, clay tiles.
:DPC. Earth fill.
,Reinforced cement
'concrete (RCC) slab.
DPC, earth fill, mud
plaster, clay tiles in
cement mortar.
Precast cement concrete
I(PCC), girders & tiles.
DPC, earth fill; mud
:plaster, clay tiles in
cement mortar.
!Floor: packed earth, brick ballast,
!tement plaster. Walls: cement pointing
:or plaster on exterior, cement plaster
!on interior. Roof: mud plaster & dung
Ifinish.
Floor: packed earth, sand, brick
:ballast, concrete, cement plaster.
IWalls: cement pointing or plaster on
lexteriorcement plaster on interior.
!Roof: mud plaster & dung finish.
Floofr: packed earth, sand, brick
ballast, concrete, cement plaster.
Walls: cement plaster or pointing on
:exterior, cement plaster on interior.
Roof: clay tiles.
!As above.
-------------
PROPOSED TECHNOLOGY
A. Indigenous
1. Sun-baked brick in
mud mortar (13 1/2').
Fired brick in lime
mortar at base,
parapets, sills, arched
lintels & encasing beams
DPC.
!Treated timber beams &
!battens, reed mats,
!DPC,earth fill.
1 Floor: packed earth, mud plaster, &
dung finish. Walls: mud plaster & dung
ifinish. Lime pointing on exterior fired
!brick. Roof: mud plaster & dung finish.
2. As above but with 24' !Sun-baked brick vaulted 1
thick wall. !roof, DPC, earth fill. !As above.
B. Intermediate
1. Fired brick facing on
sun-baked brick wall
(Ghilafi) in mud mortar
(13 1/2" thick). Arched
lintels.DPC
ITreated timber beams,
Ibattens & planks. DPC,
learth fill.
Floor: packed earth, sand, brick
!ballast & cement plaster. Walls: lime
Ipointing or plaster on exterior, mud
!plaster & dung finish on interior.
2. As in proposed IFired brick vaulted
technology Al. above but !roof, DPC, earth fill. !Floor: packed earth, tiles in cement
using fired bricks. Or 1m!aortar. Walls & roof: as above.
as in B1. above w/ 24'" 1
thick walls.
C. Imported
1. Fired brick in line
mortar (9 1/2' thick).
!Steel girder, T-iron &
Itile, DPC, earth fill. floor: as in proposed technology Bl.
!above. Walls: lime pointing or plaster
:on exterior, lime plaster on
hinterior.Roof: mud plaster & dung
finish.
2.Fired brick in lime !Fired brick vault, DPC, 1
sortar (24' thick). !earth fill. :As above.
-- - --- - --- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- ----------------I
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FIG.A4.E. INDIGENOUS BUILDING TECHNOLOGY EXAMPLE:
SUN-BRICK WALL AND TIMBER ROOF.
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FIG. 5.A: IMPORT-INTENSIVE BUILDING TECHNOLOGY EXAMPLE:
FIRED BRICK WALL AND REINFORCED CONCRETE ROOF
(for e-Aact specjctions see Arreniyt 5 spreaashneet Ii.2-)
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FIG. 5.B: IMPORT-INTENSIVE BUILDING TECHNOLOGY EXAMPLE:
FIRED BRICK WALL AND REINFORCED CONCRETE ROOF
(for ey.act Specificat'ion, see kppenixCV b spreadshe eat 1.4.2.)
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CHAPTER THREE
NATIONAL POLICIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OP INDIGENOUS
TECHNOLOGIES: THE PAKISTAN CASE
The importance of reducing construction costs through
low-cost technologies was emphasised in the rural Village
Agriculture and Industrial Development (Village AID)
programs adopted by the Pakistan government in the early
fifties. Using low-cost, particularly indigenous,
technologies to reduce housing costs was an issue as early
as the mid-sixties when provincial building research centres
were set up. The Rural Works Program1 was also launched
with the twin objectives of improving rural conditions and
generating employment in the rural areas.
Despite long-standing recognition of the potentials in
construction and indigenous technologies, the trend has
clearly been to adopt increasingly more capital- and import-
intensive technologies in public sector programmes.
1. This was introduced under the system of Basic Democracies
during the regime of President Ayub Khan and continued under
that of President Yahya Khan (1958-72). With the change in
government in 1972, it was renamed the People's Work
Programme (PWP) and was combined with a new model of rural
development, the Integrated Rural Development Programme
(IRDP).In 1979, it again got its original name, Rural Works
Programme.
Why has this been the case, and what if anything should be
done about it?
The answers to these questions. can be addressed at two
levels.
First, at the level of national objectives, policies and
programmes, how do these influence technology choice?
Specifically, what obstacles and potentials do these
objectives, policies and programmes present for the
development and adoption of low-cost, indigenous
technologies?
Second, is that of specific factors that influence
technology choice, especially at the local level. These
factors include: (i) the belief that in choosing between
indigenous and import-intensive technologies a trade-off
between equity and efficiency exists; (2) the likelihood of
a mismatch between the characteristics of indigenous
technologies and the spatial and institutional environments
within which most construction has been promoted; (3) the
influence of interest groups who stand to gain or lose from
a shift in technology choice.
In this chapter we discuss the issues at the national level.
Chapters 4 and 5 will examine the factors more relevant to
the local level. We argue that, although well entrenched
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national policies have favoured import-intensive
technologies, new possibilities to promote indigenous
technologies have emerged. These possibilities lie in the
rising demand for low-cost construction, shifts in public
investment resulting from a recent move towards
privatisation, and renewed emphasis on a strengthened local
government system based on the rural district.
Public investments have been reallocated from large
industrial projects and urban housing to the social service
sectors, specifically their rural construction component.
The responsibility for much of small-scale construction has
been transferred from the Buildings Department to the local
councils supervised by the Ministry of Local Goverment and
Rural Development (LORD). Policies and programmes to develop
indigenous technologies can take advantage of, or be
"piggybacked" on these recent changes.
We first examine examine the conditions that have favoured
import-intensive technologies. We then discuss those
emerging possibilities for developing indigenous
technologies.
1. Conditions Favourable to Import-Intensive
Technologies
Pakistan's development efforts have supported import-
intensive technologies producing for an upper-income market
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to the detriment of indigenous technologies producing for a
low-income market. This is a combined result of policies
that encouraged an unequal income distribution, a specific
type of import substitution policy, and investments on
large-scale construction and industries. We shall examine
the individual effects of these factors in some detail.
1.1 Income Inequalities
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the growth model of development
relies partly on income inequalities or at least accepts
such inequalities as a temporary but necessary price for
sustained progress. This model and its assumptions shaped
Pakistan's policies.
To quote a leading Pakistani economist:
"[Pakistan's) model of development relied on income
inequalities as a basis of generation of surplus funds
needed for investment. It implied that the higher
income groups would save a large proportion of their
incomes and that growth would be rapid enough to
percolate down through to the lowest income strata of
society. Both were false assumptions, repudiated in the
Pakistan context (Naseem, 1981:58)."
Thus in 1972, forty-three percent of the national income
accrued to the highest quintile, compared to only eight
percent to the lowest quintile. By 1984, the share of the
lowest quintile had dropped further to seven percent (World
Bank, 1984:vii).
This distribution, although better than that of many Third
World countries, has a substantial effect on the housing
market. The effective demand of the upper-income groups for
luxury housing using import-intensive technologies and
materials dominates- the market. A study of new housing
construction in nineteen Pakistani cities (United
Consultants 1975:9) shows that almost sixty percent of total
investment in new housing was made by the highest income
bracket but they constructed only twenty-two percent of the
total number of units (Table 8). More revealing, seventy-one
percent of the new units had cemented roofs (reinforced
brick or cement concrete roofs), and eighty-four percent had
cemented walls (fired brick in cement mortar, see Table 9).
1.2 Import Substitution for the Upper-Income
An import substitution policy whose objective is to produce
locally those goods required by low-income groups and to use
production technologies that draw on local resources would
create a demand for indigenous technologies. The import
substitution objectives and policies implemented in
Pakistan, however, simply attempted to produce locally the
goods being imported, largely for the upper-income, by
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importing the large-scale, capital-intensive production
technologies used in the country of origin.2
The import substitution policies lowered the effective price
of capital relative to labour, thus encouraging capital-
intensive technologies over labour-intensive ones. 3 The
prices of materials using capital-intensive technologies
became lower relative to those dising local resources and
thus encouraged more purchases of the former and less of the
latter. For example, the price of roof girders equalled that
of timber beams, their direct substitutes, partly because of
the substantial savings accruing to the steel re-rolling
2. This type of import substitution was influenced by at
least three basic principles of neo-classical economics:
production for the market, the inevitability of scale
economies and the superiority of the latest in capital-
intensive technologies.
3. Such policies included overvalued, sometimes multiple,
exchange rates, low duties for imported equipment,
subsidised loans (sometimes with negative interest rates to
finance capital investments), tax concessions to lower
effective cost of fixed capaital, import permits for raw
materials linked with capital investment, accelerated
depreciation, and other tax concessions.
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the import substitution policies. 4 In
contrast timber, a major building material of low-income
groups, is given little attention as an industry.
1.3. Public Investments in Large-scale Construction
and Import-Intensive - Materials Industries
A significant proportion of Pakistan's public investments
has been on large-scale infrastructure and building
construction thus creating a demand for the import-intensive
materials and technologies required for such construction.
This construction program and the manufacturing industries
established as part of the import substitution objectives
mentioned above closely reinforced each other.
4. These policies result in low, subsidised prices for
capital equipment and energy. Both items comprise a major
portion of costs in the private re-rolling mills, which to
date have supplied most construction steel. The steel
products of the new state-owned Pakistan Steel Hill will be
sold at prices equal to border prices of imported steel and
hence, will be directly subsidised since production costs
are much higher for the Steel Hill. The government expects
that within a few years production costs will dropped and
the subsidies will be removed. (Lack of data has prevented
the inclusion of these subsidies in the economic analysis of
construction using steel.) Timber production, even if
industrially organised to use some of these subsidised
imported inputs would not benefit equally, since by nature
it is a more labour-intensive process. Its longer gestation
period and special problems, such as the competition for its
use as fuel, and the prevailing attitude that timber is a
second class building material and cannot be really
considered an industry (although, or perhaps because, it is
so widely used by low-income groups), all require government
attention to resolve. Such attention might have been
forthcoming if the import substitution policy was of the
first kind mentioned above.
mills through
Examples of such projects are the huge Hangla and Tarbela
dams, the ten cement plants that these dams in part provided
a justification for, and the nearly completed Pakistan Steel
Hill near Karachi. The cement plants and the steel mill are
both highly import-intensive which naturally makes
construction using cement and steel also import-intensive.
Besides the imported capital equipment, the cement plants
are fueled by imported furnace oil (GOP-Planning Commission,
1983). Imported raw material alone - iron ore and
metallurgical coal - make up half of the production cost of
steel (Zuberi, 1983:15).
These projects claimed a large share of public industrial
investment. The steel mill cost Rs 27.7 billion, of which
Ra 9.8 billion was for infrastructure and a new 3,290
hectare township for 10,000 employees (Zuberi, 1983). Ten
percent of the investment budget of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, 1983-88 was set aside simply for the completion stages
of the mill (more information on the cement and steel
industries is given in appendix C).
These projects continue to claim a significant proportion of
government expenditures even after completion because of
their large-scale and the technology used. The maintenance
expenditures for the Tarbela dam, for example, absorbed an
average three percent of total development expenditures
between 1980 and 1984 (World Bank, 1984:xviii).
The sophisticated technology ties the government to regular
capital improvements if these industries are to remain
competitive in the international market. Thus the Sixth Plan
budget provides for the rehabilitation of six of the nine
cement plants. Similarly, the technology of the nearly
completed steel mill is already outdated (World Bank,
1944: x v £ i i).
Although the economic justification for the steel mill and
recently the mining project at Saindak was questioned at the
highest levels of government and by international agencies
such as the World Bank, interests in these projects were so
deeply rooted, they could not be dislodged (World Bank,
1984:xviii). 5
The foregoing examples are cited not so much to question the
wisdom of the development approach adopted by Pakistan nor
its policies or investment programmes, but primarily to show
how these trends, dominant at the national level, have
influenced technology choice in favour of import-intensive
methods and against indigenous ones.
5. A number of alternative proposals for small-scale, more
labour-intensive, cement and steel plants were consistently
rejected by the government (Interview with Hafiz Pasha,
Assistant Director of the Economic Research Unit, University
of Karachi, conducted by the author in Cambridge, MA USA, 29
February, 1984).
In sum, income inequalities, import substitution policies
and investments in large-scale, capital- and import-
intensive projects all worked to favour import-intensive
technologies over indigenous ones. The above also highlights
the entrenched interests supporting import-intensive
technologies manifested in the physical and financial
commitment to these technologies.
Two other related effects of national policies should be
noted.
First, Pakistan's market- and growth-oriented policies have
helped channel most construction investments to the large
cities, notably Karachi.6 As we shall discuss in the
next chapter, large and, in particular, port cities are not
conducive to the development of indigenous technologies.
Second, both large- and small-scale construction are the
responsibility of the same public institutions -- the
Ministry of Public Works and the Construction Departments of
other ministries. Because large-scale construction and
import-intensive technologies have been the national
priorities, the preferences so reflected have dominated
these institutions and spilled over onto attitudes and
6. An account of how such policies channel investments to
large urban areas is beyond the scope of this study and also
well known. For a discussion in the Pakistan context, see
Qadeer, 1983.
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practices for small-scale construction as well. Import-
intensive technologies have been used for such construction
where they may- not be necessary.
The spatial and institutional issues will be discussed in
the next chapter.
.4 Effects on Housing and Rural Works Programmes
Given the above income distribution, national interests,
policies, investment and technology emphasis, it is not
surprising that government programs which could have
supported indigenous technologies lacked political
commitment, imagination, and funding.
Programmes such as low-cost housing and rural works have
been long featured in Fakistan's development plans. Their
objectives of low-cost construction and employment creation
would have been more effectively achieved by adopting
indigenous technologies. The national climate in support of
the capital- and import-intensive technologies was so
dominant, however, that the use of such technologies was not
seriously questioned. Instead the programs relied on high
funding levels to be effective; because such funding was
committed to other high priority projects, the impacts of
these programmes were minimal.
During the Fifth Plan period, a shortage of 581 thousand
urban and 864 thousand rural housing units were estimated.
But there were allocations for only 425 thousand urban
units, of which only 285 thousand units were implemented. A
major reason for this shortfall was the cost inflation of
the import-intensive materials adopted (GOP-Planning
Commission, 1983:388).
The number of man-years of employment created through the
People's Works Program (PWP) in 1973-74 was only 22,000 of
which 12,000 were regular employees of the PWP. This low
figure was in retrospect traced to the use of contractors
and capital-intensive construction methods.
Labour-to-material ratios for construction in the Works
programmes averaged 20:80. Based on this ratio, it was
estimated that a total of only 15,500 man-years of
employment were created (Bohari, 1978:177-78). The ratios
for indigenous technologies (estimated in the next chapter)
are 40:80. Thus merely switching technologies would have
doubled employment (for a discussion on rural programs which
included construction: Village-AID, People's Works
Programme, and Integrated Rural development, see Bokhari,
1978 and Kahn, 1982).
Clearly, import-intensive technologies have a well developed
market in upper-income housing and government projects, and
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are also essential for large-scale construction projects.
Public commitment to the cement and steel industries
producing the materials for these technologies is also very
strong. Given these conditions, indigenous technologies
cannot win serious government support if they are perceived
as a threat to these industries.7  Indigenous
technologies must complement, not compete with their
import-intensive counterparts.
Moreover, since the above conditions are well entrenched,
the development of indigenous technologies cannot be
predicated on any fundamental structural change. Instead we
need to identify the potentials for promoting indigenous
technologies within the existing yet evolving structure,
specifically through channels with strong government backing
to promote these technologies. Fortunately such potentials
and channels exist.
2. Potentials for the Development of Indigenous
Technologies
There are several potentials. First, there is a long
standing need and demand for low-cost construction for which
7. Thus according to one local economist, because the
private steel re-rolling mills are now viewed by the
government as competition to the Pakistan Steel Hill, the
products of the re-rolling mills are to be taxed, while
those of the Hill are to be subsidised (Interview with Hafiz
Pasha, Assistant Director of the Economic Research Unit,
University of Karachi, conducted by the author in Cambridge,
HA USA, 29 February, 1984).
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indigenous technologies could be suitable. Next, for the
first time, standards below those in the building codes and
construction unregulated by these codes have been accepted
as official policy. Finally, and most important, are the
shifts in public investment contained in the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, 1983-88. From heavy industry and large-scale
infrastructure construction, public investment has been
reallocated to: research into science and technology,
including appropriate technology; rural building
construction through the social services sector, and a
strengthening of the local government system.
We shall examine the significance of each of the above for
the development of indigenous technologies.
2.1 Need, Demand and Current Investments in
Indigenous Technologies
We previously identified the large proportion of total
public and private investment allocated to import-intensive
construction technologies, especially in connection with
large-scale infrastructure projects and upper-income housing
in the larger cities. A closer look at urbanisation patterns
and public investment reveals a concurrent trend in
investment more supportive of indigenous technologies.
Urban growth trends show that twenty-five percent of the
expansion in the urban areas is in squatter settlements,
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which are receptive to using indigenous technologies (the
proportion is higher in the large cities, for example, a
third of Karachi's expansion is in these areas, see World
Bank, 1984:124). Next to the largest cities, the fastest
growing settlements are the small towns of 10 to 25 thousand
population, settlements where indigenous construction
technologies prevail (World Bank, 1976:Annex I and Table
1.8; Afshar 1981:3-4). Several housing studies also confirm
housing need to be greatest in the low-income, especially
rural areas. It was estimated, for example, that 3 million
new housing units would need to be constructed by 1980
simply to achieve habitation density levels of 1960. Of
these units, eighty-four percent would need to be in the
rural areas, sixty percent in rural Punjab alone (Zaki,
1981:216-246; Afshar, 1981:7).
Finally, a surprisingly large percentage of provincial
development budgets is allocated to construction; much of
it, small-scale and of the type that could adopt indigenous
technologies. Over the period 1980-84, for example, the
Punjab government allocated on average forty-one percent of
its total development budget to construction; sixteen
percent was on buildings (Table 10.1).
Although these trends have existed for some time, they have
proved insufficient to promote indigenous technologies.
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2.2 Acceptance of Lower Construction Standards
The majority of housing construction falls below
Pakistan's formal building code requirements. The official
policy until recently considered such construction in
violation of these codes and subject to demolition. The
threat of demolition was used by building officials to
extract money from noncompliers. The same threat also
prompted some house builders to spend more on construction,
especially to use officially approved import-intensive
materials such as cement and steel than they otherwise might
have chosen.
Aid agencies have for sometime advocated a relaxation of
construction standards. In its 1978 Urban Sector Survey on
Pakistan, the World Bank urged the acceptance of sun-brick
construction. In a recent review of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, the Bank again listed inappropriately high standards
as the main constraint, after land, to expanding PaRistan's
housing supply. But this time the Bank noted the federal
government's acceptance of this position as a major step
forward in resolving the housing problem (World Bank,
1984:xxvii).
The federal government's recognition of the need to relax
building codes was first expressed in 1981 in a draft
national housing policy document. The document stressed the
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need to revise the building codes, lower standards,
encourage research in low-cost indigenous materials and
technologies, and accept the use of these technologies in
housing construction (GOP-Ministry of Housing and Works,
1981). The entire document has yet to become government
policy, but several of its recommendations, notably those
mentioned above, were included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
The Sixth Plan document states:
"The poor will be allowed to construct their own houses
according to their own design and with their own
labour, without interference from the regulatory
building authorities (GOP-Planning Commission,
1983:391)."
As a more active support the Sixth Plan also proposes the
provision of low-cost building materials to such house
builders (World Bank, 1984:xxviii).
Thus acceptance of standards below those required in the
official building codes and of construction unregulated by
those codes is, for the first time, official policy.
This measure removes a considerable constraint to the
adoption of indigenous technologies. But it does not reflect
a higher priority given to the housing- sector nor does it
necessarily reflect changes in attitude and practice below
the highest policymaKing levels in the housing and
construction sectors.
Allocations to the physical infrastructure and housing
sector fell from six percent in the Pifth Plan to five
percent in the Sixth Plan (World Bank, 1984:24). The housing
sector has in effect become a lower priority in the current
plan. It is therefore unclear whether the new policy on
lower standards and unregulated construction reflects a
desire to improve housing conditions or to deal with them on
a reduced budget. (The relaxation of building regulations is
consistent with a general move towards "privatisation" and
*deregulation" advocated by the World Bank and a major
feature of the Sixth Plan as we shall discuss.)
The breakdown of allocations within the housing sector
suggests that actually more traditional attitudes and
practices still prevail. Constructing housing units of
higher standards has priority over assisting the low-income
groups to construct on their own using local resources. The
five percent allocation of the housing sector is to be
divided between constructing 670 thousand housing units
adhering to building code standards but developing only 500
thousand plots (GOP-Planning Commission, 1983:390-391). In
physical units and more so in resources spent, the
government housing sector will clearly continue to emphasize
the construction of units by contractors and the use of
import-intensive construction.
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Finally, all of this expenditure will be in the large
cities, an unreceptive environment for the introduction of
indigenous technologies, as we shall see. For example, given
the sizeable investment in the steel mill, its proximity to
Karachi where much urban housing investment will
materialise, and the subsidies planned for mile steel rods,
which will reduce its market price, government housing
engineers could argue that these rods and therefore
reinforced concrete construction meet the criteria for using
"low-cost building materials."
In sum, what we have so far is only a partial basis for
developing indigenous technologies. A significant proportion
of government investment is in small-scale construction that
could use indigenous technologies. Housing studies, the
rapid growth of low-income housing areas in the large
cities, and the growth of small towns in general all suggest
a need, demand, and similar investment and activity for
indigenous technologies in the private sector. And, although
the motivations are ambiguous, it is now government policy,
if not yet practice, to encourage construction less hampered
by building regulations.
Still missing is a channel with enough financial and
political clout. A channel within an environment relatively
free of deeply rooted technological and other biases through
which indigenous technologies could be introduced into
83
construction practice. Particular shifts in emphases between
the Fifth and Sixth Plans indicate possibilities of such a
channel.
2.3 The Sixth Five-Year Plan: 1983-88
The Sixth Plan departs from its recent predecessors:
ideologically, by making a push for "privatisation," and,
financially, by reallocating public investments from heavy
industrial projects and large-scale infrastructure
construction to energy, science and technology, the social
services sectors, and, to a lesser extent, small industries.
In addition, the new Plan seeks to strengthen local
government at the rural district level.
The resources released by the completion or near completion
of major industrial and infrastructure projects such as the
dams and the steel mill mentioned and the opening up of the
industrial sector to private sector investment have made
possible the shifts in sectoral allocations (World Bank,
1984:24).
The effect of privatisation and its concomitant emphasis on
deregulation are apparent in the policy to ease controls on
housing construction mentioned previously. A similar effect
can be noted in support of the small industries sector where
indigenous production technologies are adopted and materials
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for indigenous construction technologies are produced.
Investment in small industry has been increasing at a
relatively high rate in recent years. With the proposed
liberalisation of economic controls and a favourable fiscal
system, the Plan projects the rate of growth in small
industries to be even higher (GOP-Planning Commission,
1983:17).
An emphasis on science and technology, specifically research
into appropriate technologies, is essential for the
development of indigenous technologies. On this aspect, the
Sixth Plan states:
"The need for self-reliance through the development of
appropriate technology will be given special emphasis.
A comprehensive programme for the development of
science and technology has been drawn up - existing
institutes will be strengthened and new ones set up for
developing indigenous labour-intensive techniques in
sectors such as construction and highways (GOP-Planning
Commission, 1983:435)."
The development of appropriate technology is based on the
following: the use of Pakistan's raw materials and labour, a
fourfold increase in expenditure on science and technology,
and a decentralisation of technological institutes (GOP,
Planning Commission, 1983:17). As part of this effort,
Rs 100 million was set aside for a national building
research centre and for measures to strengthen building
research at the universities and provincial research
centres.
Moat significant for the development of indigenous
technologies are the Plan's shifts in emphases to the social
services sector, rural areas, and local councils. To
appreciate the importance of these shifts, we have to break
away from traditional conceptions and turn to spatial,
sectoral, and institutional channels quite different from
those usually associated with public intervention in
building construction. We have to turn our attention from
the large cities to the small towns and rural areas, from
the physical planning and housing sectors to the social
services sectors, and from the centralised construction
agencies - the Public Works inistry and the construction
departments of other ministries - to the local councils and
the LGRD - department. The rural areas, social services
sector, and local councils together offer the mix of
conditions necessary to initiate indigenous technologies:
political commitment, public investment and activity in
construction, and a potentially receptive spatial and
institutional environment.
We have already discussed the high level of need, demand,
and investment in small-scale building construction in small
towns and rural areas. We have also alluded to the relative
lack of receptivity to indigenous technologies in the large
cities and how the rural areas may be better breeding
grounds for developing these technologies. We will return to
the factors affecting receptivity in more detail in a later
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chapter. Here we shall examine the financial and political
factors that make the social services sectors, local
councils, and the LGRDs unusual but promising conduits for
technology change.
2.3.1 The Social Services Sector Construction Program
A breakdown of the sectoral budgets shows that the physical
planning and infrastructure sector does not finance most
building construction but, ironically, the social services
sector. Moreover, compared to any other sector, a much
larger proportion of the social services sector budget goes
to construction. Between 1960-84, on average, fifty-five
percent of the annual public investment in building
construction in the Punjab was funded by the social services
sector, compared to only thirty-three percent and twelve
percent by the physical and production sectors, respectively
(Table 11). The social services sector spends approximately
forty-three percent of its budget on building construction
as opposed to only fifteen and four percent spent by the
physical and production sectors, respectively (Table 10.1).
The prominence of construction in total development
expenditures and that of the social sector in building
expenditures is repeated at the district level (Table 12).
Thus the social services sector has the most financial clout
to directly influence technology choice in public building
construction and, through examples of its buildings, to
influence private housing as well. Its large share of public
construction investment also indicates it could have the
most impact on stimulating demand for indigenous materials
industries.
The effectiveness of social services sector buildings in
disseminating technology is OIcreased by their greater
geographical spread relative to public housing projects.
Moreover, they- are among the first public buildings to be
constructed in such projects.
The social services sector's leverage is greatly enhanced in
the Sixth Plan, especially relative to the housing sector.
While allocations to housing and physical infrastructure
dropped from six percent of the total in the previous Plan
to five percent in the Sixth Plan, those to the social
services sector nearly doubled from close to ten percent to
an unprecedented seventeen percent (World Bank, 1984:24).
And, as we just noted, channeling funds to the social
services sector largely amounts to channeling funds to
building. The result in the Punjab was an increase in
building construction's share to the total development
budget: from an average of fourteen percent in 1980-83 to
twenty-two percent in 1984. For the same periods,the social
services sector increased its investment on building from
thirty-six percent to fifty-eight percent of its total
budget (Tables 11.1 to 11.4). Much of this construction is
earmarKed for the rural areas. As the Sixth Plan document
states:
"An extensive networK of primary schools, basic health
units and rural health centres will be constructed to
extend coverage to the entire rural population (quoted
in World BanK, 1984:19)."
Along with the above building construction, a much expanded
rural works programme is also being implemented.
2.3.2 Local Government as Implementors
The local councils - district and union councils - with the
LGRD departments will be the institutions to implement the
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expanded construction coverage.8 Construction has f or
7. The present local government system of district and union
councils was set up in 1979 under the Martial Law
administration of President Zia-Ul-Huq. The councils are
elected bodies headed by a Chairman who is concurrently the
Project Director of the Works Program in the district. These
councils have functions and powers to plan, approve (within
limits), and implement development activities and to levy
taxes. The councils have overall responsibility for the
following construction projects: primary, middle and
secondary schools, rural health centres, basic health units,
family welfare clinics, small water supply schemes,
sanitation and rural roads (Jafri, 1982:6-7).
Local councils have three sources of income: government
grants, local taxes, and income from commercial projects
(profits, rents, fees, etc.). Government grants are the
major source of fundsthese consist of: (1) the development
grant for rural development and construction (Rural Works
Programme); (2) a portion from the provincial sectoral
departments' development fund to construct and repair
schools, staff residences, basic health units, etc., (Jafri,
1983:9).
Planning and implementation of the Rural development
Programme starts at the district council. The council draws
up a district development programme by aggregating the
sector-wise financial allocations, physical programmes and
targets received from the Provincial Government. Suggestions
are made to the Proviincial Planning and Development
Department for necessary modif ications in the aggregate
district programme by identifying the gaps, internal
inconsistencies and its incompatibility, if any, with the
local priorities and implementation capacity. Upon approval
of the revised district programme and its inclusion in the
Annual Development Programme of the province, the district
council invites development schemes (for the types of
projects mentioned above) from the constituent union
councils (Khan, 1982: 55).
All government representatives at the respective levels are
ex-officio members of the councils. Both tiers of local
government are linked to the provincial government through
the Department of Local Government and Rural Development
(LGRD) which resulted from the merger of the Integrated
Rural Development Programme and the People's Works Programe
(now renamed the Rural Works Programme). For a description
of the larger financial and institutional framework within
which building construction is implemented, see appendix D
and Afshar, 1981 and 1982.
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some time been a major activity of these institutions (Table
13). Under the Sixth Plan their involvement is to be greatly
increased. Thus the Sixth Plan document goes on to state:
"One of the major concerns is to bring development
closer to the people. There must be larger community
participation [in the execution of development
programmes). There must also be a larger role for
elected local (council) bodies in the planning and
implementation of development programmes ... the local
bodies will be expected to play a much larger role in
the construction of primary schools, basic health
units, rural health centres, farm to market roads and
rural water supply (GOP-Planning Commission, 1983)."
A specific role in the improvement of rural housing is also
envisaged for the local councils:
"In the rural areas too, housing of satisfactory
standards is in very short supply - technical guidance
for improved methods of construction with local
materials could be invaluable to the rural population.
A properly planned house constructed with locally
available building materials can, inspite of being much
cheaper, be as comfortable as a house having pucca
(fired brick in cement mortar) walls and rcc roof.~TH-e
local councils will therefore be required to evolve
suitable mechanisms for arranging technical advice on a
regular basis (GOP-Planning Commission, 1983:392)."
For the first time, the Housing and Building Finance
Corporation has been directed to extend credit to rural
housing.
In addition to resources channeled through the social
services sector, another Rs 20 billion has been set aside
for the local councils: a 228 percent increase from the last
Plan allocation.
The political motivation behind the emphasis on local
councils and increased public investment in rural
construction through these bodies is unofficially but widely
acknowledged in government circles. As one high-ranking
district official explained, the local elite (elected to the
councils) traditionally with the opposition are won over by
giving them the power and patronage associated with these
projects. These local elites are encouraged to concentrate
on development programmes rather than on political activity
by limiting council functions to such programmes.9 The
emphasis on development of the district level shifts
9. As the district official put it:
"The government is giving more development responsibilities
and powers to local bodies. These are often the middle level
politicians and supporters of , the long-standing national
opposition parties such as the People's Party. They were
traditionally the intermediaries between the national
leadership and the people. Now, as they get more and more
involved in the local government system, in the exercise of
local power that comes from being able to influence where
development projects occur and how (power that comes from
the present government), they increasingly cut themselves
off from their former political bosses.
A Chairman of a the Municipal Committee in this district wan
old and once ardent People's Party supporter. I asked him
recently how come he was participating so enthusiastically
in local government elections. He replied that,4 if he
remained a People's Party worker, he would remain a mere
functionary of his bosses, executing their orders.' Now he
is Chairman of the Municipal Committee with much more power
and independence. We as civil servants do not object to this
transfer of development functions and responsibilities since
we maintain our law and order, political amd even overall
control of development decisions made by the local bodies
(Interview, May 1983)."
attention from political activity, or the lack of it, at the
national levels.1 0
3. Summary
The broader political and developmental merits of the recent
moves to privatisation and local government notwithstanding,
the resulting release of public funds for small-scale
industries, research on appropriate technology, and rural
construction projects implemented through local councils
presents a momentum on which can be "piggybacked" the
development of indigenous technologies.
The basic ingredients for a successful programme exist:
political commitment, substantial financial resources, and
as we shall discuss later, a more receptive spatial and
institutional environment. But, as we shall also discuss,
none of these ingredients guarantee support and success for
such technologies. They present positive conditions under
which, if handled correctly, programmes for the development
of indigenous technologies may succeed.
In this chapter we examined the effect of national
objectives, policies, and programmes on technology choice.
10. Provincial and national assemblies with members drawn in
part from these local bodies have recently been instituted.
Some commentators note that these assembly members rival the
leaders of the old opposition to the present government.
We found that within the existing structure of unequal
income distribution and public commitment to
import-intensive technologies, there were nevertheless
emergent potentials such as in social services sector
investment and in local councils through which the
development of indigenous technologies could be promoted.
None of the above, however, addressed the basic question of
whether the promotion of indigenous technologies is a good
thing or a bad thing. The answer depends partly on the
validity of the claim that, although indigenous technologies
may be more equity promoting, import-intensive technologies
are more efficient and, therefore, in the longer term
equity- promoting as well. This trade-off between equity and
efficiency was the single most fundamental and common reason
given for selecting import-intensive technologies. It must
be addressed before we can proceed further in our analysis
of technology choice and the promotion of indigenous
technologies.
94
TABLE 8 PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION:
BY INCOME GROUP. 1973 - 74
Incomrre/Mo. Units Constructed Cost/ Total Investment
(In Rs) No. X Unit (Rs) Rs 100,000 X
< 300
301 - 900
901 - 1500
> 1500
8, 680
27, 280
12, 400
13,640
14 5, 780
44 15,970
20 30,250
22 92,450
Total 62, 000 100 2,122.0 100.0
Source: United Consultants Limited (1975) "Housing in the
Private Sector". Report prepared for GOP-Planning
Division. Lahore,Pakistan: United Consultants Limited.
TABLE 9 PRIVATE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION:
BY MATERIALS AND FACILITIES 1973 - 74
Type of Material Used/Facilities
Cemented Walls
Cemented Roof
Separate Cooking Area
Separate Bathrooms
% to Total of New Houses
84
71
90
89
Source: United Consultants Limited (1975) "Housing in the
Private Sector". Report prepared for GOP-Planning
Division. LahorePakistan: United Consultants Limited.
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50.2 2. 4
435.7
375. 1
1,261.0
20.5
17.7
59.4
TABLE 10 SHARE OF CONSTRUCTION IN DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURES. BY SECTOR. PUNJAB 1980 - 84
10.1 (In Rupees 100,000)
YEARLY AVERAGE !11980 - 84
-- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
- - - -- - - - - - - - - i -- - - - -- - - S
i CONSTRUCTION 40.72 OTHER 59.28 TOTAL 100
!Building #Infrastructure
Rs. 1 1 Rs. 1 Rs. I Rs. 1 1
SECTOR
1 Production U 711.20 4.44 1277.48 7.97 114043.86 87.60 :16032.53 I 43.13
2 Physical
Infrastructure 1 1993.63 15.02 :7731.34 58.26 3544.92 26.71 :13269.89 1 35.69 1
3 Social
Infrastructure !1 3369.73 42.80 1 55.41 0.70 14448.32 56.50 :7873.45 1 21.18
---------------- ! --------- ------------------ ------------------ ---------
TOTAL 11 6074.56 16.34 : 9064.22 24.38 :22037.09 59.28 :37175.87 1 100.00 i
-- - - - - - - - - !- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - -- - - - i --- --- ---------
SOURCE: Government of Punjab Annual Development Programse 1980-81 through 1983-84
10.2 YEAR 1!983-84
~Ia------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------- I----- --------- ---------
!! CONSTRUCTION 39.00 I0THER 61.00 !TOTAL 1 100
!!Building Hlnfrastructure I1 TOTAL
,Total 1 Total !Total 1 Total Total 1 Total I
SECTOR I
-I,----------------,- --- -a-----------------I------ -----------------
-I---------------------------- -------- --- a----- ------- -----
I Production 1 599.26 3.99 736.24 4.90 :13688.5 91.11 :15024.00 1 36.51
2 Physical
Infrastructure 2749.79 17.08 5975.00 37.11 7374.21 45.81 16099.00 1 39.12
1 3 Social I :
Infrastructure ! 5783.42 57.64 1 208.65 2.08 1 4040.93 40.28 :10033.00 1 24.38
-- - - - - - - --a- - - - - - - - - - - --------- :------------------~ -- - - - i -- - - - a
TOTAL 9132.47 22.19 1 6919.89 16.81 125103.64 61.00 141156.00 1 100.00
------------------- ------------------------------------------------------- 
--------- :---------
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TABLE 10 SHARE OF CONSTRUCTION IN DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURES. BY SECTOR. PUNJAB 1980 - 84(In Rupees 100,000)
10.3 YEAR 111982-83
-------------------------------------------------------I -----I-----
CONSTRUCTION 37.31 O0THER 62.69 !TOTAL I too
!Building Hlnfrastructure WOther !TOTAL II TOTAL 1
HTotal 1 Total ITotal 1 Total !Total I Total
SECTOR
1 Production U 644.42 3.75 130.26 0.76 116416.32 95.49 117191.00 43.45
2 Physical
Infrastructure U 2686.00 19.06 18531.15 60.53 1 2876.08 20.41 14093.23 1 35.62 1
i3 Social
Infrastructure I 2764.57 33.38 1 6.60 0.08 5510.98 66.54 :8282.15 1 20.93 1
- - -- - - - - -I: I - ---- - - - - - -i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -i- - - - -i- - - - -
TOTAL 1:6094.99 15.40 1 8668.01 21.91 124803.38 62.69 139566.38 1 100.00 1
10. 4 YEAR .1981-82
H, CONSTRUCTION 45.76 l0THER 54.24 :TOTAL 1 100 1
"Building 'lnfrastructure 1 1 it TOTAL 1
HTotal 1 Total Total 1 Total !Total 1 Total 1
SECTOR
*-- -- -I-- -- --- -- I- -- ----- I-------
I I Production 11 717.88 5.19 13263.83 23.59 9852.00 71.22 113833.71 42.16
2 Physical H
Infrastructure 11 1352.60 11.51 17169.00 61.00 13231.73 27.50 111753.33 1 35.82 1
3 Social
Infrastructure 112505.94 34.67 1 6.38 0.09 4716.43 65.25 17228.751 22.03
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -i- - - - - - - - - ----------------I I - - -I -- - - -I
TOTAL U 4576.42 13.95 110439.21 31.81 117800.16 54.24 132815.79 1 100.00 1
10,5 YEAR 1980-81
CONSTRUCTION 41.87 l0THER 58.13 !TOTAL 1 100
HBuilding Infrastructure I 11 TOTAL I
,Total 1 Total :Total 1 Total ITotal I Total I
SECTOR
1 1 Production H 883.25 4.88 1 979.57 5.42 1 16218.6 89.70 118081.42 51.42 1
1 2 Physical I's
I Infrastructure 111186.13 10.65 19250.20 83.08 1 697.67 6.27 111134.00 1 31.66 1
13 Social
Infrastructure 112424.98 40.76 1 0.00 0.00 13524.92 59.24 5949.90 16.92 1
T-T A 4494.36 12.78 !--229.77 2 2 932--------------9 ---44-
I TOTAL U1 4494.36 12.78 110229.77 29.09 120441.19 58.13 135165.32 1 100.00 1
-- - - - - - - - - Ii - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- i - - - -- i- - - - - I
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DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON
CONSTRUCTION:, BY SECTOR AND CONSTRUCTION TYPE.
PUNJAB 1980-84
Expenditure on:
Buildings % In f ra Total
Produ:tion 711.2
Physical 1,993.6
In f ra
Soc i al 3, 369. 7
All Sectors
11.7 1,277.5 14.1
32.8 7,731.3 85.3
55.5 55.4 0.6
6074.5 100.0 9,064.2 100.0 14,688.8
Source: Government of Punjab. Annual Development Programme
for 1981-82 through 1983-84.
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Sec t or
1,988.7
9,275.0
3,425.1
13.5
63. 1
23.3
100.0
TABLE 11
TABLE 12 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON BUILDING:
SAHIWAL DISTRICT. 1980 - 84
III .1
YEAR |:1980 - 81|81
SECTOR
1 Production
2 Physical
Infrastructure
3 Social II
TOTAL
114.88
36.77 1
117.9
- 82 :82 - 83
83.4 83.87
19.23 25.59
112.16 93.23
:83 - 84 Average Per Year
(Total) : (1)
14.4 74.14 1: 33.02
40.18 : 30.46 13.56
1 156.54 119.96 53.42-19.6 .42
269.55 : 214.85 : 202.69 | 211.12 1 224.55 :| 100.00
Total Development Expenditures 1983 - 84 741.31
Building as percent of Total Expenditures (83-84) 28.48
Source calculated from: Government of Punjab, Annual Development Programse,
1980-81 through 1983-84
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES AND
ACTIVITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT. SAHIWAL DISTRICT 1980 - 83
(In Rs. 100,000)
YEAR ||1980 - 81 |1981 - 82 :1982 - 83 !Averages 1980 - 83
No. Rs. i No. I Rs. 1 No. 1 Rs. :No. Rs. 1/Building
BUILDING TYPE Rs.
1 Schools 49 38.38 24: 31.09: 109: 24.49: 61 | 31.32: 0.52:
2 Residences 5 2.58 5 2.58 - 0.00 3 | 1.72 0.52
3 Markaz Centres 2 4.04 2 8.09 : 7 1 6.59 | 4 6.24 : 1.70
TOTAL 1: 56| 45.00 : 31: 41.76 1 116 31.08: 68: 39.281 0.58
If
tI
a/ Source: District Office, LGRD Department, Sahival
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TABLE 13
CHAPTER POUR
IRDIGEKOUS VERSUS IIPORT-INTEUSIVE TECHNOLOGIES:
-EVIDERICK FROM SAHIWAL
Here we examine the importance of technology choice. Is
there really a significant advantage in adopting indigenous
rather than import-intensive technologies in construction
and materials production projects?
To address this question we compare the alternative
technologies against three sets of criteria: first, those
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criteria of equity and efficiency;i second, relative to
who gains and who loses from the current shift to import-
intensive technologies, and, finally, the effect of the
alternatives on the objectives of promoting participation
and local institutions.
Our construction technology examples are the indigenous sun-
brick walls and timber roofs . compared t.6 the import-
intensive fired brick walls and reinforced concrete roofs.
Our production technology -examples are relate to brick
kilns: the indigenous wall type, agri-waste fired kilns
1. The equity criteria for both. construction and production
technologies are as follows: low-cost (affordability),
employment, and income distribution, especially within the
district and among the rural- and low-income groups.
Note that two measures of income distribution are used: from
the undiscounted cash flow analysis and from the cost-
benefit analysis. The differences between the two and the
rationale for using both are discussed in the methodology
section, appendix B1.
For the construction analysis the efficiency criteria are as
follows: (1) cost-effectiveness - initial construction and
maintenance costs discounted over the building's life span;
(2) economic costs of construction, and (3) capital and
labour productivity. For the production analysis the
corresponding criteria are: (1) cost minimisation;
(2) profitability, financial and economic; (3) capital and
labour productivity.
Savings effects come under efficiency criteria for both
construction and production technologies as recorded from
the cash flow and cost-benefit analysis (see Table 4 for
detailed list and description of the criteria against which
technologies -are compared).
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compared to the import-intensive trench type, coal and oil
fired Kilns.2
1. The Equity-Efficiency Trade-off: Assumptions and
Evidence
We address the above question by testing the common
assumptions about the relative performance of indigenous and
import-intensive technologies against our empirical
evidence.
Assumption One. Indigenous construction technologies may
be cheaper than import-intensive technologies but they are
not significantly so, especially if we take economic costs
into account.
Using market prices, we find that the import-intensive
construction technology is about, five times more expensive
than the indigenous alternative (Rs 85 per square foot
compared to Rs 18 per square foot respectively). Put another
way, the import-intensive alternative can produce only a
2. For information on the full range of building
technologies and materials industries see Tables 6 and 7 and
appendix C. For an analysis of five building technologies
relative to costs, employment, and income effects, see
Afshar,1982 (the 1982 study adopted a simpler, less detailed
analytical method than the present one).
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fifth of the covered area that can be constructed with the
same budget using the indigenous technology. 3
Accounting for economic costs (as opposed to using financial
costs as above), we might expect the difference to be
greatly reduced in favour of the import-intensive technology
since it uses a higher proportion of such heavily taxed
inputs as cement and steel. But the difference is only
slightly reduced (by two percent) because the market wage
rate for unskilled labour is also higher than the economic
wage rate.4 The indigenous technology uses a much
higher proportion of unskilled labour than the import-
intensive one, hence the differential in cement and steel
costs is thus offset (Table 14; for the underlying costing,
financial and economic analysis see the Construction Hodel
Table I, specifically 4.1 and 4.2 in appendix Bi. A full
discussion on cost-benef it techniques, the selection of the
shadow prices and their implications on the evaluation of
the alternative technologies is given in appendix B2).
3. For construction, all values are expressed in Pakistani
Rupees (Rs) per Rupees 100 of construction expenditures or
as Rs per square foot of covered space. For production, all
values are stated in Rs per Rs 100 of brick purchases (i.e.,
the receipts from brick sales or the value of output) or Rs
per 1000 bricks. In both cases, the per Rs 100 represents in
effect the unit of investment in the district that occurs
through construction expenditures. Where the values are Rs
per Rs 100 they can also be expressed as percent of
investment.
4. The terms technology and project, financial and market,
economic and shadow are used interchangeably.
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Assumption Two. Indigenous shelter technologies may have
lower initial construction costs but their much higher
maintenance results in greater costs ingyrred over the
building's life span.
This assumption, expressed as cost-effectiveness over the
building's life-span, is commonly made by government
engineers in the public works departments (for the same
assertions made in other countries and projects, see
Tendler, 1978).
Precise maintenance patterns are difficult to establish.
From case-studies and interviews with house owners,
builders, and engineers a worst case pattern for the
indigenous technology and a best case pattern for the
import-intensive technology are adopted.
Based on these patterns, over a twenty year life-cycle, the
indigenous technology requires annual re-rendering (surface
plastering) and major structural repairs every ten years. In
effect, except for its foundations, the building is assumed
to be reconstructed over the twenty-year period. The
import-intensive technology requires some replastering every
five years and minor structural repair every ten to twenty
years (compare Tables I, 2.1 and 2.2 in appendix Bi and
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 in this section).
With maintenance cost added to the initial construction
costs, at a zero discount rate, construction using
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indigenous technology still costs only sixty percent of the
one using import-intensive technology. Applying a twenty
percent discount rate (a low figure given capital scarcity
in Pakistan and typical rural interest rates of twenty-five
to a hundred percent), the cost of indigenous technology
drops further to only thirty percent of . the import-
intensive alternative (Table 14 and Figure 9). Therefore,
even with worst-case maintenance scenarios and at
conservative discount rates, the indigenous technology is
far more cost-effective than the import-intensive one
throughout the building's life span.
The equity advantages of indigenous technology are more
apparent when we consider the income flows from maintenance
expenditures. The maintenance of indigenous technology is
more labour-intensive compared to the construction stage,
and it is more unskilled labour-intensive compared to the
maintenance of import-intensive technology. The share of
on-site labour income to total construction expenditures on
indigenous technology increases from forty-five percent
during initial construction to seventy-four percent during
maintenance; the relevant figures for import-intensive
technology are twenty-four to thirty-five percent,
respectively. This increase in income is equally shared by
both skilled and unskilled labour in the indigenous
technology; in the import-intensive technology, skilled
labour gets most of it (see Table 14 and Figure 9).
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Implications of the technologies' contrasting maintenance
characteristics for community participation, income levels,
the spatial and institutional factors will be discussed in
the third section of this chapter and in the next chapter.
Assumption Three. The local income and employment
generating effects of expenditures on indigenous
technologies are not much greater than those on import-
intensive technologies. This Is especially so if we take
into account leakages through respending on the inputs of
materials production and supply.
(a) Comparing Construction Technologies
After respending leakages (i.e., second-round payments) have
been traced, ninety-seven percent of the expenditures on
construction using indigenous technology still remain within
the district to generate local on and off-site incomes and
employment. In contrast, half of the expenditures on
import-intensive technology are leaked out of the district
through payments for import-intensive materials such as
cement, steel, and coal (used to fire bricks). The leakage
of three percent in indigenous technology results from the
purchase of reeds for roof mats from the neighbouring
district, a major reed and mat producing area (see Figures
10.1 and 10.2 and Table I, 3.1 and 3.2 in appendix Bi for
the underlying cash flow analysis giving these results).
Every Rs 100 of expenditures on indigenous construction
creates approximately 2.1 man-days of on-site employment, of
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which 1.5 man-days are in unskilled labour. The comparable
figures for the impor-t-intensive technology are 0.72
man-days, of which only half a man-day is in unskilled
labour. Compared to the import-intensive technology, the
indigenous construction technology is more labour-intensive
rather than materials-intensive and uses more unskilled
labour. (Figures 12.1 and 12.2. see also Table I, 3.1 and
3.2, Box IC in appendix BI for the underlying analysis.)
When leakage through respending on the inputs of materials
production and supply is accounted for, Rs 100 in indigenous
construction generates approximately 3.2 man-days of local
employment in construction and materials production and
supply. The same expenditure in import-intensive
construction technology generates only 1.67 man-days. 5
5. The on- and off-site employment figures are obtained by
dividing the cash flow remaining within the district (which
is Rs 97 for the indigenous technology and Rs 49 for the
imported technology) with a wage of Rs 30 per man-day.
This average wage rate is derived as follows:
In building construction the typical ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers is 2:4 and the ratio of earnings per day
is Rs 20:Rs 50 respectively. The weighted average is
therefore Rs- 30 per man-day. Wage rates are similar in brick
production and supply, but the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers is 1:6. The weighted average is in this case Rs 25
per day. However, we adopt the higher figure (Rs 30) to
estimate the employment effects of this wage income. A
higher figure gives a lower employment rate and roughly
compensates for the slightly overstated wage bill. that
results from the inclusion of the entrepreneur's profit in
the total wage bill.
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(b) Comparing Production Technologies
Ninety percent of the receipts in the indigenous wall type,
agri-waste fired brick kilns remain in the district to
generate local income and employment as compared to only
forty-three percent in the trench type, coal and oil fired
kilns (Table II, 1.1 and 1.2 in Appendix B).
The inputs for the indigenous kiln are entirely local, but
charges for transporting the bulky agri-waste are high.
Hence, the ten percent leakage from the second round of
paymerts made by the truckers for diesel fuel. In trench
kilns, fifty-seven percent of the receipts immediately leave
the district as payments to the producers, dealers and
truckers (who are all based outside the district) of the
coal and oil used to fire these kilns.
As for employment, for every Rs 100 of brick purchases from
the wall kiln 3 man-days are created in the district as
compared to only 1.4 man-days created in the trench kiln.
However, on-site employment is higher in the latter kiln. We
shall discuss this next.
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Assumption Four. Indigenous technologies may be more
equitable in terms of their local employment and income
effects, but import-intensive technologies are more
efficient in their use of inputs per unit output as
reflected in lower production costs, higher productivity and
profitability (financial and economic).
The debate around equity versus efficiency and employment
versus output is a central and an ongoing one in the
development literature. Pakistani government officials also
cite efficiency as the reason for favouring the most modern
construction and production technologies.
(a) Comparing Construction Technologies
The greater cost-effectiveness, that is, lower production
costs, of the indigenous construction technology has been
discussed under assumptions one and two above. For the same
cost, using indigenous technology can produce approximately
five times more covered area than import-intensive
technology.
Labour productivity is also higher in the indigenous
construction method: 0.4 man-days is required to produce a
square foot of shelter space as against 0.6 man-days when
using the import-intensive construction technology (see
Table I, 3.1 and 3.2, Box IC in appendix BI). The extra
labour in the latter technology is required for the higher
standard of construction as in surface plastering and
pointing of mortar joints rather than for producing more
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Thus the indigenous
technology is more efficient in its use of capital and
labour while also providing more employment per unit of
expenditure, i.e. per unit of investment.
(b) Comparing Production Technologies
The results of comparing brick production technologies are
contrary to those expected. The import-intensive technology
using the more modern production methods- the trench type,
oil and coal fired kiln - creates slightly more employment
but is much less efficient than the indigenous wall type,
agri-waste fired Kiln. For every Rs 100 worth of output, the
trench kiln creates 1.6 man-days of employment; the wall
kilns, 1.5 man-days. On the other hand, the production cost
per Rs 100 of output for the trench kiln bricks is Rs 97 as
compared to Rs 85 for the wall kiln bricks. The financial
profit margins are therefore much smaller for the trench
Kilns (compare Table II, 1.1 and 1.2, Box A).
6. It can be argued that, because the two products are not
qualitatively homogenous, cost, and labour product
comparisons bias unfairly against the higher quality
product. Differences in quality with regard to cost
comparisons are corrected for by taking maintenance costs
into account. The corrections are less satisfactory for
productivity comparisons. Along with other exponents of
basic needs, we argue, however, that since the objective is
to provide basic shelter, differences in quality need not be
considered in the comparisons beyond those necessary for
health and safety. Differences beyond such essentials are
considered when they are relevant to the issues being
addressed as when income from rental or resale, or value
attached through cultural or taste preferences are being
discussed. The latter issues are considered in the next
chapter.
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covered area.6 construction
As in the construction technologies, adjustments for
economic costs do not make much difference to the relative
production costs and profits. The downward adjustment in
labour costs is almost equal in both production methods. The
extra tax on diesel paid by the more transport-intensive
trench Kiln is offset by the subsidy on the coal it uses.
For both Kilns then, the economic analysis shows a larger
social than financial profit, but their positions relative
to each other remain unchanged (Table II, 2.1 and 2.2).
Three reasons explain why, contrary to expectations, the
trench kiln is more labour-intensive while being less
efficient.
First, fuel is the major cost factor for both Kilns. Coal
and furnace oil used inthe trench kiln is much more
expensive than the agri-waste used in the wall Kiln.
Second, the larger scale of the trench kiln and the
loan-indentured labour system it uses adds to its labour
costs.7 The kiln requires a much larger area of land for
7. Under the loan-labour (paish-gi) system, the worker
is given a loan on joining a Kiln. Repayments are deducted
from his future pay. The majority of unskilled workers in
trench Kilns, especially brick moulders, work under this
system. For the rural poor who live at subsistence and are
easily in debt, this system offers immediate relief. For the
Kiln owner, the workers' effectively indentured status
guarantees a continuing supply of labour, and as we shall
see, at subsistence rates.
III
clay than is required by the wall kilns. This land, where
bricks are moulded, can be some distance from the kiln site.
The costs of brick loading, carriage, and unloading - an
animal- and labour-intensive activity - are higher than in
the wall kilns. Paid managers are also designated from among
the thirty to sixty brick moulders (most of whom would be in
debt to the kiln owners) to insure both a steady supply of
bricks and that no one absconds before his loan is repaid.
Finally, to retain them for the next production season, the
brick-moulders in the trench kiln are paid even during the
two to four months annually when the kiln may not be in
operation.
The smaller capacity wall Kilns avoid both the higher
transport and management costs. The fewer moulders are paid
higher rates but are not kept on when the kiln is closed.
The kiln wall can be also widened or narrowed to increase or
decrease capacity in response to fluctuations in supply of
moulded bricks or in demand by buyers. In the trench kiln,
the wide trench walls are fixed. A slowing down of either
the supply of moulded bricks or of demand usually requires
stopping the firing process. Subsequent refiring start-ups
add to fuel costs.
A combination of economic, institutional, and technical
reasons explain why the wall Rilns are a more eff icient
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production method. The single most important factor here,
however, is the cheaper fuel: the locally obtained agri-
waste in contrast to the import-intensive coal and furnace
oil.
Assumption Five. Greater efficiency results in lower
production costs and hence higher profits to the
entrepreneur who therefore favours the more efficient
import-intensive technologies over the Indigenous ones.
If, as discussed, the indigenous wall Kilns rather than the
import-intensive trench Kilns are more efficient and
profitable, why are the latter still widely used by the big
entrepreneurs? The reasons are threefold.
First, agri-waste-fired bricks are considered technically
substandard; their use is illegal under the building code.
To serve the urban upper-income groups and the government
who constitute the bulk of the brick market, the
entrepreneurs therefore have to use the coal-fired trench
R I n s . 8
Second, although theoretically trench kilns have small
profit margins, in practice, these margins are much wider.
8. No technical studies have been done to assess the
structural qualities of agri-waste-fired bricks relative to
coal- fired ones. The former type is used widely in the
small towns and villages by all but the wealthiest and the
government. Local builders consider it marginally weaker
than the -coal-fired bricks. That differences in production
costs between agri-waste and coal-fired bricks are much
wider than the differences in sale price, suggests the
agri- waste fired bricks are not considered greatly
inferior.
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Timber and agri-waste are often combined with coal and oil
to fire these kilns. Under the guise of deducting loan
repayments, kiln owners in effect pay moulders subsistence
rates: a quarter to a third less than the rate Kiln owners
say they pay the moulders and on which the financial
analysis done here is based. 9 For these reasons the
preceding analysis overstates the actual production costs of
the tirnch kiln bricks.io
9. Brick moulders at several kilns complained of being thus
underpaid. Responding to complaints made by moulders and
researchers, the government passed a law requiring Kiln
owners to issue notebooks recording payments made to the
workers. It is doubtful if this measure will ensure full
payment because most moulders are illiterate, and the
occasional government inspector can and is easily bribed
into accepting the entries made by the kiln owners. The
notebooks shown to me recorded Rs 300 to 400 paid out to the
moulders, whereas the number of bricks they produce per
month would entitle them to a payment of Rs 600 per month.
Whether these subsistence payments represent the shadow wage
rate depends on the moulders' awareness that, that is what
they are being paid and on the freedom the loan-indentured
labour system allows them to change their place of work. The
evidence suggests both information and mobility are
restricted.
The practice of underpayment through the loan-labour system,
- the restrictions it imposes on labour mobility, and the
practice of kiln owners forcibly keep*ng workers from
leaving the kiln have been documented by other researchers
(United Consultants, 1976).
10. Thus caught between unrealistic standards for brick
quality and price controls, on the one hand, and rising
production costs, on the other, the entrepreneur resorts to
illegal and exploitative practices to preserve his profit
margins. A similar cause and effect is manifested in the
substandard construction practices of the building
contractor.
14
Nonetheless, the financial advantages of the wall kilns are
perceived by the larger entrepreneurs. Although the wall
Kiln was introduced from Sind province only a few years ago
(by small entrepreneurs who operate most such kilns in the
district), bigger versions owned by wealthier entrepreneurs
have begun to appear. A contributing factor may be that,
despite the building codes, private sector demand for the
cheaper wall Kiln bricks is increasing, making it worthwhile
for the entrepreneur to risk losing the government market.
Or entrepreneurs who own -more than one Kiln may be
diversifying.
Whatever the case, efficiency and profitability (financial
and economic) seem to lie with the indigenous Kiln, which at
the same time appears preferable for the equity objectives
of employment and income distribution.
Assumption Six. Investment in income-distributing
indigenous technologies will be at the expense of national
savings and future investment since upper-income groups and
the government have a higher propensity to save and reinvest
than the lower-income groups.
Welfare economists and those in favour of housing investment
have usually argued their case on the basis of enhancing the
productivity of the poor or stimulating further investment
through housing (e.g., Burns and Grebler, 1976). Some have
questioned whether the upper-income or the government
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actually reinvest or instead indulge largely in conspicuous
consumption.
Here, for technology alternatives a different issue emerges:
if there are substantial savings in construction
expenditures from using the cheaper indigenous technologies,
do these savings offset any negative impacts on savings from
the income distribution effects?
Both the cash flow and cost-benefit methods of measuring
income distribution from construction expenditures show that
once we include the losses incurred by switching from
indigenous to import-intensive technologies, these losses
more than offset the positive savings effects of the extra
income accruing to the government and upper-income groups
from such a switch. That is, if, as is the case here, we are
assuming the projects are government financed.
Let us first take the cash flow analysis. When a shift is
made from the indigenous to import-intensive technology, a
positive impact on savings equal to roughly four percent of
construction expenditures results from income accruing to
the government (from taxes) and to the upper-income groups.
However, the government loses a fifteen percent savings in
construction costs which indigenous technology would have
brought (see Table 15, Boxes A,B and D).
116
Similarly, in the cost-benefit analysis, the less than one
percent (0.38) positive impact is offset by a fifteen
percent negative impact (see Table 16, Boxes A,B and D in
this section). The small net effect of income distribution
on savings is because the government as building financier
is paying out to the government which levies taxes on
materials.
The above assumes that low-income groups do not save while
the upper-income, business, and government sectors have
saving propensities of ten, fifteen, and twenty percent
respectively. Because the government incurs both the major
loss and gain - paying and receiving taxes for materials
purchases - changing' its savings propensities will have no
effect. (The payer and receiver split, however, into the
local and central government respectively, the implications
of which we will discuss in the gainer and loser analysis in
the next section.)
In sum, the indigenous technologies are both more efficient
and equitable. The indigenous construction technology is
more cost-effective, even with its higher maintenance costs
included. Labour productivity per square foot of covered
area constructed is also higher in the indigenous
technology. As for production technologies, the indigenous
wall kiln, is likewise more efficient, has lower production
R17
costs per brick, and offers higher financial and economic
returns relative to the import-intensive trench Rilns.
Expenditures on construction using indigenous technology and
on brick puchases from the -indigenous wall kilns create much
more local income and employment compared to the same amount
of expenditures on the alternative import-intensive
technologies.
The lone deviation from the foregoing findings is that the
trench kiln provides slightly more employment. But once
actual, rather than stated, wages are considered, we find
that employment is at lower wages and the share of wage
income in the trench Kiln is in fact lower than in the
indigenous wall kiln.
The negative impact of income distribution on savings is
offset by the substantial construction savings accruing from
using the less expensive indigenous technologies.
Finally, an analysis of price trends since 1975 suggests
that cost differentials between indigenous and import-
intensive construction projects should widen even further,
at least in the near future. Increases in the prices of
inputs for import-intensive technologies have been steeper
than those for indigenous technologies. Cement prices have
been increasing at a faster rate than timber; wages of
118
skilled labour have been rising faster than those of
unskilled labour (see Figures 13.1 and 13.2 and Table 17).
While the equity advantages of the indigenous technologies
could be expected, the magnitude, of the difference between
the indigenous and import-intensive alternatives, as made
evident here, is less well known. Moreover, finding that
indigenous technologies can also be more ekficient in terms
of productivity, profitability, and savings directly
contradicts the conventional wisdom about the superiority of
import-intensive technologies. Together these findings
suggest that the large proportion of development
expenditures on import-intensive construction could be far
more effectively utilised through construction using the
indigenous alternatives.
If indeed greater efficiency considerations influence
technology choice, the support for import-intensive
technologies may, at least in the instances we examined, be
based on misconceptions of where the efficiency advantages
lie. Evidence exists that other economic, institutional and
social factors override pure efficiency and equity
considerations. Some of these factors were discussed in
Chapter 3. Others more specific such as prestige
enhancement, building standards, and the training of
engineers will be examined in Chapter 5.
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2. Gainers and Losers: Who Benefits From Construction
Investments?
The gainers and losers from the alternative technology
choices were implicit in the preceding analysis. Here we
identify who they are, the social groups they represent, and
the magnitude and spatial distribution of their gains and
losses. This information gives us additional criteria for
selecting among alternative technologies. It also helps us
anticipate who may support or who may oppose particular
choices; hence, help us to better design technology-
promoting programs.
If the elite benefit from the current trend toward import-
intensive technologies, this finding validates the power
structure view that vested interest and power relations are
important determinants of technology choice.
It is commonly assumed that urban and upper-income groups
gain from and therefore support import-intensive
technologies while rural and lower-income groups gain from
and support indigenous technologies. The polarisation of
interests around these alternative technologies may
initially appear correct from a quick interpretation of the
preceding section. However, a closer analysis reveals
another clustering of gainers and losers.
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The net effects on income (referred to as net income effects
in the rest of this section) of switching from indigenous to
import-intensive technologies offers us a useful way to
identify these gainers and losers. We examine these net
effects, as reflected in the cash flow and cost-benefit
analyses, for the construction and then for the production
technologies
2.1- Comparing Construction Technologies
As expected, the main gainers from a shift to import-
intensive technologies are outside the district. The
district as a whole loses substantially from this shift. The
gainers are thus those who obtain the largest share of the
expenditures on materials such as cement and steel: the
producers, transporters and large retailers of these
materials who are based in the provincial capital, Lahore,
or in the production sources. The central government may
also perceive itself as a gainer if it only considers the
taxes it receives on these materials. These tax gains,
however, are more than offset by the financial and economic
losses the government sustains by adopting the mor.e
expensive and inefficient import-intensive technology (see
Table 16 Box A and B).
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Set against these gainers are the losses of almost all
groups within the district. This loss is the substantial
forty-four percent net increase in leakage of construction
investment resulting from the shift to import-intensive
technology. The expected conflict of interest within the
district between the urban and upper-income groups and the
local government on one side, and the rural and lower-income
groups on the other, is not supported by the evidence. On
purely economic grounds, all these groups should support a
shift to the more indigenous technologies as indeed should
the central government.
The expected benefits to the district's urban materials
merchants, the local retailers of the import-intensive
materials, are small because local markups are small. The
gains in urban income from retail trade are further offset
by the income losses of the urban reed mat makers and
construction workers adversely affected by the switch. The
net benefits to the urban areas are small: the main gainers
being the urban building contractors. Table 18 shows the
income gains and losses among input suppliers.
The district's rural economy loses substantially. Besides
the expected losses to rural contractors and construction
workers, much of the loss is borne by the rural elite. The
elite would otherwise profit from investment in indigenous
construction technologies through the sale of trees for
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roofing and of clay, water, and sand, which make up a large
portion of sun-brick costs. Rural contractor-builders who
cannot handle projects using import-intensive technology
lose bids to the urban contractors.
Local government revenues are also lost. The revenues from
taxes on local enterprises like timber mills are higher than
those from octroi (toll) payments on materials brought into
the district and those from taxes on local retailers of
these materials (for example, compare the local tax obtained
from the timber mill, Table III, 3.1 with that obtained from
cement distribution, Table IV, 3 in appendix BI).
Thus from the district's viewpoint, there should be no major
opposition to the adoption of more indigenous technologies.
Given that the rural areas would gain much more than the
urban merchants would lose in the event of a shift to more
indigenous technologies, these areas could (through some
policy measure) compensate the urban merchants for their
losses and still maintain substantial gains. The central
government should support such a shift if it looks beyond
its tax gains to the financial and economic losses it bears
by adopting the import-intensive technologies in its
projects.
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2.2 Comparing Production Technologies
As in construction, likewise in production. The shift to the
import-intensive technology benefits groups outside the
district at the expense of those within it. A net increase
in leakage of forty-seven percent of local expenditures on
bricks occurs because of a shift from using those produced
by the wall kiln to those produced by the trench kiln.
This leakage is an income gain for the coal and oil
industries and the coal truckers based outside the district.
It is a loss for the district's agri-waste producers -
mainly the large wheat and cotton cultivators, ginning
factory owners - and the local urban-based truckers who
transport agri-waste to the Rilns.
Thus the assumption that adopting import-intensive
technologies at least benefits the urban and upper-income
groups within the district is as much erroneous for
production as it is for construction. Besides the expected
losses for rural areas and lower-income groups, the urban
groups within the district - the truckers and their labour -
and the upper-income groups in general, the large landowners
included, all forego a substantial income gain by the
adoption of bricks produced by trench rather than wall
kilns.
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The upper-income groups actually lose much more than the
lower-income groups from the shift. The local elite,
represented by the large landowners and the truckers (often
the same people) are the single largest losers. The local
government also loses revenues. Taxes and octroi payments
made by the local truckers carrying agri-waste, etc., add
more to municipal revenues than the octroi, which are the
only local payments made by the oil and coal truckers based
outside the district (Table 20, Box A).
The cost-benefit analysis shows that a shift to trench kiln
bricks results in an income gain for the kiln workers and a
somewhat larger loss in revenues for the central goverment
(Table 21, Box A). As stated earlier, the payments to the
brick moulders in the trench kilns are almost certainly
overstated. Hence, the workers' recorded income gain may be
misleading. The central government loses by the switch
because part of the diesel tax it gets from the transport of
oil and coal is offset by the subsidies it provides for
coal. The wall kiln, on the other hand, uses no subsidised
inputs. This loss to the central government is in addition
to its losses from paying for the more expensive coal fired
bricks for its public construction projects.
Thus the cash flow and cost-benefit analyses reveal that,
except for the coal industry and the truckers in the
coal-producing areas, no one gains income from the promotion
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of trench kiln bricks. As discussed earlier, even the kilns'
entrepreneurs would make more profits if they switched to
wall kilns (and if the government lifted the ban on using
agri-waste fired bricks for its projects). Thus among the
low-income groups and the district's elite, there should be
a broad constituency of support for lifting the ban. Given
the effects on revenues, the central government could also
be expected to support such a move.
2.3 Summary
The gainers from the shift to the import-intensive
technologies are the main producers and suppliers of the
inputs for these technologies: the large producers,
retailers and transporters of cement, steel, coal and oil,
all of whom are outside- the district. The losers are almost
everyone within the district except for local cement and
steel merchants who make a small gain. There is evidence
that much of the income losses fall on the district's elite
and on the local government. The central government's gains
are ambiguous at best because tax revenues are offset by
other losses.
Perhaps the most important finding here is the unexpected
convergence of the local elite's interests with the
promotion of indigenous technologies. These elites' active
support is essential to the successful implementation of
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local level projects. Clearly, the benefits of the
indigenous technologies to these elite have yet to be
demonstrated. The questions then remain: how can these
benefits be persuasively demonstrated? And assuming local
groups are persuaded, how can these groups influence
decisions affecting technology choice since many such
decisions are made outside the district? Finally, what is to
be done about the overlap of interests between the
government and the cement and steel industries? Such
questions will be addressed in the final chapter.
3. Promoting Participation and Local Institutions: Does
Technology Matter?
Does the technology adopted in projects promote or hinder
community participation and the development of local
institutions, or is its effect unimportant? Specifically, do
indigenous technologies promote participation while import-
intensive ones hinder it?
Advocates of indigenous technologies claim the latter, but
the evidence is inadequate - ranging from theoretical
generalities to isolated case examples.
This is not surprising because community participation and
institution building are complex processes, imprecisely
defined, and influenced by a variety of factors.
Establishing causal links between technology and these
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processes is difficult, much more so than, say, establishing
links than between technology and employment. The fact that
those who study technology seldom relate it to issues such
as participation and vice-versa further compounds the
problem.
In addressing the above issues, we must thus at the outset
acknowledge that the evidence will be uneven. Quantifiable
evidence suggesting direct causal links between some aspects
of technology and the participation it permits will be
accompanied by others suggesting likely connections, and
still others largely anecdotal. But on the whole the
significance of technology choice in participation and
institution building is established along with a framework
to examine the issue in other contexts.
We first define what we mean by participation by culling
what appears to be a consensus in the literature and see how
this definition relates to policy and practice in Pakistan.
Taking the evidence from Sahiwal district, we then examine
the implications of alternative technology choices on local
community participation and institution building in that
country.
The evidence suggests that as we move from indigenous to
import-intensive technologies we reduce the scope for
participation and, consequently, the likelihood of attaining
its objectives. Illustrative of this is the decrease in
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inputs that the community can contribute and the consequent
limit on project cost reductions possible through
participation.
The evidence also suggests that construction projects using
indigenous technologies can contribute more to the
institution building objective than those using import-
intensive technologies (from hereon the alternative
technologies will be referred to as indigenous and import-
intensive construction projects, respectively). Local
organisations can more effectively implement and maintain
the indigenous construction projects. These same projects
are a better training medium to upgrade local skills. Their
lower cost permits a wider distribution and hence, increases
the training opportunities. The wider distribution also
means that a greater number of local organisations can be
organised around the implementation of such projects, thus
expanding the institutional base.
3.1 Participation Defined
The literature on participation usually examine the effects
of participation on particular projects and on project
objectives rather than the effects of a technology on
participation. Thus definitions center on the Kinds of
participation and the reasons or objectives of
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participation. These definitions are nonetheless useful for
our purpose.
Four kinds of community participation in projects are
identified: in decision making, in implementation, in the
benefits of the project, and in its evaluation (Cohen and
Uphoff, 1977:7; World Bank, 1978 cited in White, 1982:17-
1 9 ) . I i
The reasons for, or the objectives of participation can
likewise be reduced to four. First, participation in
projects makes it more likely that community needs and
priorities are reflected. Second, more is accomplished, or
costs per project are reduced. Third, control over
development projects can be devolved to the community
through representative local organisations or institutions.
Fourth, community leaders and the government gain the
11. These are defined as follows:(i) decision making -
goal-setting, evaluation of options, and the formulation of
strategies to achieve the objectives; (2) implementation -
examples are provision of resources (funds, labour,
materials), participation in project administration or
coordination, and actual enlistment of development projects;
(3) benefits - receipt of material (e.g., increases in
income), social (access to public services), and personal
(increased power) benefits; (4) evaluation - actual
participation in project evaluation, lobbying, or
influencing public opinion. The last kind of participation
is the most difficult to ascertain partly because of the
lack of a conceptual framework of what this entails (Cohen
and Uphoff, 1977:30-55).
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political support of the community they benefit (Rodell,
1983:126-27; White, 1982:19-34).12
The relationship between the preceding Rinds of
participation and their objectives can be expressed as
follows. Community needs and priorities are expressed
through community participation in decision making
(reflecting greater local control). Project costs are
reduced through community participation in implementation.
The more cost- and otherwise effective projects thus provide
greater benefits to the community. If this is so, then such
participation should be institutionalised through local
representative organisations (institution building) rather
than left to occur (or not) on an ad-hoc, project-by-project
basis.
With the above definitions of participation as givens, we
examine whether technology choice affects the kinds of
participation possible and the achievement of their
objectives.1 3 We address these questions within the
Pakistan context in the next section.
12. These four objectives consolidate Rodell's (1983) six
and White's (1982) ten reasons for community participation.
13. In effect, we are not examining how participation (or
the lack of it) influences technology choice, rather how
such choices influence participation. The former issue will
be discussed in the next chapter when we consider the
effects of alternative institutional arrangements on
technology choice.
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3.2 Participation in Pakistan
"One of the major concerns is to bring development
closer to the people. There must be larger community
participation in the execution of development
programmes....a larger role for elected local (council)
bodies in the planning and implementation of (such)
programmes (especially) in the construction of primary
schools, basic health units, rural health centres, farm
to market roads and rural water supply (GOP-Planning
Commission, 1983: )."
We repeat this quote from Chapter 3 as it is the clearest
recorded statement of the government's current policy on
community participation. It brings to the forefront a point
usually left unacknowledged in the literature on
participation: the central role construction often plays in
participatory and institution building processes.
The "development" to be "brought closer to the people"
consists of the schools, roads, etc., to be constructed at
the local level; the people's involvement in such
construction projects provides the link between community
participation and the building up of local institutions. The
largest proportion of local council expenditures and
activities are construction related.
The LGRD department is responsible for promoting local
councils and community participation in Pakistan. The Annual
Development Programme-LGRD shows that the capital budgets of
the LGRD department in Sahiwal, for example, are almost
entirely for construction. Studies in other districts also
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show that local councils choose to spend a very high
proportion (up to eighty percent) of their unallocated funds
from government grants and local resources on construction -
roads, bridges, buildings, and the like (Kauras, 1982:17;
Khan, 1982:62).
From interviews and observations at the national and local
levels, it was clear that the kinds and objectives of
participation as outlined in the preceding section also
applied to Pakistan. National officials tended to emphasise
the importance of "institution building, and strengthening
local financial, managerial and technical capabilities."
They outlined such measures as increasing local taxation
powers and training programs to upgrade local managerial and
technical skills. Less precise statements were made on how
participation and local decision making would also ensure
that such projects would be under local control and would
reflect local needs and conditions (Interview with Bukhari,
1982). Although it went unstated, it was clear that given
the limited training resources, much of the skills upgrading
would have to occur through "learning by doing."
The main concern of local officials was with participation
as implementation: in particular, community contribution of
project inputs to reduce the government's costs. Local
officials and, more so, local councillors were also
concerned with strengthening local decision-making powers,
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although (as we shall discuss) there was ambiguity and
conflict among government officials, engineers, and
councillors on this issue. The communities were reluctant to
contribute to projects seen as under government control and
as a government responsibility.
Everyone was interested in gaining some political capital
through involvement in projects. But no one, at the national
or local levels, considered how the technology of the
construction projects - the concrete manifestation of all
the above issues - would affect their objectives.
3.3 Implications of Technology on the Kinds and Objectives
of Participation
We can now discuss in detail the effect of technology on
participation by drawing on the evidence from Sahiwal.
3.3.1 Decision maKing and Local Control: Empowerment or
Disempowerment
As the complexity or unfamiliarity of the technology adopted
in a project increases relative to the resources and
knowledge of the community, so does the dependence on
experts or outsiders to make most project decisions, to
supervise implementation, and to evaluate the success or
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failure of the project.1 4 Such dependence weakens a
major objective of participation - the increased empowerment
of the community through the eventual devolution of control
over development projects to the community and its
representatives.
Similarly, the adoption of the more complex or unfamiliar
technology legitimises any predisposition to restrict
community control of public projects. This may not be the
intent of policy makers in making a technology shift but
simply a likely result of that shift.
These effects are evident in shifting from indigenous to
import-intensive technologies in Sahiwal. An example was the
introduction in 1983 of new specifications for constructing
14. Complexity and familiarity are inversely related.
Complexity may be more relative than absolute depending on
the familiarity of the task. The more familiar a task is -
that is, the closer it is to what people already know and
the resources already available - the easier it is to
perform and conversely. Thus familiarity and unfamiliarity
become relevant in deciding the ease (or difficulty) with
which the community can perform the task. As Korten
(1980:20-21) also notes, building on indigenous technologies
reduces the likelihood that the villagers will be
"deskilled" and thus increase their dependence on external
experts over whom they have no social control. This point is
illustrated in the contrasting examples of implementing
construction projects using indigenous and import-intensive
discussed in this chapter (cf. the markaz centre project
discussed in this section and the school construction
discussed in section 3.3.2[c)).
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markaz1 5 centre buildings (a central location for field
offices of the LORD, the council, and other government
departments). These new specifications required reinforced
concrete instead of the more familiar girder and tile roofs
(used until then) in all -new markaz centre buildings.
In one such project, the LORD project manager for the area
complained that he had to spend most of his time
administering the project. Other projects using the girder
and tile technology could be left mainly to the councillors
(Interview with Chaudury, 1983). The LORD assistant engineer
complained that he, too, had to visit the site more
frequently (Interview with Ghumal Rahat, 1983). The project
manager hoped that this author could influence the "higher
ups" to reinstate the previous technology, while the
engineer wondered how local councillors could ask for more
projects when they could clearly not implement them without
relying heavily on him.
3.3.2 Implementation: Community Contributions and
Cost-Reductions. Reductions or Transfers?
When community participation is referred to, what is
frequently meant is participation in implementation:
15. The markaz (project centre) is an administrative unit
created under the Integrated Rural Development Programme in
1972. Each markaz was designed to serve fifty to sixty
villages stretching over an area of 200-300 square miles(Khan, 1982:27).
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community contribution of resources - funds, materials,
labour - and assumption of management tasks. The viewpoints
of the government and the community on this Kind of
participation may conflict, however. For the government, the
benefit of such participation is simply to transfer part of
the project costs to the community: the contribution of
resources for the project by the community with a
proportionate reduction in projecct costs for the
government.1 6 For the community, such participation must
result in the implementation of the project in a way that
the .costs borne by them are reduced.
Participation in these terms can be measured in three ways.
First, the greater the proportion of total resources
provided and tasks implemented by the community, the greater
the level of participation. Second, the greater the value of
inputs in proportion to total project costs that can be
contributed by the community, the greater the participation
and cost reduction from the government's viewpoint. Finally,
the greater the value of inputs that the community can
provide with little or no cost to themselves: materials
obtained without payment (e.g., reeds or straw gathered for
free), labour for supervision or construction during periods
16. Note we are concerned here with cost reduction possible
through community participation, that is, through
contribution of inputs, not through selection of cheaper
technology. The latter is measured by the cost-effective
analysis discussed in the first section of this chapter.
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of employment troughs (that is, low opportunity cost), the
greater the cost reduction for the community.
Potentials for levels of - participation and consequent cost
reductions are dramatically greater in indigenous compared
to import-intensive technologies. Let us compare, for
example,the indigenous sun-brick, timber roof with the
import-intensive coal-fired brick, reinforced concrete
cement technology for each of the three preceding
measurements of participation.
(a) Proportion Contributed and the Level of Participation
With the indigenous technology, local councillors and
residents can assume all managerial responsibilities ranging
from obtaining materials, skills, and labour to implementing
and supervising construction, to evaluation. The tasks
involved are also more compatible with the convenience and
work schedules of the local residents. The technology
permits work stoppages at all stages of construction without
affecting quality. Foremost, the community has greater
social control over those involved in the construction
process. Social pressure, community traditions, and
community cohesiveness have a hand in such control. Greater
participation and more flexible arrangements in mobilising
internal resources - barter, more liberal credit, extra
concessions - can be worked out than would be otherwise
possible with external experts and suppliers over whom the
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community has no social control. (All the above is clearly
illustrated in the case example of school construction in
section 3.3.2 [c] of this chapter).
In contrast, the import-intensive technology requires the
LGRD official to be heavily involved as already noted. The
relevant construction tasks are not as adaptable to the
local residents' convenience and work schedules. Laying a
concrete roof slab, for example, must be a continuous
process and cannot be interrupted.
The community can contribute seven out of eight materials
required for indigenous construction as compared to only
three out of eleven materials in import-intensive
construction (see Table 22). Seventy-three percent of the
total man-days of labour in indigenous technologies is
unskilled, which can be contributed by the community,
compared to sixty-seven percent in import-intensive
construction. Finally, even the sKilled tasks in indigenous
construction can be implemented by local builders with
little supervision from engineers. The significance of these
differences are more apparent when monetised as is done in
below.
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(b)Value of Participatory Inputs and Effect on Cost
Reductions
Costs of indigenous construction projects may be reduced by
sixty-three percent through community contributions compared
to a possible reduction of twenty-one percent in import-
intensive projects (Table 22).
The differences in cost reductions are even greater in the
maintenance stage. Maintenance in the indigenous
construction requires largely local materials - mud and
straw - and relatively low skills. Mud plastering is often
done by women and children. By comparison, cement plastering
in maintenance of import-intensive construction is a highly
skilled task and the material is of course nonlocal.
Although mud and the labour of women and children have a
social cost, this cost, fairly imputed, would still be
substantially lower than that of cement and the labour for
cement plastering. Thus community contributions in the
maintenance of indigenous construction projects can reduce
project costs by seventy-nine percent as compared to only
twenty-four percent for import-intensive ones.
Put another way, indigenous construction projects are four
and a half times cheaper than import-intensive ones when all
inputs are valued. But if we deduct savings through possible
community contributions, indigenous construction projects
become nine times cheaper. Maintenance, which was
approximately twice as expensive (at zero discount rates) in
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indigenous technologies, falls to one-third below the cost
of maintenance in import-intensive technologies if we deduct
community contributions (Table 22 and Figure 15).
(c) Value of Participatory Inputs and Cost Reductions to
the Community
Construction using indigenous technologies offers ample
scope for materials and labour considered free goods or
nearly so by the community. Wealthier members can also
organise implementation so that the costs are transferred to
them but in inputs they, the wealthy, consider "free" goods.
In Sahiwal, as in many rural areas, materials, such as
reeds, clay, straw, and - to a lesser extent - timber, can
be obtained free or almost free. Unpaid labour by tenants
can be contributed by the larger landowners during slack
periods in agriculture.1 7 In addition, the opportunity
cost of unskilled voluntary labour is also very low,
17. Strictly speaking, tenant labour is not free as the
landlord has obligations to provide for the tenant, hence
the cost is eventually paid for. This is, however, a "sunk"
cost.The marginal cost of labour contributed for that
particular project is really zero as far as the landlord is
concerned. From the viewpoint of the worker involved,
however, a cost is involved. This cost consists of the
disutility of the effort he must contribute and the value of
the leisure time he forgoes. Thus insofar as the unpaid
worker is forced to work because of the control the landlord
or councillor may have over him, the cost saved from the
government, councillor, or landlord's viewpoint is in fact
transferred to this worker.
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especially during the annual troughs in labour demand in
response to the agricultural cycles.
The following case example of the construction process of
some schools using indigenous technologies helps to
illustrate the preceding points.
A Union Council secretary proudly described two schools
constructed through community participation:
"The site was donated by one landowner. Another
provided the clay for sun-bricks,- which our sun-brick
makers made for free. You can be sure these sun-brick
makers will be the first to be given work when the
harvest starts. Our Rumhaars (transporters using
donkeys) did all the carrying back and forth of
materials for which they were partially recompensed by
hay for the donkeys given by another of our landowners
We had to pay for the timber beams and battens but the
sawmill owner cut and shaped them at no cost. We also
had to buy the doors and windows. Everyone donated some
of his time for construction work since most of us are
familiar with it and the harvesting had not yet begun,
but we had to pay our builder ."
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Such participation (and consequent cost reductions) would
have been impossible if the schools had been constructed
using fired brick and reinforced concrete roofs.18
Thus, while the government wants to encourage community
participation in construction projects and reduction of
project costs through such participation, by adopting
increasingly more import-intensive technologies
substantially, it reduces the scope for such participation
and increases costs for both itself and the community. In
shifting from indigenous technologies to import-intensive
ones, the government's share of the costs increases from
Rs 8 to Rs 74 per square foot of construction and the
community's share, from Rs 13 to Rs 20 per square foot of
construction (Figure 15).
3.3.3 Benefits: Haterial, Social and Personal
The greater benefits accruing to the community through the
adoption of indigenous technologies have been demonstrated
18. Also, contrast these projects with the one mentioned in
the earlier discussion of complexity and who controls - the
mar.kaz centre - which used reinforced concrete roofs
(cf. section 3.3.1 of this chapter). The markaz project was
of a complexity that marginalised the involvement and
control of councillors and the community. The school
projects and its participatory implementation required a
familiarity with the technology and the local community - a
type of complexity - beyond the capabilities of the
government agencies. We pursue the relationship between
technology and the institutional environment in our next
chapter.
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in the analyses of equity and efficiency and gainers and
losers (cf. sections I and 2 of this chapter).
In brief the findings were as follows. On material - that
is, income benefits - we found that ninety-seven percent of
the investment in indigenous construction projects was
captured as income by the district, compared to only
fifty-three percent of the investment in import-intensive
construction. The corresponding income benefits to the rural
communities were eighty-one percent as compared to
twenty-one percent.
Because constructed facilties using indigenous technologies
were close to five times cheaper, we can expect the same
investment would provide as many times more facilities for a
community thus greatly increasing their social benefits,
that is, access to such facilities.
Finally, as discussed above, the less complex indigenous
technologies would permit greater community control of the
planning and implementation of local projects using such
technologies and hence transfer greater power to them.
3.3.4 Gaining Prestige and Political Support
Because of its modernising image, import-intensive
construction projects usually confer greater prestige to
144
those associated with such construction. The prestige factor
is important for the community that wishes to raise its
collective self-esteem through a project - a school,
community centre, and so forth. It is then also important
for community representatives and politicians wanting the
political support of such communities. All other factors
being equal, the community may therefore be more inspired to
contribute to a project adopting import-intensive
technologies than to one adopting indigenous technologies.
As we have just discussed, however, all other factors
related to the promotion of participation are not equal
between the two technologies. Further, for the community
representatives wishing to gain political support, a larger
facility made possible by the adoption of the cheaper
indigenous technologies may be more effective than a small,
albeit more modern looking one.
Morever, prestige is not inherent in technology, especially
building technology, but is acquired through association
with those considered prestigious in a society. Projects
using indigenous technologies could also become prestigious
through the demonstration effect as we shall later discuss.
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3.4 Building Local Institutions
Successful institution building depends on the following:
justifying the need for such institutions; the strengthening
of the institutions' capabilities - fiscal resources and
upgrading organisational and technical skills, and the
expansion of the institutional base. We shall discuss below
the effects of technology choice on each of these factors.
3.4.1 Justifying Local Institutions
The justification for institution building at the local
level depends on how much better these local institutions
can perform important functions than the other more
centralised ones.
The national government clearly believes that local
institutions - the local council system assisted by the LGRD
departments - can better plan and implement local projects
than the existing line agencies can and that the local
institutions should do so. These projects, as mentioned, are
for the most part construction related.
In this context, the reduced scope for community
participation in construction projects resulting from the
shift to import-intensive technologies also affects the
institution building process.
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The reduced scope for community participation weakens the
case for devolving responsibility for such projects to local
institutions. Given that the implementation of such projects
are a major function of these institutions, such reductions
can undermine the entire local institution building process.
Officials of the conventional construction agencies - the
Public Works department (PWD) and the construction
departments of other line agencies - had reservations about
turning over project control to the local project
committees. They argued with some justification that such
committees lacked the requisite managerial and technical
skills and that the apparent savings in projects resulted
less from the committees' greater efficiency than from their
zeal - substituting their unpaid time for the paid time and
profits of the contractors. They pointed out, too, that
these committees were heavily dependent on the paid staff,
particularly the engineers of the LGRD department, whose
time was also not included in project costing. These
officials, of course, spoke with reference to projects using
import-intensive technologies.
Although strong central government support for such
committees currently overrides such reservations, these
criticisms may gain more strength and undermine local
institution building if the political climate goes against
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local development, as it has done periodically in the
p a s t . 1 9
In contrast, the adoption of indigenous technologies in
construction projects can strengthen the case for local
institutions. As illustrated in the case described above
(cf.3.3.2 [c] of this chapter), administering such projects
requires a close relationship with the local community and
familiarity with local technologies: characteristics that
institutions composed of local residents can claim to have
to a greater degree than the construction agencies.
3.4.2 Strengthening the Capabilities of Local Institutions
Building up local institutions requires strengthening their
fiscal, organisational, and technical capacities. A modest
government program to increase the income generation and
taxation powers of these institutions exists. An equally
modest program is underway to train district councillors in
the organisational and technical skills required to
administer local level projects. How does the technology
adopted affect these efforts to strengthen the capacities of
local institutions?
19. Political support for local institutions has been
cyclical and in pace with the central government's
perception of its need for support at the local level. Once
established and confident in its position, each regime has
reduced such support. Basic Democracies and the People's
Works Programs both lost momentum as the Ayub and the Bhutto
governments became more secure.
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(a) Increasing Local Fiscal Capacities
Perhaps the most important measure for local institution
building is one that increases the financial resources of
the local community through income generation and taxation.
Increasing local incomes is the basis for increasing local
capacity to finance projects, whether as private financing
for personal housing, as contributions for community
facilities, or as business income taxable by the local
government.
Our analysis of gainers and losers showed that the shift to
import-intensive technologies resulted in a loss of local
personal incomes and taxes to the local government. Every
Rs 100 of construction investment on import-intensive
instead of indigenous projects resulted in a loss of Rs 44
in local incomes. The tax loss resulted from larger payments
to externally based materials producers and suppliers who
either paid no local taxes or paid a much smaller proportion
of their revenues in local taxes than their local
counterparts (cf. section 2 of this chapter).
Consequently, a government-supported trend towards import-
intensive technologies conflicts with the [government's)
objective to enhance local capacity to finance housing and
community projects. Conversely, a reversal of this
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technology trend is an important step towards enhancing
local capacity to finance construction as a personal,
community, and local government endeavour.
(b) Upgrading Skills through Training and "Learning by
Doing"
Formal training programs at the district level are important
in strengthening the organisational and technical
capabilities of local institutions. Formal methods of skills
development are, however, limited by both the government's
training resources and the understanding of the issues and
skills relevant to local level projects. Almost by
definition, many of these issues and skills may be location
specific. Because of these constraints, much of the required
training will have to occur through an incremental "learning
by doing" process. 2 0
Construction projects offer a potentially effective vehicle
for formal and nonformal training. The participants'
interest can be engaged because the subject matter - badly
needed infrastructure and facilities - relates closely to
their situation and needs. These projects provide
opportunities for practical training in both organisational
and technical skills, which are equally important for
institution building at the local level. Moreover,
20. Korten (1980) also stresses "action based learning" as
an important part of organisational development.
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construction projects are what local institutions do most,
therefore formal training is best designed around these
projects. Informal learning will, in any case, rely on
experiences gained from such projects.
How does the choice of technology in these construction
projects affect their effectiveness as vehicles for training
and learning?
Let us first examine formal training. Using import-intensive
construction projects as training media imposes a double
burden on the trainee. Trainees have to simultaneously
contend with two levels of unfamiliarity and complexity:
that of the training medium, the construction process using
import-intensive methods, and that of the concepts and
techniques of project planning and management.
Consistent with the more complex tasks inherent in
import-intensive construction projects, the level of skills
to be imparted to the project participants - planners,
managers, and technicians - is also higher. The learning
curve is thus more gradual.
But the most serious shortcoming of training based on such
projects is the content. Because training takes its cue from
the needs of import-intensive rather than indigenous
construction methods, what is taught and learnt is less
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relevant to the skills local institutions need to
effectively contribute to broad-based rural development. The
trainee learns more about managing capital- and import-
intensive projects rather than administrative- or
labour-intensive ones, which are more typical of poverty-
focused rural development efforts. Keeping steel rods rust
free rather than timber damp free; securing heavy equipment
for construction rather than organising community members
for the periodic maintenance of constructed facilities;
dealing with a few large contractors and cement retailers in
the city rather than with small contractors (builders, local
materials producers and entrepreneurs) dispersed in the
smaller towns - these are but a few examples.
Since the projects' success does not depend on the success
of the latter builders and entrepreneurs, issues and skills
relevant to the development of such rural groups are not
considered as important, are not taught nor learnt.
These shortcomings of formal training designed around
import-intensive construction projects are even more evident
in nonformal training, which relies on "learning by doing"
such construction.
In contrast, formal training based on projects using
indigenous construction methods can be more easily absorbed
and avoid the biases previously mentioned.
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Nonformal training is likewise better served by such
projects. Construction projects using indigenous methods
provide much more opportunities for "learning by doing."
The lower cost per project means more projects to learn
from, for the same construction budget. And since the
project tasks are simpler, more familiar, and more labour-
intensive, a greater number and a wider range of locals can
assume responsibilities of implementation instead of the
learning experience being restricted to a few better
educated, more motivated councillors, and the LGRD
personnel.
Perhaps most significant is that the project development
(construction) process is incremental - requiring a small
initial commitment of technology, time, and money - thus
making it easier to introduce the project, to learn from
each step, to make changes as required, and to
simultaneously improve the construction and the skills being
developed around its implementation. 2 1
This process of action-based incremental learning extends
through the life of the building. The annual, generally
predictable maintenance that can be entirely locally
implemented offers a continuing learning experience. Around
21. In many ways, the learning experience provided by
construction using indigenous technologies are compatible
with the "learning process" approach to community
organisation and rural development (see Korten, 1980:19-24).
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it more formal training can evolve while addressing
maintenance needs. The capacity to adequately maintain
constructed facilities is in itself a major resource
management sKill frequently overlooked in many training
programs.
Thus formal training and "learning by doing" through
projects using indigenous resources are a more effective
learning media, involves larger numbers of locals in the
learning experience, and encourages addressing a wider set
of more relevant issues and skills than import-intensive
projects do.
(c) Expanding the Local Institutional Base
As mentioned at the outset, the justification for a local
institution depends in part on identifying a function best
performed by that institution. As more leaders and members
gain experience through the repeated performance of such
functions, the organisation's activities and performance are
regularised; the capabilities of local institutions are
strengthened; organisational effectiveness is increased. An
institution once thus established for a single function can
take on other tasks and broaden its membership; skills in
community leadership, mobilising local resources, project
planning, and management learnt in one type of project can
be applied to other types.
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A key element of institution building is the expansion of
the institutional base, that is, growth in membership as
well as in functions. Organising local institutions around
construction projects offers scope for such expansion. Again
construction projects using indigenous technologies fare
better than their import-intensive counterparts. More
projects could be implemented; hence the accompanying
institutions - such as village project committees - could
be more widely distributed and extend farther down in the
settlement heirarchy.
Besides permitting a wider geographic spread of the
institutional base, indigenous technologies encourage a more
egalitarian organisational structure. As earlier pointed
out, training opportunities through indigenous construction
projects are open to more people - leaders as well as other
community members - and skills are spread throughout the
organisation. This reduces the likelihood of the
organisation being dominated by an advantaged few.2 2
The simpler, more familiar, and more labour-intensive
indigenous technologies allow greater flexibility to
disperse project responsibilities among members. In low-
income, rural areas the community's assumption of project
22. A widening of the skills gap between leaders and
followers as the former gain more experience has been noted
as one of the factors leading to oligarchic tendencies in
organisations (Michel, £915 cited in Esman and Uphoff,
1984:216).
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responsibilities may very well compete with the sheer
demands of survival. The dispersal of responsibilities among
a larger group reduces demands on each individual and
permits the involvement of those who may have been otherwise
reluctant. Thus broader participation is encouraged. In
addition, such dispersal of responsibilities can also
improve organisational effectiveness. 2 3
The higher proportion of inputs that can be contributed by
the community in construction projects using indigenous
technologies increases the institution's capacity to
mobilise resources internally. Reduced dependence on
external experts and suppliers increases community control
over the project. Both these effects [of technology choice]
promote collective pride (members regard the project as
"theirs"), self-reliance, and group solidarity - all
critical factors in successful local institutions.2 4
Once a village institution is organised around the
construction of, for example, a school using indigenous
technologies, its continued existence can be justified on
the basis of the annual maintenance tasks that it can best
perform, with some support from district level institutions.
23. Cases of organisational effectiveness resulting from
dispersing leadership responsibilities have been documented
in the Small Farmer Development Programs in Nepal and
Bangladesh and women's cooperatives in Nicaragua (Esman and
Uphoff, 1984:226).
24. A considerable body of literature has examined the
factors related to successful local organisations (Esman and
Uphoff, 1984; Uphoff and Esman, 1974; Leonard and
Marshall,1982; Korten, 1980).
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Such repeated tasks can consolidate the institution and the
skills learnt by those involved. The local institution thus
established can be used for other development tasks in the
village. Through such a process,- construction projects using
indigenous technologies can help strengthen local
capabilities and spread local institutions down to the
village level.
5. Summary
In sum what do the preceding findings suggest, especially in
terms of the alternative development perspectives that we
presented in Chapter 2?
The potential for a tradeoff in efficiency, at least in the
short run, to achieve equity objectives was implicitly
acknowledged even by the advocates of indigenous
technologies. The achievement of short-run equity objectives
is the most that supporters of import-intensive technologies
(from the development theorists to local engineers) are
willing to concede. These groups accept the greater
efficiency of import-intensive technologies almost as an act
of faith; much in the same way that supporters of indigenous
technologies accept the greater equity advantages of the
latter.
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Thus our finding that the indigenous technologies were both
more equitable and efficient is significant. It challenges a
basic, widespread, and deep-rooted belief in the superiority
of more modern, import-intensive technologies - the economic
rationale and also the most commonly used justification for
adopting these technologies over indigenous ones. This is so
at least for the cases investigated in this study.
The analysis of gainers and losers touches on the issues
raised by the power structure theorists who suggest that
such a shift increases the exploitation of the periphery by
the core, the' rural by the urban areas, and the rich by the
poor.
Frank is quite explicit. At the risk of being repetitive we
can recall his quote:
"...the domestic metropolis promotes the technology in
its hinterland that serves its interests and suppresses
the pre-existing - artisan technology that interferes
with the use of the countryside's productive buying
capacity and capital for metropolitan development
(Frank, 1971:33)."
Does this appear to be so in Sahiwal?
The gainers from import-intensive technologies are those who
benefit from the cement, steel, and coal industries. These
beneficiaries are the government, the shareholders and
workers in these industries, and the associated retailers
and transporters of these materials. These beneficiaries
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reside outside the district and in the large cities. Frank
would interpret the net loss in rural public and private
investment through income flows out to these industries as
the use of the buying capacity of the countryside to serve
metropolitan development or more generally, as one way
resources are siphoned from rural to urban areas, from the
periphery to the core.
Issues of exploitation and control emphasised by the power
structure groups also emerge from our examination of
technology and participation. As noted, cost reductions
through community participation, are cost transfers from the
government to the community, and from stronger to weaker
members within the community. The cost thus transferred is
lower in a participatory project that adopts indigenous
technologies. This is because a large proportion of the
inputs - clay, reed mats, timber, and unskilled labour - can
be obtained for little or no cost. However, two problems
remain.
The question is raised here that applies to all
participatory projects in a society where power is held
unequally. To what extent are the contributions of unskilled
workers - men and women - voluntary or the result of the
control that the more powerful - government representatives,
councillors, landowners, etc., - may have over these
workers? Even if they are voluntary, to what extent is the
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level of participation a measure of the otherwise
undesirable situation of low or no employment or low value
placed on certain- types of labour such as construction
maintenance undertaken by women and children?
The devolution of greater control made possible through
indigenous technologies is of course devolution to the local
councils and the elites represented in them. Whether this is
good or bad for the lot of the less wealthy and powerful
depends on how responsive the elite or the central
authorities will be to the less advantaged in the district.
Other studies of local organisations show that an active
role by elites is not necessarily harmful. To the extent
that local organisations "provide services that are widely
diffused and shared such as schools; roads, health clinics,
control and leadership by established elites may spread
benefits and access widely if not equitably (Leonard and
Marshall, 1982:12-18, cited in Esman and Uphoff, 1984:191)."
Without relying on technological determinism, we can at
least hope that the strengthening of local institutions and
the expansion of local involvement in projects made possible
by adopting indigenous technologies will promote a
concomitant expansion in self-esteem, awareness, and
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skills.2 5 The latter are critical in
ability of the poorer groups to press their demands and give
rise to a more representative leadership.
Thus the promotion of indigenous technologies seen clearly
to serve reformist objectives, may also contribute to more
significant change.
25. In Hansehra district, membership in the project
committees is such that all the households in the community
are represented in at least one committee. Under such
circumstances, the close involvement in development
activities encouraged by the adoption of indigenous
technologies will have a maximum effect.
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TABLE 15 SWITCHING From Indigenous to Imported CONSTRUCTION Technologies.
From Sun-Brick Mall, Timber Roof Type to Fired Brick Wall, Reinforced Concrete Roof Type Technaloi
NET EFFECTS on Income Distribution, Costs, Employment, Productivity I Savings.
(Comparing Results of CASH - FLOW Analysis)
A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION ::Through Cash - Flow from Construction Expenditures
!.Spatially I !By Income Group
":External District 'Within District Local Govt
Construction Technology Type :Urban Rural 1 Upper Lower
c d ! f g i j I 1 m o
Indigenous (Sun-Brick Walls, Timber Roof)', 2.04 98.01 : 17.10 81.08 1 29.39 68.75 1 0.68
Imported (Fired Brick Walls, RCC Roof) :1 46.06 53.?4 : 32.97 20.97 24.75 29.19 I 0.49
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 11 44.02 -44.07 1 15.87 -60.11 1 -4.64 -39.56 1 -0.17
NET INCOME EFFECT !! -0.05 1 -44.24 1 -44.20 1 -0.19
z: SAVINGS THROUGH: :1: Income Distribution
*e noI itrbto
SAINS ISRIUTO
:Spatially IBy Income Group
:'External District :Within District 'Local GoYt
!Urban Rural 1 Upper Lower
Net Income Distribution :1 44.02 -44.07 1 15.87 -60.11 1 -4.64 -39.56 1 -0.19
Marginal Propensity to Save Input ==> 0.10 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 1 0.20
SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION 1! 4.40 -0.79 I 0.48 -1.20 | -0.46 0.00 I -0.04
NET SAVINGS 3.61 3.61 1 -0.73 I -0.46 : -0.04
1B: CONSTRUCTION COST-EFFECTIVENESS
*: I Y
H Rs/sf sf/Rs100
!Indigenous H 20.73 4.82
!Imported H 93.92 1.07
NET LOSSES(Rsts) H -73.09 -3.76
lValue/si (Rs) :1 20.73
'Total Value of sf Lost (Rs) -77.90
1D2: Construction Cost Differences
Marg.Prop.to Save
SAVINGS Effect
Froa: I) Rsisf
Y) sf/Rsl00
NET SAVINGS EFFECT
D1 + 1) Rs/sf:
111 + Y) sf/RslOO:
If Consumer is:
::Govt. Low Y.
H 0.20 0.00
-14.62 0.00
-15.58 0.00
HS
:-11.01
|| -11.97
3.61
3.61
Cl: EMPLOYMENT (MDays/RslOO) '
(Onsite)
ITotal Unskilled
aab ac
Indigenous 2.07 1.3
! Imported 0.72 0. 4
NET
EMPLOYMENT -1.35 -1.05
.5
5*
'II,
'I
D83: Net Mages I
I I
:Net Employment! -1.35 1
NWages/Mday I 30.00
:Net ages ! -40.50
1f.P.to Save 1 0.00
SAVINGS EFFECT! 0.00
!NET SAVINGS I
I (>UD2+D3h: ! 3.61
I- - _______
TABLE 16 SWITCHING from Indigenous to Imported CONSTRUCTION Technologies -
(From Sun-Brick Wall, Timber Roof to Fired Brick Wall, Reinforced Concrete Roof Types)
NET EFFECTS on Income Distribution, Costs, Employment, Productivity k Savings
(Comparing Results of COST-BENEFIT Analysis)
A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION 8 Groups Affected:
8 Project Bsnss.Nrkr. Central'
Construction Technology Type ! Govt.
a e.a Ic .! e f g h j
Indigenous(Sun-Brick Malls,Timber Roof)! -4.17 0.00 4.17 0.00 1
lmported(Fired Brick Walls, RCC Roof) 11 -10.70 1.76 1.36 7.58
NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION ! -6.53 1.76 -2.81 7.58
as
6a
as
as
a,
s
a s
ID: SAVINGS THROUGH: 8D1: Income Distribution
:.If Project is: BusnesWorkerCentrall
SlGoyt.orLow Y. G ovt.
Net Income Distribution 8 -6.53 -6.53 : 1.76 -2.81 7.58 1
!Marginal Propensity to Save. (Input ==) 0.20 0.00 : 0.10 0.00 0.20 1
:NET SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION -1.31 0.00 1 0.18 0.00 1.52
as a
:NET SAVINGS EFFECT
If Project Funded by: :a Government
::b) Low-Income Person
1B: CONSTRUCTION: COST EFFECTIVENESS
!! I y
!N Rs/sf sf/Rs100
n 8 Input q
=====------ \ ====
Indioenous 81 20.73 5.31 1
:Imported ! 93.82 1.17 1
!NET LOSSES(Rs,sf) 8 -73.09 -4.14
Valueisf (Rs) 8 20.73
H
TOTAL Value of lost sf(Rs) -85.82
a,
a'
\/
1D2:Construction Costs Sayings/Losses
!Marg.Prop.to Save
SAVINGS Effect
:From: 1) Rs/sf
Y) sf/Rs100
::If Funder is:
::Govt. Low Y.
Ii .
al
1! 0.20 0.00
-14.62
-17.16
a a as
:NET SAVINGS EFFECT::
0.39 1=0 :Dla) + X) Rs/sf -14.23
1.69 .
-- IDb) + Y) sf/RsOO:: -16.78
a as
0.00
0.00
1.69
I Cl: EMPLOYMENT (Man Days/Rso0)8
1 (Onsite) IlTotal Unskilled:
n 8 p r
|--- -- 8!========= a
:Indigenous 8 2.07 1.53 1
!lImported 1: 0.72 0.48
INET H I
:EMPLOYMENT !8 -1.35 -1.05 |
:D: Net Wages
a as
:Net Employment:: -1.35 :
:Wages/Nday 8! 30.00 1
:Net Wages 1!-40.50
:K.P.to Save 8! 0.00 1
!SAVINGS EFFECT:: 0.00
a a a 
a a so
5 a as a
:NET SAVINGS
==)Dia) + D2 + D3:1-16.78 :
1.69 I !Dib) + D2 + D3:: 1.69 I
C2: LABOUR
PRODUCTIVITY1
(ManDays/sf)
u
0.39
0.61
-0.22
INPUTS 1975-83TABLE 17 PRICE TRENDS OF CONSTRUCTION
INPUT
-II-------------------------------
b/ '!Price | 322
f|Index 1 100
!!Manday! 42
II I 100
1:Manday: 28
100
II I
Unskilled |!Mandayl
Timber Log !!cubic
(Shishan) ::metre
Cement :!50kg
(Portland, Grey) !
Mild Steel Bars 1:M ton i
(1/2' dia) |
Bricks ! 1000
(Coal Fired) !
Motor Spirits Uhlitre 11
(Truck transport)M 1
I I
I I
63
225
2.G
185
1781 2477 2030 2078
100 139 114 117
24
100
2252 2499 3126 3531
126 140 176 198
58
241
3644 4426 4045 4134 5371 6049 4526 4422
100 121 111 113 147 166 124 121.
245
100
2.56
100
2.70 2.80 3.13
105 109 122
3.96 4.83 5.08 5.72
155 189 198 223
a/ All Lahore prices from National Engineering services Pakistan Ltd. NESPAK Price Index, (Feb. 1983:24-25)
except for motor spirits, oil and coal which are Pakistan prices from GOP (1983-84: )Pakistan Economic Survey
b/ 1969-70 = 100
c/ NESPAK July-Dec. 1982 figures for labour, timber, cement, steel, bricks.
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Construction
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TABLE 18 INCOME GAINS AND LOSSES AMONG INPUT SUPPLIERS
RESULTING FROM SWITCHING BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES
(Per Rs. 100 Expenditures)
HINCOME GAINS AND LOSSES
Ill: First Round Payments
CONSTRUCiION TYPE HA: INDIBENOUS
=z=2) IISun-Brick
!!Walls,liber
INPUTS #IRoof
!!
TOTALS II 99.99
Contractors PROFIT(lOlofMtlL)I 9.09
11
1.0 MATERIALS II 50.18
||
1.1 Local II 50.18
Straw, Dung, Brass :1 0.00
Earth, Clay 11 9.56
Sand iI 0.00
Wood Forms IRental) 1 0.00
Reed Mats l 5.01
Timber Beams,Battens 11 18.00
Sun-Britis H1 17.61
Fired Bricks,Tiles,BallastII 0.00
Il
1.2 Non-Local 11 0.00
Bitusin, Polythene 11 0.00
Aggregate It 0.00
Cement ~ 1 0.00
M.S.Bars 1/2' -l1 0.00
SI
2.0 LABOUR ! 40.72
Skilled it 19.89
Unskilled it 20.83
-II
12: Second Round of Paymentsl
18: IMPORTED li1:SWITCHINGI Local 1121SNITCHING I
IFired-Brick lifroa A to BI Coeff- lfrom A to B I
IWalls, R.C. iI(Net Incomel icients It(et Income
IRoof 11ais I I lains I
Illosses) IIlLosses)
100.01 11 0.02 1I1 -
1 II 11 1
9.0 0 1.00
69.17 1I 18.99 1 II -25.33 1
I1 1 It I
I 28.34 It -21.84 1 11 -29.04 1
1 0.00 H| 0.00 1 1.00 i1 0.00 1
1 0.75 1I -8.81 I 1.00 it -8.91 I
1 8.65 II 8.65 1 1.00 II 8.65 1
1 3.13 1I 3.13 1 1.00 11 3.13 1
1 0.00 11 -5.01 1 0.71 11 -3.56 1
1 0.00 It -18.00 1 0.99 -1.82 1
I 0.00 11 -17.61 1 0.?9 1 -111S. I
1 15.81 it 15.81 1 0.43 11 6.80' 1
11i 1 i
40.83 11 40.83 1 11 3.71 1
I 7.50 I 7.50 1 0.07 11 0.53 1
1 7.17 11 7.17 1 0.20 11 1.43 1
I 19.96 11 19.96 1 0.06 11 1.20 1
1 6.20 i( 6.20 1 0.0? if 0.56 1
I I 1 1I 1
I -21.75 1I -18.97 I It -18.91 1
1 12.97 It -6.92 1 1.00 11 -6.92
1 5.18 1I -12.05 1 1.00 11 -12.05 1
il2:~liCIN8 I
a/ Contractors as a group maintain their percentage of
profits hence the net effect on them is "0". However, urban
and large contractors gain at the expense of rural and small
contractors because the former group can handle Import-
intensive construction better than
and therefore obtain more projects.
their rural counterparts
FIG. 14 INCOME GAINS AND LOSSES AMONG INPUT SUPPLIERS
RESULTING FROM SWITCHING BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES
(Per Rs. 100 Expenditures)
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TABLE 19 SWITCHING FROM INDIGENOUS TO IMPORTED PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES:
Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type, Coal I Oil Fired.
NET EFFECTS ON BASIC CRITERIA: PROFITABILITY, CAPITAL & LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT.
A: Capacity utilisation: Wall Kiln z 661; Rotary-Trench Kiln = 751
BASIC CRITERIA IIPROFITABILITY(/RsO00 Output)l PRODUCTIVITY
"Financial 'Economic ICapital llabour (Man Days) I
At Discount Rates ! Employment
Production Technology Type(Kiln) II OX 1 01 201 /K Bricks /Rs 100 /Man Day /K Bricks /Rs 100 1
c d ! f I g i I k 1 o p I
Indigenous:Wall,Agri-Waste Fired !I 14.97 1 19.66 11.88 1 2.27 0.86 0.56 1 3.94 1.50
lported:Trench,Coal-Oil fired 11 2.54 1 7.38 4.41 1 4.09 1.35 0.83 1 4.92 1.62 1
I------ ----------- f---------- I---- -----i------------------------ I---------------1I
!XET EFFECT 1I -12.43 1 -12.48 -7.47 1 -1.82 -0.49 -0.25 1 0.98 0.12 1
8: At 1001 Capacity Utilisation
BASIC CRITERIA I1PROFITABILITY(/RsI00 Output)l PRODUCTIVITY
!Financial lEconomic !Capital ILabour (Man Days) I
!!At Discount Rates 1 Employment I
!Production Technology Type(Kiln) II 01 I 01 201 1/K Bricks /Rs 100 /Man Day /K Bricks /Rs 100 1
c d I f I g i I k I a I o p I
Ilndigenous:Waill,Agri-Waste Fired 11 18.14 1 22.89 53.88 1 0.76 0.29 0.29 1 2.63 1.00 1
Uupored:Trench,Coal-OlI Fired 11 5.96 1 10.59 46.52 1 2.04 0.61 0.55 1 3.69 1.22 1
---------------------------------- I I--------------------------- --------------------------- I-------------------I
:NET EFFECT l1 -12.18 1 -12.30 -7.36 1 -1.28 -0.38 -0.26 1 1.06 0.22 1
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SWITCHING From Indigenous to Imported PRODUCTION Technologies.
Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type. Coal & Oil Fired.
NET EFFECTS On Income Distribution, Materials' Costs, Employment, Productivity & Savings.
(Comparing Results of CASH - FLOW Analysis)
,A: INCONE DISTRiBUTIONSINCO-E  I: Through Cash - Flow from Materials' Purchase Expenditures
HSpatially :By Income group
U External District Within District :Local
:Production Technology Type:Kiln) Urban Rural :Upper Y. Lower Y. Government!
-c d f g-- I __z a o i
'Indigenous:WallAgri-Waste Fired 9.88 89.82 ! 24.07 65.75 43.62 46.20 0.96 i
Imported:Trench.Coal-Oil Fired !! 56.67 43.33 t 7.43 35.88 ! 15.26 28.07 0.56 !
:INCOME DISTRIBUTION 11 46.79 -46.49 -16.64 -29.87 1 -28.36 -18.13 -0.40
NET INCOME EFFECT 1! 0.30 1 -46.51 1 -46.47 -0.4
a,
am
aa
'a
ia
\/
:D: SAVINGS THROUGH: !!D: Income Distribution
Spatially IBy Income Group
:External District :Within District 'ovt.
Urban Rural !Upper Y. Lower Y.
:Net Income Distribution t 46.79 -46.49 1 -16.64 -29.87 1 -28.36 -18.13 1 -0.40 1
!Marginal Propensity to Save: Input-) 0.10 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 i 0.20
:SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION 4.68 -0.93 1 -0.42 -0.73 1 -2.84 0.00 -0.08
:NET SAVINGS 3.75 !! 3.75 1 -1.15 1 -2.84 -0.08
8: SAVINGS/LOSSES THRU BRICK PURCHASE:
Ia, a1
Y
aIRs/KBrs.Brs/Rs100l
ac H Input af I
:Indigenous 263.00 380 1
'Imported 303.00 330 1
:NET LOSSES(Rs,is) -40.00 -50.20 1
Value/Brick (Rs) 0.26 1
;TOTAL Value of Bricks(Rs)
C1: EMPLOYMENT (MDays/Rs100)
!Total Unskilled
Indigenous 1.50 0.00
Imported H 1.62 0.00
INET 0
!EMPLOYMENT 11 0.12 0.00
-13.20 !
a
ae
\/
1D2:Savings/Losses Thru Brick Purchasel
::If Consumer
::Govt. Low
tMarg.Prop.to Save :1 0.20
SAVINGS Effect Il
Fros: I) Rs/K Brs.1I -8.00
i Y) Brs/RsI00l -2.64
===):NET SAVINGS EFFECT
IDla) + X) Rs/Kbrs:II
Dlb) + 1) H!
111a) + Y) Brs/RsIO!
IDlb) + Y) a!
-4.25
1.11
D3: Net Wages i
is:,
Y. :Net Employment:! 0.12
0.00 as 30.00
-Net Wages 3.60
0.00 1 M.P.to Save H 0.00
0.00 I1
1 SAVINGS EFFECT;: 0.00
:==>NET SAVINGS
S D + D2 + D3 > 3.75
3.75
3.75
TABLE 20
TABLE 21 SWITCHING FROM INDIGENOUS TO IMPORTED PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES.
( Ex. Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type,
NET EFFECTS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION, EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY,
(Comparing Results of COST - BENEFIT Analysis)
A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1I Groups Affected: I
U!Proj.Or Cnsmr. Bsness. Wrkr. Central I
Production Technology Type 1! Govt. I
c l1 e i g h I I
Indigenous (Agri-Fired Kiln)II -24.48 -24.48 0.00 18.63 5.85 1
Jaported (Coal-Fired Kiln) 1! -24.17 -24.17 0.00 20.57 3.60 1
---------------------------- !----------------------------------------I
NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION !! 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.94 -2.25 1
!!
!!
8i
'i
\/
I
D: SAVINGS THROUGH: 1IDI: Income Distribution I
I!Cnsar. is:
U!Govt.or Lov Y. Busness. Worker Govt. I
Net Income Distribution U! 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.94 -2.25 1
Marginal Propensity to Save :! 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.20 1
--------------- H-----------------------------e
NET SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION : 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.45 1
NET SAVINGS EFFECT Ha) Government: -0.39 1
If Consumer is: U1b) Lov - Income Person: -0.45 1
-----------------------------------------------------
Coal k Oil Fired.)
PURCHASE COSTS, k SAVINGS.
19: SAVINGS/LOSSES THRU BRICK PURCHASES!
1! I Y I
!!URs/KBrs.Brs/Rs100O
a 1! Input p
llndigenous H 263.00 380 I
flaported 1! 303.00 330
I H----------------
INET LOSSES(RsIs) !! -40.00 -50.20 1
IValue/Brick (Rs) !! 0.263 1
ITOTAL Value of Bricks(Rs) -13.20 1
If
ID2:Savings/Losses Thru Brick Purchases!
5,
UIff Consumer is:
!!6ovt. Lov Y.
Ifarg.Prop.to Save
:SAVINGS Effect
IFrom: I) Rs1K Brs.
I Y) Brs/RsIO0
=====> INET SAVINGS EFFECT
IDIa) 4 1) Rs/KBrs.
'DIb) 4 I) Rs/KBrs.
!DIa)+Y) Brs/Rs.100
IDIb)+Y) Brs/Rsl00
0.20 0.00
-----------------
-8.00 0.00 1
-2.64 0.00 I
-8.39
-3.03
-0.45 1
-0.45 1
17 6
TABLE 22 PROPORTION OF TOTAL INPUTS THAT CAN BE CONTRIBUTED BY THE COMMUNITY
(Indicator of Participation)
!A: INPUTS IN PHYSICAL VALUES 1B: INPUTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL COSTS (1) !TOTAL COSTS(Rs/sf)
1 1 BEFORE AFTER
1 MANAGEMENT MATERIALS LABOUR I MANAGEMENT MATERIALS LABOUR TOTAL :(Deducting
!(Obtaining Inputs, Man Days 1 (1) !Contributions)
!!supervising Constr- (1) '(Rs/Sf)
TECHNOLOGY Huction & Maintenance)
Constr. 10 32 21 63 21 8
INDIGENOUS I! ALL 7 out of 8 73 1
I! IMaint. 10 22 47 79
(Construction Only)!! -------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------
!Constr. 3 9 9 21
51 II
----------------
94 74
IMPORT-INTENSIVE SMALL
PROPORTION
3 out of 11 67 1
iMaint. 3 8 13 24 1 24 18
FIG. 15
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CHAPTER 5
THE INPLUENCE OP- INCOME LEVELS, SPATIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FACTORS ON TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
In the last chapter we established that the use of
indigenous technologies relative to their import-intensive
alternative, can be more equitable and efficient while also
strengthening participation and the building up of local
institutions. Why then are import-intensive technologies
still being promoted?
Although the economic justification of greater efficiency is
the most common, perhaps the most legitimising, it is not
be the only reason for choices made, nor perhaps the most
important. In Chapter 3 we discussed how Pakistan's national
development objectives and policies encouraged the selection
of import-intensive technologies. We also mentioned other
factors such as building codes, prestige enhancement, and
preferences learned from professional training.
This chapter suggests that the influence of such factors
varies with the income level of the decision maker and with
the spatial and institutional environment within which
technology choices are made. The characteristics of
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import-intensive technologies match those of upper-income
groups, the large cities, and the centralized construction
agencies such as the Public Works Departments (PWD).
Seemingly desirable characteristics of indigenous
technologies may be irrelevant or even undesirable for the
above. The characteristics of the indigenous technologies,
on the other hand, conform more to needs and conditions of
the low-income groups, the small town and rural areas, and
the local government institutions such as the local councils
and Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD)
departments. 1 For example, the poor may welcome the
possibility of lowering construction costs by spreading
these costs in recurring maintenance. For the rich with
fewer resource constraints, recurring maintenance is an
unacceptable inconvenience. The greater employment
possibilities of indigenous technologies make them
attractive to commmunity responsive institutions such as the
local government. They are irrelevant to the PWD whose
objective is limited to building.
1. Construction rather than the materials production
technologies are considered here. In principle, the same
situation applies to the latter. To do justice to the
production technologies, an analysis of relevant
institutions equal to that done of the construction agencies
is needed; this is beyond the scope of the present study.
We consider small towns of populations of 25,000 or less to
be in the rural sector (cf. chapter 1). Thus from hereon,
when we speak of rural areas, we include these towns.
Private voluntary organisations may be even more receptive
than local governments. We speak of the latter since our
concern is to institutionalise the development of indigenous
technologies through the public institutions.
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Given such considerations and that Key decisions influencing
technology choice are made in the large cities, by the
upper-income group, and by officials of centralised
construction agencies, it is not surprising that
import-intensive technologies are replacing indigenous ones.
But the result is the technology needs of the lower-income
groups, city and rural, remain unmet. The urban poor have a
choice between inadequate housing using discarded scraps or
a very slow incremental construction process, the latter a
reflection of the gap between their earnings and the rising
costs of expensive import-intensive technologies. The rural
poor face a similar prospect given the steady erosion of
their existing sources of adequate housing: the builders
trained in indigenous technologies and the indigenous
materials production industries.
A reversal of this trend requires a shift in decision makers
or at least in the spatial and institutional environment
within which critical technology choices are made. The
comparative advantage indigenous technologies have in rural
areas must be exploited to develop and establish these
technologies in materials industries and construction
methods. Once established, the same technologies with the
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requisite modifications could be introduced into low-income
urban construction. 2
The institutional channels for such a program need to be the
local government organisations: the local councils and the
LGRDs.
This chapter examines how technology choice is guided by
the interaction among the characteristics of alternative
technologies and those of income groups and of
spatial-institutional environments. The first section
discusses the effect of income levels and the spatial
environment. The second section discusses the effect of the
institutional environment. 3
2. Although this approach has not been consciously
articulated and attempted, the experience in several
countries have been suggestive. Technologies of lower
standards than. officially acceptable have had to prove
themselves first in smaller settlements before they were
introduced in the larger cities. Low-cost water supply
techniques in Brazil, for example, had to prove themselves
first in small towns before they were introduced in the
nation's capital (Gaenheimer and Brando, 1985).
3. Other approaches to analysing technology choice stress
socio-cultural or political factors in addition to
institutional and economic ones. Architecture and
anthropology emphasise socio-cultural factors because
products of construction technologies - shelter and
infrastructure - tangibly express and shape living patterns
of society. Political scientists argue politics shape policy
decisions. Any of these factors can and often do override
purely economic ones. We believe that socioAcultural factors
vary with income and spatial environments. And from the
plannners' and policy analysts' perspectives, it is adequate
to discuss political influences when these bear directly on
choice.
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1. Income Levels, the Spatial Environment, and Technology
Choice: Comparing Upper- and Lower-Income Needs, the
Cities with the Small Towns and Rural Areas
Several factors relating technology characteristics to those
of income and space influence technology choice.
1.1 Construction-Naintenance Ratio and Timing
Besides cost-effectiveness over the building's life span,
the timing of construction tasks over that period is an
important criteria of technology choice. We earlier implied
(cf. chapter 4) that the timing characteristics of
indigenous construction were often preferable to those of
import-intensive construction. This view is, however, very
income- and space-sensitive.
Construction using import-intensive technology is marked by
a major proportion of total money, time, and effort invested
in initial construction and a much smaller proportion at
infrequent intervals throughout the building's life span
Construction using indigenous technologies has a relatively
smaller proportion of total investment in initial
construction with the rest spread over the building's life
span, either in maintenance or in incremental improvements
For the urban, upper-income resident whose opportunity cost
of labour or leisure time is high, it is not worthwhile
setting aside either labour or supervision time for frequent
183
construction. For the low-income, urban formal sector
worker, job timings may make frequent construction tasks
difficult to do. The lowest income groups in the urban
informal sector may likewise find the tasks inconvenient
Their periods of unemployment may be unpredictable, may be
spent in seeking work, or may have to be left free to work
at a short notice.
Unlike their rural counterparts, urban informal sector
workers cannot rely as easily on the women to do
construction and maintenance tasks. Religious and cultural
constraints on women in Pakistan's urban areas, except in
the lowest income groups, are much stronger than they are in
the rural areas, where women do most of the housing
maintenance.
Thus in a city setting, and definitely for the upper-income
groups, the construction and maintenance characterisitics of
indigenous technologies are undesirable.
In contrast, small town and rural residents can fully
exploit the opportunities for reducing costs offered by the
construction timing characteristics of indigenous
technologies. Agricultural cycles highly influence the
labour market in these areas; hence, annual and predictable
periods of low employment and low wages arise.
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Sahiwal has two agricultural slack periods in the year:
after the rice harvest and sowing, from February to April
and after the wheat harvest, from August to October. Upper-
and lower-income groups, farm and nonfarm workers use these
periods to do construction and maintenance tasks relatively
inexpensively. The farm worker, otherwise unemployed,
invests his time in improving his house. The nonfarm worker
and upper-income can hire construction labour at lower
ra te s. 4
Similar cost-saving opportunities are available to the rural
community- and government-funded construction adopting these
technologies. If indigenous technologies were widely adopted
in government construction, and if construction and
maintenance were timed for the low employment periods,
significant cost savings for the government and improvement
of income distribution to the poor would result. If the
investment were large, a public construction activity
4. Note that in our economic and income distribution cost
comparisons we have been conservative in not assuming this
very real possibility of coinciding construction and
maintenance with periods when the opportunity cost of labour
could be close to zero. We have instead assumed construction
could occur any time during the year, and thus only slightly
lowered the shadow price. Moreover, we have not shadow
priced maintenance costs. If we were to shadow price
maintenance as well and assume that both construction and
maintenance were to occur in such periods, indigenous
technologies would appear even more preferable than shown
by current calculations for both cost and income
distribution reasons.
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with low employment periods would reduce
joblessness when it was most acute. 5
This favourable match between the labour needs of
indigenous technologies and the seasonal variations in
employment is not present in cities.
1.2 Proportion of Possible Self-Help Inputs
Indigenous technologies are preferable to import-intensive
ones, partly because the former have a much higher
proportion of inputs - local materials, unskilled labour -
supplied through self-help or community participation.
5. Labour-intensive construction projects have been used
occasionally to ease periods of high unemployment in other
countries. Here we propose the annual, predictable
maintenance tasks of rural construction using indigenous
technologies to coincide with the equally predictable and
annual periods of low employment to thus serve all three
objectives of cost-reduction, employment, and income
distribution.
Construction tasks spread out as maintenance or planned
incremental improvements over several years and timed for
agricultural troughs can limit inflationary effects and make
construction management more efficient. Construction during
periods of low employment will not bid up wages. Relatively
small-scale, regular, and repeated construction tasks can
more easily be planned for and managed in an efficient
manner. Local materials producers can rely on a predictable
demand for their products, be encouraged to invest in
expanding production and also have time to expand production
to meet this demand (other institutional implications are
discussed in the next section). The author is thankful to
Michael Jacobs, with whom some of these ideas were raised.
L8
dovetailed
In Sahiwal and in rural areas, in general, this factor gives
indigenous technologies a decided advantage over
import-intensive ones. Self-help possibilities can
drastically reduce the effective cost of the rural
inhabitant's house. The proportion of potentially "free"
inputs are high: materials - such as reeds, sand, and
timber - obtained without payment or by barter, and the
workers' own otherwise unemployed time to make materials or
to construct. Moreover, maintenance, which permits full use
of the annual low employment periods, has an even higher
proportion of these inputs compared to construction.
The construction costs of community services can be likewise
greatly reduced through community contributions. This
feature can thus be important for community organisations
and government agencies responsible for such projects.
(These cost-reduction possibilities were quantified and
discussed more fully in the section on participation in the
last chapter.)
Self-help and community participation in construction is
also a city phenomenon. The possibilities, however, are
much less than in rural areas. It is harder to get "free
goods" by gathering. And, as noted, given the potential for
year-round employment, it may be more economical for the
house builder to purchase materials and hire labour than to
use his own time. Individuals would be similarly more
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reluctant to contribute their labour in a community project.
Hence self-help and community participation possibilities
are less in the city, although the technology has a high
proportion of unskilled labour and local materials. And, as
we shall see, the type of materials considered "local" may
differ in the urban and rural areas.
1.3 Availability of Materials
Proximity of materials, such as agricultural waste in place
of coal in Kilns, gives the indigenous technology an
advantage over its import-intensive counterpart in Sahiwal.
In cities, the advantage of materials proximity lies with
the import-intensive technology. Here the materials for
import-intensive production and construction are more
readily available, a major reason why these methods are more
common in cities.
Take Karachi where most construction occurs. It is a port of
entry for imported materials. Most of the cement from the
plants located in the province of Sind are sent here
directly. And the new National Steel Hill lies only forty
kilometers away.
Even when import-intensive materials are produced in the
rural areas, these are distributed through the major cities.
Thus steel bars and girders are cheaper in the provincial
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capital Lahore, their major distribution centre, than in
Sahiwal, which is closer to the steel rerolling mills
producing them.
On the other hand, the production and distribution system of
the indigenous materials industry is very undeveloped and
receives no government assistance. Therefore such materials
as sun- and agri-waste bricks, and timber can only compete
with their import-intensive substitutes when proximity of
resources and market are overwhelmingly in their favour.
Even in Sahiwal, some agri-waste kilns had to initially rely
on the trucks returning empty from deliveries to the coal
fired kilns to deliver agri-waste to them.
1.4 Multiple Functions of Buildings: Prestige Enhancement,
Investment, and Establishing Tenure
A construction project has purposes other than its immediate
function as service or shelter. It may be an investment, a
means of acquiring status, or simply a means of establishing
tenurial rights. These functions are most obvious in
building construction, especially housing, and can greatly
influence technology choice. These functions gain importance
as settlement size and income levels increase. Finally,
these functions are also better served by adopting import-
intensive technologies rather than indigenous ones, at least
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given the current level of technical development of the
latte r. 6
1.4.1 Prestige Enhancement
Construction as a projection of prestige and progress for
the individual house owner, the community, the
patron-politician, or the government department responsible
for the project, applies to both cities and rural areas.
What may differ is the particular symbol associated with
attaining prestige. This symbol develops through the
demonstration effect of "trend setters" in the community:
the rich, the powerful, the respected, the peer group Known
to have done well, and the government.
The overwhelming impact of this demonstration effect in
Pakistan's cities is to encourage the use of
import-intensive technologies. This effect extends to rural
districts like Sahiwal, although it is much weaker.
In Sahiwal the use of import-intensive technologies to
project prestige is most common in the buildings of those
who have close contact with the cities (and have few
resource constraints): some landed rich who live in Lahore,
6. To say, for example, that timber per se is non-durable
or cannot symbolise "upward mobility" is to ignore its level
of development and use in many western countries today.
190
local residents working in the Middle East, and the
government.
Yet the influence of the traditional grand houses of the
rural elite and the earlier government buildings that adopt
more indigenous inputs still offer alternative symbols for
construction that locals can take pride in (and copy more
low-cost, technically adequate shelter solutions). As one
town councillor of Halka Hans (population of 15,000) put it:
"We have fine examples of our traditional houses right
here [in Halka Haus). They show that even a Rucha
(sun-bricK, timber roofed) building, if well
constructed and maintained, will remain forever."
New houses in another settlement (Chak Bedi, population
12,000) adopted the timber and tile roofing system and the
facade of local government buildings constructed in the
early sixties. The same roofing systems were also adopted in
community-funded buildings such as local mosques.
1.4.2 Housing as Investment
Housing as an investment to generate income either through
rental, part commercial use, or resale, is a common
phenomenon in large cities. Because buildings using
import-intensive technologies tend to be more comfortable,
more prestigious, and have a greater monetary value, these
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technologies will be generally preferred wherever obtaining
incomes is a major motivation for construction.
No studies have been done to either prove or disprove this
last assumption. In any case, we can expect location and the
market served by the landlord, shopkeeper, and house owner
to also influence his technology decisions. Thus, in the
low-income areas of Karachi and Lahore, renters and
shopKeepers are housed in buildings using technologies
ranging from the most indigenous to the most
import-intensive.
As for resale value, the only systematic study done in
Pakistan found that this was not an important factor. In a
survey of new housing construction in nineteen cities,
Karachi and Lahore included, only seven percent of the new
house owners cited resale possibilities as a motive for
constructing their houses (United Consultants, 1975: 27).
Most of these owners were from the highest income brackets.
This finding is consistent with my own more limited survey
of new house builders in Sahiwal.
One can nonetheless expect pressure to adopt
import-intensive technologies (because of concern for
returns on investment) to be stronger in Karachi, Lahore,
and Sahiwal city than they would be in small towns and
villages.
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1.4.3 Establishing Tenure -
Many studies have documented the importance to urban
migrants of establishing their right to be there. In the
Pakistan study cited above, forty-five percent of the new
house owners gave establishing security of tenure as their
primary reason for housing construction.7
It may be reasonably assumed that those concerned with
establishing tenure would prefer durable import-intensive
technologies. Such technologies comply with building codes
and act as some deterrent to demolition by the government.
In low-income settlements of Pakistan's major cities, shanty
housing concealed and protected by fired brick walls on the
property's boundaries, a common phenomenon, suggests such a
relationship between establishing tenurial rights and
technology choice.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the relaxation of standards will
at least reduce the imperative to adopt import-intensive
technologies, but the time lag between policy and practice
may be great. Meanwhile land rights remain a problem.
7. The second most frequently cited reason, rent savings,
was mentioned by only nine percent of the owners (United
Consultants, 1975:27).
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These factors are, however, of little concern in rural
areas. In Sahiwal, tenant farmers with no land rights have
lived on their landowners' farms for generations and do not
perceive a threat of eviction nor conceive of resisting it.
In small towns that are expanding, farm land that can be
converted to housing plots is still in adequate supply and
relatively affordable to new house builders. Moreover,
spatial and institutional distance also greatly weakens the
threat of building codes. Residents can therefore make
technology choices less impelled by pressures to adopt
import-intensive alternatives.
Finally, the needs of greater physical security from fire
and theft are clearly better served by import-intensive
technologies. Equally clear, however, is that these concerns
are greater in the more densely populated, less closely Knit
large cities than in small towns and rural areas.
1.5 Summary .
This is not to say, however, that indigenous technologies
have no place in the urban areas. The factors that maKe
indigenous technologies more problematic in the urban
environment apply less, if at all, to the urban poor. The
recent urban migrant, one still struggling for economic
security, may indeed have more time to spare for
constructing his shelter, may be yet unconcerned with urban
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social mores restraining women from maintenance work, and
may place less importance on prestige, tenure, and durable
housing than his more established counterpart (Turner,
1976). As earlier noted, such persons make up a large and
growing proportion of the urban population (twenty-five to
thirty-three percent of the expansion in Pakistan's urban
areas is in squatter settlements, World Bank, 1984:124).
For the urban poor, indigenous technologies similar, if not
identical, t6 those in the rural areas could be suitable.
Yet, the forces for the development of indigenous
technologies are too weak in urban areas. The urban poor who
would benefit most have little influence: politically,
socially and economically. As discussed, they are also
subject to pressures against the adoption of indigenous
technologies such as the demonstration effect.
Attempts to introduce indigenous technologies, construction
methods and industries within Pakistan's cities have
therefore been unsuccessful. The technologies used in model
houses of government low-income housing projects have rarely
been utilised by the residents (e.g., Lines Area Housing
Project, see Afshar, 1982). For the same reasons, attempts
in other countries to introduce indigenous technologies in
large cities have also seldom been successful. Soil-cement-
block-making plants failed to catch on in Dakar, Ghana,
because of the heavy maintenance required and the low status
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accorded the material (Skinner, 1983: 147; also Martin,
1983).
Although the urban low-income cannot be expected to create
an adequate initial demand for indigenous technologies, they
can be the market on which these technologies can expand
once these have been established in the rural areas and
modified to suit the urban context.
Programs to develop indigenous technologies should take root
in the small towns and rural areas where conditions are more
favourable. The basis of these technologies - materials
industries such as agri-waste kilns, timber, and the like -
are all in the rural areas. These industries and their
immediate potential. market - the middle- and low-income
rural groups - are relatively free of the social and
economic pressures that make the emergence of such
industries so difficult in cities.
But neither low-income demand, nor a potentially conducive
rural environment is adequate for the development of
indigenous technologies if the institutional channels
through which decisions on technology choice and the
allocation of public construction expenditures are made, are
unsympathetic to the adoption of these technologies. These
institutional issues are discussed in the next section.
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2. Institutional Factors and Technology Choice:
Centralised Construction Agencies eompared to Local
Government Institutions
This section examines how institutions influence technology
choice. We discuss the characteristics of indigenous and
import-intensive technologies in relation to those of the
alternative institutions involved in construction - the
centralised construction agencies, such as the PWD and the
construction departments of other line agencies, on one
side, and the local government institutions - the local
councils and the LGRD, on the other.
The analysis suggests that the characteristics of the
construction agencies give them a natural preference for
import-intensive technologies over indigenous ones. The
local government institutions, in contrast, should be more
sympathetic to the adoption of the latter technologies.
2.1 Potential for Cost Reduction
The primary advantage indigenous technologies offer over
import-intensive ones is the opportunity to reduce costs.
Yet this advantage is unimportant to the construction
agencies. These agencies have no incentive to cut costs. If
anything, their incentive may be to increase costs. Why is
this so?
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The power of an agency is closely related to its budget; the
budget, to the costs of the projects implemented. To cut
costs is to risk reducing one's budget and hence weaken the
agency relative to others.
The bias towards increasing costs is reinforced by the
budget procedures in PaRistan. Even if budgets were assured,
there is no incentive to reduce project costs so that more
projects could be implemented. More projects mean more work
unless the staff increases. Yet staff increases are very
difficult, if not impossible, to justify; increasing capital
budgets is much easier than increasing current budgets,
which fund personnel salaries. The pressure to expend
capital outlays without the commensurate staff increases
therefore promotes projects using import-intensive
technologies. 8
Moreover, corruption increases with the project's size. The
occasions for earning "illicit income" and its amount relate
directly to the project's physical and financial scale -
another factor against cost reductions and for cost
increases through higher standards.
8. A World Bank review of planning in developing countries,
also notes that a dual budget outlay (current and capital)
"contributes to a needless emphasis on brick-and-mortar
projects, and conversely, to the neglect of maintenance
outlays (Agarwala, 1984:25). Similar observations are made
by Korten (1980) in analysing disbursement procedures of
donor agencies.
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Not least, projects of a large-scale and high standards are
key elements of prestige for construction departments. Both
elements are compromised by cost reductions and by lower
standards concomitant with using indigenous technologies.
On the other hand, local government institutions would be
more receptive to cost-cutting measures for construction
projects. Much of the power and prestige of the local
councils, relative to government agencies and to their own
communities, hinge on the number of projects they have
control over. And their argument for getting more control
from the government is that they can implement these
projects more cost-effectively than other agencies. 9
Councillors, LGRD staff, and community members in Sahiwal
formed project committees to manage and supervise
construction. The committees claim to have reduced
construction costs by cutting out contractors' profit
margins and inefficiencies. Consequently, an increasing
number of construction projects are being handed over to
these committees. Similar savings through project committees
have been documented elsewhere.1 0
9. Interview by the author with the Chairman, Union Council
of Pukka Sudhaar, Sahiwal, 14 Decemeber 1982.
10. In Hansehra district (North-West Frontier Province)
project committees have been twenty to thirty percent more
cost-effective compared to government agencies in a wide
range of activities including school construction. Based on
this experience, the Hansehra District council has handed
over the entire pacKage of Sixth Plan projects to the
project committees (Hauras, 1982:17 and Lashker, 1983:34).
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As an elected representative of numerous settlements, a
councillor's popularity depends on providing something to as
many of -the settlements as possible. There is thus an
incentive to decrease project costs so that more projects
can be implemented. Spreading a construction budget among
several low-cost schools in several villages may gain a
councillor more favour among constituents than using it all
in a single high-standard school in one village, which may
simply bring charges of favouritism.
2.2 Construction-Maintenance Characteristics
A basic difference we earlier noted between indigenous and
import-intensive technologies is in the ratio and timing of
their construction and maintenance requirements. In
addition, the type of maintenance also differs. Construction
projects using indigenous technologies require effort and
expenditure on construction and maintenance spread out in
annual but small, predictable amounts over the projects'
life span. With import-intensive projects, most efforts and
expenditures are concentrated up-front in initial
construction with occasional but nonetheless substantial,
less predictable amounts for maintenance concentrated at
certain points of the projects' life (compare Figures 8.1
and 8.2). Such maintenance is also technically more complex.
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These differences make the import-intensive technologies the
natural choice of construction agencies who have large
capital budgets for construction but no maintenance budgets.
Project maintainance is ad-hoc. The responsible agency funds
maintenance when severe disrepair in enough projects prompts
it, and the scale of damage makes maintenance costs high
enough to qualify as a capital budget outlay.
The funds required for annual maintenance in indigenous
technologies, on the other hand, are too small to qualify
for a capital budget. Further, maintenance in projects using
these technologies cannot be postponed till maintenance
needs are severe enough to warrant a larger budget because
by then the project would be irrevocably damaged.
The lack of a maintenance budget contrasts sharply with that
of capital budget allocations often too large to be
comfortably absorbed at the local level. This researcher was
present in the district near the end of the fiscal year when
LGRD project managers were busy attempting to get community
leaders to accept construction projects and complete them.
The allocated funds had to be disbursed by the year's end.
Otherwise, unexpended funds would revert to the provincial
government and the next fiscal year's ceilings would be
reduced.
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Even if funding were available, construction agencies are
not sufficiently decentralised below the district to
adequately monitor, implement, and inspect the maintenance
of projects using indigenous technologies. The frequent
maintenance of these projects, although technically simple,
is administrative- and personnel-intensive, and can thus
pose problems if the implementing body is distant from the
project.
Choosing import-intensive technologies does not, however,
circumvent problems of recurring maintenance.
Given the different ages of the projects spread throughout
the district, maintenance, although infrequent for each
project, is a recurring problem when the district's projects
are considered altogether. This factor, besides those of
budgets and spatial distance, prompts agencies to pass
responsibility for maintenance of some projects on to the
community served by it. But no provisions are made to assist
the community. Maintenance in import-intensive technologies
can be complex and expensive, given the technical and
managerial skills, and the type of materials available to
the community. Often poor maintenance, or none at all, is
done. Under these conditions, the choice of import-intensive
technologies exacerbates rather than solves the maintenance
problem.
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Therefore, regardless of who is responsible, the lack of
maintenance remains a major problem of facilities
constructed in import-intensive technologies.
Since the establishment of the local councils, construction
and maintenance tasks are being increasingly delegated to
the local councils. Some technical and financial assistance
is provided through the LGRD. The councils are also expected
to work with their constituencies in doing these tasks and
to reduce costs through community contributions. Under this
institutional structure, the adoption of indigenous
technologies makes sense.
A more decentralised monitoring and management system is
possible through the project committees. A much larger
proportion of required skills and materials in indigenous
technologies, relative to import-intensive ones, can be
contributed by the community; this is more true of the
maintenance than of the construction stage. Thus the
construction and maintenance characteristics of indigenous
technologies dovetail with the local councils' takeover of
construction projects using these technologies. Nonetheless,
providing a regular maintenance budget remains a necesity.
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2.3 Employment, Income Distribution, and Community
Participation
Employment, income distribution, and community participation
effects are not the primary arguments for indigenous
technologies, but these considerations strengthen the case
for these technologies. For the centralised construction
agencies, however, these effects are irrelevant: the
agencies' objectives are to construct facilities that are
structurally sound, acceptably cost-efficient, and provide
service and shelter.
Indeed, labour-intensive construction and certainly
community participation are considered likely to complicate
or delay project construction. Hence, from the perspective
of construction agencies, a major set of arguments for
indigenous technologies, at best, carry no weight and often
dissuade those contemplating their use.
In contrast, the local councils and LGRD departments are
mandated to promote employment, income distribution, and
community participation. For the elected councillors, these
objectives have pragmatic value. Achieving them enhances the
councillors' popularity and, thus, their chances of
re-election. Community participation and, hence,
contributions help cover part of project construction and
maintenance costs. For the LGRD personnel, who are trained
to act as intermediaries between the people and the
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government, community participation in projects is an end in
itself. Thus, from the perspective of the local government
structure, the employment, income distribution, and
community participation effects of import-intensive
technologies are powerful arguments for adopting them.
2A Training and Personnel Bias
In the construction agencies, engineers make the major
policy, adminstrative, and technical decisions affecting
construction. Trained professionals in Pakistan, like other
developing countries, are generally from the big cities.
With their urban origins, most engineers are likely to be
unfamiliar with indigenous technologies practiced largely in
the smaller settlements. Their subsequent training, focused
almost exclusively on import-intensive technologies, weakens
any familiarity they might have had.
Let us take two examples. A standard civil engineering text
(Khanna, 1982) of the Engineering University in Lahore gives
210 pages to reinforced concrete construction and only 23
pages to timber. Agri-waste bricks are not mentioned at
all.1 1 Similarly, a recently graduated engineer, a PWD
employee in his hometown of Sahiwal city, categorically
11. This text nonetheless gave more information on timber
and other local material than any other this researcher
could find. It is widely used in India and Pakistan.
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stated that no one in his district uses "ghilaf i"2
construction anymore, a practice in fact still widespread in
that city.
The engineers in the construction agencies are trained to
work only with import-intensive technologies. They often
firmly believe in the superiority of such technologies over
any indigenous alternative. The selective engineering
criteria they are trained to apply in making technology
choices further reinforces this view.
Engineers of the local councils and the LGRD departments
have the same professional backgrounds. They, however, do
not dominate the local government institutions.
The management and field personnel of the LGRD are largely
generalists or graduates of the agricultural schools. Many
are veteran development workers of rural development
programs in previous administrations (e.g. Rural Works,
Basic Democracies). All undergo pre-and in-service training
on rural development and local administration in the
provincial local government training institutes. Their
12. "GhIlaf 1" are walls faced with one layer of fired
brick with the rest in sun-brick. It is an effective and
economic solution to both weather proofing (therefore
maintenance) and "appearance" concerns. The author has seen
it still widely practiced in South Asia, the Middle East and
China.
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training therefore makes it easier for them to examine
technology choices within broader developmental criteria.
The administrative presence of LGRD at the district and ,
union council levels permits closer contact with local
conditions. 1 3 Most important, councillors, as residents
of the district's small towns and villages, are Keenly aware
of these conditions.
Contrasted to the views of the engineer from the PWD in
Sahiwal city, are those of a town councillor from Pukka
Sadhar in Sahiwal:
"We know that we can use two-foot wide kutcha
(sun-brick) walls and cement plaster them. They will
last at least twenty years providing that the plaster
is keyed into the mud wall. Such a wall will be much
cheaper and cooler. Similarly, AIJMar (accacia) as
long as it is at least ten years old can last as a beam
for at least twenty years. But we cannot use such a
roof or such walls. Specifications for all technical
work are given by the government. Local councillors can
make no changes."
2.5 Modernity and Prestige
The stronger image of modernity and progress projected by
import-intensive construction projects (relative to
indigenous ones) extends prestige to all those associated
with its implementation. This also has its institutional
implications.
13. The District and Union Council secretaries are both LGRD
personnel.
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The prestige factor makes import-intensive technologies
equally appealing to members of both the construction
agencies and the local government institutions. Councillors
are, however, not as quick to dismiss their indigenous
technologies as the engineers of the construction agencies
(or those of the LGRD, for that matter) are prone to do.
Indeed, some councillors regard these technologies highly as
evident, for instance, from the previously cited quote.
Yet councillors as politicians may be swayed by the prestige
factor if it affects their popularity among their
constituents. Whether this factor will influence them
towards indigenous or import-intensive technologies depends
on what they value for their popularity. That is, whether
they perceive their popularity as better enhanced by the
modernising image of a few projects using import-intensive
technologies, or by the greater coverage from a larger
number of more modest projects that also create more
employment and incomes among their constituents.
Thus in the local government structure the prestige factor
may influence technology choice towards either alternative,
but in the centralised construction agencies, it almost
always reinforces preferences for import-intensive
technologies.
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2.6 Contracts and Materials Procurement
Materials production and supply as well as construction of
projects using import-intensive technologies are done by a
group of entrepreneurs, merchants, transporters, and
builder/contractors distinct from those who do the same
activities for projects using indigenous technologies. The
former group are based in the main towns, mostly in Sahiwal
city. They are relatively large, licensed establishments,
and hire non-family employees. The latter are small, usually
unlicensed, family enterprises distributed in the smaller
settlements. 1'
The construction agencies, all based in Sahiwal city, have a
long established network of official and unofficial contacts
with the first of these two groups. All materials
procurement and construction is done through this network.
Only contractors with assets (bank balance, capital
equipment, etc., not less than Rs 200,000) can be licensed
to construct government projects. 15 These contractors,
with their own set of contacts with merchants and
transporters from the former group, are unwilling to work
with those that use indigenous technologies.
14. Exceptions on both sides include the truckers for coal
fired kilns who are based in the coal producing outside the
district and the reed mat producers who are in Sahiwal and
in the neighbouring district.
15. Interview with PWD Assistant Engineer Ali, Sahiwal City,
18 December, 1982.
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Most important, the cost-plus system encourages contractors
to bid for only the more expensive import-intensive
projects.
Thus when engineers of construction agencies state, as they
often do, that they cannot find contractors and materials
suppliers for projects using indigenous technologies, they
mean, they cannot find them among those they are officially
allowed, used, and willing to work with. At the national
level a similar situation operates. Top decision makers and
the large contractors and materials suppliers move in the
same social circles. It is natural that these decision
makers should have more confidence in and patronise these
contractors, suppliers, and their products rather than the
many small-scale contractors, builders, and suppliers who
are unfamiliar to them.
The LGRD department also has its lists of official
contractors and network of materials suppliers largely from
the first group. But in addition, it draws on producers,
suppliers, and builders, from the second, unlicensed group.
This greater flexibility stems from two factors: first, the
pressure from local councillors eager to use entrepreneurs
from their constituents; second, the smaller-scale and
greater dispersal of the construction projects. Moreover,
the project committees formed by the councillors and the
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LGRD replace the contractors and the pressures these
contractors bring to use import-intensive technologies.
2.7 The Scale Effect
Large- and even some medium-scale construction, such as
rural hospitals, often require import-intensive
technologies, heavy machinery and equipment, contractors,
and materials suppliers able to meet the technical and
supply demands of such projects, and, of course, government
engineers trained to deal with all of the above.
When the same institution is responsible for both
'large'- and small-scale projects, as is the case with the
construction agencies, the attitudes and practices
associated with the former projects tend to dominate in
those institutions and are also applied to the latter
projects.16 This tendency contributes to the prevalence
of import-intensive . technologies in these institutions and
to some of the situations described previously.
Cement mixers purchased for the lone district hospital
contracted out by the local PWD are then available for use
16. Similar observations are made in a case study of the
Integrated Rural Development Programme: "There is very
little support that the project manager [of LGRD) can get in
technical matters from the nation building departments... At
best, these departments can suggest technical specifications
that they use for bigger projects in the urban areas (Khan,
1982:50)."
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in subsequent buildings - big and small - thus reducing the
labour content of construction and further prompting the use
of cement. The same contractor is relied upon to construct
several primary and secondary schools across the district.
And he will, of course, only do so if these schools are
constructed using cement and steel, for which he is equipped
and which have higher profit margins - official and
unofficial - than schools using the indigenous technologies.
Such a "scale effect" may be avoided in construction through
the local councils and the LGRD simply because the majority
of their projects are small-scale: feeder roads, village
water-supply shemes, primary and secondary schools, basic
health units, rural. health centres, and sanitation.
2.8 Corruption
Commissioning and obtaining building contracts and materials
supplies as well as opportunities for implementing
substandard construction allows substantial scope for
illicit income from payoffs. The widespread practice of
making such income in the construction agencies is
acknowledged at all levels, unofficialy and officially. At a
National Consultative Assembly Meeting, the Minister for
Water and Power admitted to "rank corruption" in his
Ministry for which "thousands were sacked... even chief
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engineers or superintending engineers (Pakistan Times, 23
February 1983).
Less well acknowledged is the fact that such corruption
encourages the use of import-intensive technologies rather
than indigenous ones.
The opportunities to obt3lin illicit income and its amount
increase with the per unit cost of a project, and with the
scarcity' and regulation of its inputs. All three
characteristics apply more to import-intensive technologies
than to indigenous ones.
As a resident from Halka Hans town stated:
"Anything that the government puts under its control,
the prices go up. The government made local magistrates
responsible for selling cement at Rs 65 (per fifty-kilo
bag). We ordinary people could only get it at Rs 100.
Those who had Oapproach'with the magistrate would get
large quantities at Rs 65, they would pay the
magistrate Rs 10 or Rs 15 ( and still make a big
profit). If I go to the magistrate for a few bags for
my house, he looks at me, at my clothes, and says, *Who
are you? Get outt'"
Horeover, opportunities to do and conceal substandard
construction are more in import-intensive technologies than
in indigenous ones (e.g., weak cement and mortar mixes,
fewer reinforcing bars in the r.c.c slab).
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Thus corruption entrenched in the construction agencies also
reinforces the use of import-intensive technologies and the
specific contractors and materials suppliers who have
established their positions through it.
New contractors, materials suppliers, and those promoting
new technologies can only dislodge those so entrenched by
making larger illicit payments than the latter do. And to
pay more they have to anticipate making more profits than
their competitors. Given these conditions, the less costly
technologies with smaller profit margins and the smaller
contractors, materials producers, and suppliers associated
with such technologies clearly have less chance of gaining
acceptance.
Because of the above situation, adoption of technological
innovation likewise moves from the simpler to the complex
and expensive technologies. In an interview, the
representative of a firm producing new pre-cast concrete
components roofing system reminded this researcher to add
(to the product's cost) the not inconsequential percentage
they spent on bribing government engineers to specify their
product. Shortly after, the adoption of the components in
place of girder and tile roofs in some buildings "because
these were cheaper" - a claim that even the f irm's
representative could not make - was confirmed by an engineer
in Sahiwal.
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That corruption with similar effects on technology choice
will not take hold in local councils and LGRDs cannot be
guaranteed. It is less likely, however, because the
small-scale projects attract less graft. The councillors are
elected representatives accountable both to their
constituents and to the government. And finally, the
division of responsibilities among the elected councillors,
the LGRD staff, and community members of project committees
encourages some double checking against the actions of each
other. All these factors are absent in construction
implemented through the construction agencies.
2.9 The Influence of Foreign Aid
Despite their professed support for lower construction
standards and the use of local resources, aid agencies can
also distort preferences in favour of higher standards and
import-intensive technologies. Others have treated this
subject exhaustively and well (see for example, Tendler,
1975; Korten, 1980; Rondinelli, 1982). Here let us briefly
mention three ways in which this distortion can occur and
suggest an alternative to the conventional aid agencies, an
alternative not raised by others.
Aid agencies are susceptible to prestige projects in the
same way as national governments are. After all, prestige
and gaining political capital are major motivations for aid.
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And as discussed, projects using import-intensive
technologies are generally considered more prestigious.
Second, because of bureaucratic pressures for immediate
results, donor agencies have a preference for lending to
projects with a finite and preferably short completion time.
Their aid is biased towards construction rather than towards
ongoing maintenance; thus, aid is channeled into projects
and technologies such as import-intensive ones that seem to
minimise maintenance. "Haintenance" is seen as a local (not
foreign donor) responsibility; hence host governments would
like to reduce maintenance costs through "better quality"
construction.
Third and most important, foreign aid agencies, by their
very nature, are set up to fund the foreign exchange
component of projects. It is in the interest of the agency
to encourage imports; many stipulate that these come from
the country they represent. After all, enhancing 'their
countries' exports is one of the ways such agencies justify
their aid and lending programs domestically.
To attract such aid, national governments are then prompted
to design projects that have large import and therefore
foreign exchange components.
216
Hajor structural changes in these agencies may be necessary
if these and other biases are to be removed, changes which,
given the nature of such agencies, may be difficult to
implement.
A more immediate alternative may be the small nevertheless
influential group of aid organisations that have Third World
roots. Organisations such as the Aga Khan Foundation and the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International are active in
funding and supporting development projects in Third World
countries. They are headquartered in western countries but
have no interests nor obligations to encourage purchases
from those countries. Their extensive personal and business
links within the Third World make it easier for them to
support the local currency components of projects and field
local personnel as well.
These organisations, however, are responsible for only a
small proportion of total aid. Their role is perhaps in
setting examples of what can be done either in the projects
they fund or in inducing some of the required structural
changes in other agencies through the joint funding of
projects.
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3. Summary
In sum-, what we consider as desirable characteristics of
indigenous technologies may be either irrelevant or even
undesirable within the large city context, to the upper-
income groups, and to the centralised construction agencies.
Given that these income groups, spatial and institutional
environments dominate the construction market and technolog?
choice, it is not surprising that these technologies are
superseded by import-intensive ones.
In contrast, the low-income groups and local institutions in
the small towns and rural areas offer a potentially more
sympathetic base on which to develop indigenous
technologies. The current- government's emphasis on such
areas and institutions may be tapped to promote such
technologies. As noted earlier, a substantial amount of
total government expenditures and activities are in
construction, are in these areas, and are implemented
through these institutions.
Problems remain, however. First, few decisions over choice
of technology are in the hands of these local institutions.
Second, although the institutions are more receptive to
indigenous technologies, they are by no means immune to the
pressures to adopt import-intensive ones. Finally, although
a substantial amount of total construction expenditures are
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disbursed through these institutions, they are still a small
proportion of the national total. The emphasis thus has to
be on delegating decisions downward, on incentives to
encourage the use of indigenous - technologies, and on demand
creation in key ways so as to spread this choice in the
private sector. Such factors will be discussed in the
concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
IMPLICATIONS FOR A PROGRAM TO DEVELOP INDIGENOUS
TECHNOLOGIES
In this concluding chapter we first- tecall the basic
questions on indigenous and import-intensive technologies
pursued in this study. We then summarise our findings on the
relative performance of these technologies and the
distribution of costs and benefits of adopting one set
instead of the other. We outline the reasons why indigenous
technologies, despite their superior performance, are being
superseded. In Pakistan, these reasons have to do with
national objectives and policies, income levels, social, and
institutional factors. The development of indigenous
technologies will have to be based on their adoption first
in the rural areas and through the local government
structure. From here and with the requisite modifications,
they may spread among low-income groups in the urban areas.
Although the rural areas and the local government structure
offer a potentially conducive environment to promote
indigenous technologies, decision makers will not of their
own accord necessarily select such technologies. Most of
this chapter discusses proposed practicable measures
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essential to encourage the selection of such technologies,
their adoption in local government buildings, and their
spread among the rural populace.
1. The Story Thus Par
Is there a significant advantage in adopting indigenous
versus import-intensive technologies? If so, why are the
latter almost inevitably adopted, and what can be done to
promote the former? These are the basic questions of the
study.
'We found a significant advantage in adopting indigenous
technologies in terms of both equity and efficiency
criteria.1 These findings hold for at least the near
future given existing price trends. Horeover, construction
projects using indigenous technologies are a more effective
medium to promote participation, decentralisation, and
institution building at the local level.
Yet why are import-intensive technologies being adopted?
The reasons are a combination of economic, social and
institutional factors:
1. Equity criteria include affordability, employment, and
income distribution; efficiency criteria include cost-
effectiveness in market and shadow prices, capital and
labour productivity, and profit.
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(1) Upper-income housing and large-scale public
infrastructure projects - dams, highways, etc., - have a
need and a demand for import-intensive technologies. The
development of the concomitant materials industries is
therefore a major government commitment. Investment - public
and private - and government policies such as taxes,
subsidies, pricing, import-substitution, and the like favour
import-intensive technologies to the detriment of indigenous
technologies and materials industries.
(2) That import-intensive technologies are' superior for both
large- and small-scale construction is a deeply rooted
belief among those making technology decisions. Although
indigenous technologies are accepted as more equitable and
lower cost, these merits are countered - by claims that
import-intensive technologies are more efficient and
cost-effective. This claim is seldom effectively challenged.
(3) A number of other social-institutional factors make the
seemingly desirable characteristics of indigenous
technologies either irrelevant or undesirable. These factors
include: restrictive building codes; absence of maintenance
systems; prestige associated with import-intensive
construction; professional training biases of those making
technology choices; bureaucratic imperatives such as
budgeting procedures and project selection criteria of both
governmental and international agencies; undermining of the
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indigenous materials industries and building skills; the
rising opportunity cost of self-help as income and
settlement size increase. The impact of these factors,
however, is stronger among upper-income than among
lower-income groups, in large cities than in smaller
settlements, and in centralised construction agencies than
in more decentralised local government agencies.
Given such considerations and that the most critical
decisions on technology choice are influenced by
upper-income groups, by officials of centralised
construction agencies, and by conditions in the large
cities, a significant shift in policy in support of
indigenous technologies is unlikely. The policy .measures
urged by appropriate technology advocates in support of the
indigenous construction sector - retraining of engineers,
removing subsidies for import-intensive materials, providing
credit, and technical assistance to the indigenous
construction sector - while these measures are valid, are
unlikely to be adopted beyond a token level. The necessary
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commitment to this sector by policy makers is seldom
forthcoming. 2
Government support of the indigenous sector is nonetheless
possible if a program to develop indigenous technologies is
compatible with and furthers some other key development
objectives politically important to the government, if it
does not make substantial demands on government resources,
and if it complements, not competes with, existing
import-intensive industries to which the government is
heavily committed.
In the Pakistan context, all the above conditions can be met
if the strategy for a program to develop indigenous
construction technologies (and hence the sector) dovetails
with the government's priority program to develop small
towns and rural areas and the local government structure.
Indigenous technologies - in construction and materials
industries - have a comparative advantage over import-
intensive ones in these areas. Moreover, the local
2. We do not emphasise adoption of these measures here
since they are well known (e.g., see United Nations, 1978;
Hoavenzadeh and Hagopian, 1983), and, to be implemented,
they require at once a greater government commitment to the
indigenous construction sector than is usually present. Thus
such measures often remain aspirations rather than
practicable steps taken to develop this sector. Here we
focus on more modest, localised measures that can be done
without a major initial government commitment. If the latter
measures succeed, however, they may prompt a commitment to
broader changes in technology policy and more substantial
efforts to devejop the appropriate indigenous technologies.
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government and the local elite are potentially much more
receptive to such technologies (not least because they gain
most from their adoption).
Another factor supportive of such a strategy in Pakistan is
that the social service sector, which has the largest
building budget of all the public sectors, is gradually
passing on most - of its construction budget s and
implementation functions to the local governments.
Construction is the major development activity of local
bodies. Thus the objectives of local government and district
development and those of promoting the indigenous
construction sector are mutually reinforcing.
It is therefore most effective to channel the program to
promote indigenous construction and materials industries
through the local government structure in the small towns
and rural areas. Once indigenous technologies and
industries are tried and established in these areas, these
may be modified and spread to meet the needs of urban
low-income groups.
The program details are beyond the scope of this study. Here
we outline the major characteristics of a program to promote
indigenous technologies and indicate some key practicable
measures to encourage the adoption of indigenous
technologies in the rural areas. We end with some
225
generalisations about what such a program should or should
not do. 3 These progam design principles have been
developed with specific reference to Pakistan but have
general relevance to other developing countries as well.
2. Major Program Characteristics
A program to promote indigenous technologies (from hereon
referred to as indigenous technology program) would be
action based, demand oriented, and incremental.
The program strategy would be based on getting indigenous
technologies adopted in small-scale infrastructure,
residential, and community facility buildings. Such
construction projects are many and widely dispersed:
schools, health centres, staff residences, feeder roads, for
example. The functioning program and the organisational
capacity to implement it would evolve from this "learning by
doing" process. 4
The consequent demand created in the indigenous materials
production sector would be the boost required for the
development of this sector to the point of takeoff. The
3. These generalisations may be read as a series of action
hypotheses to guide detailed program design.
4. This approach is consistent with the "learning process"
strategy in which Korten (1980) emphasises . linking Knowledge
to action and the need to proceed flexibly with periodic
assessment and reassessment.
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evidence in this study suggests that increasing demand may
be the single most effective way to stimulate the
development of such noncapital-intensive industries, far
more effective than other conventional and more costly
measures such as training and low-interest loans.
The incremental program approach would allow Knowledge and
institutional capacities to develop as experience increases.
The related social, technical, and institutional problems
could be addressed at an appropriate pace to improve the
technologies and to ease the processes relevant to their
implementation and spread. Through such improvements and the
example these set, the technologies would be popularised in
the private sector:.. the low and middle-income market in the
rural areas initially and, with the requisite modifications,
spread to the urban areas.
Incrementalism would also avoid the promotion of the
indigenous construction industries posing too immediate and
obvious a threat to the import-intensive ones. It would
allow time to determine whether the overlap in the market
for indigenous technologies and the import-intensive ones is
such that the two sectors are significantly competitive, or
whether they are distinct and complementary.
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3. Heasures to Encourage the Selection of Indigenous
Technologies
Conditions in the rural and the local government
environments are more conducive to making appropriate
technology choices, but even in these enviroments decision
makers are certainly not free from the pressures that lead
to inappropriate choices. Here devolution of responsibility
for construction and technology choice to the local
government is not going to ensure that the appropriate
choices are made. Specific measures to reinforce such
choices are needed.
Here we focus on influencing choices of the LGRD officials
and elected councillors. Their actions - adopting improved
indigenous technologies in construction they implement, for
example - could in turn influence the choices of the private
sector, small industries, builder-contractors, and
individual home owners. Individuals influernced by the
demonstration effect of the local school may adopt the
technology used there. Demand for agri-waste bricks created
by their use in road soling could prompt more kiln
entrepreneurs to switch to this production technology.
In what follows we speak primarily of construction rather
than production technology although most points apply to
both. Similarly, although we focus on construction projects,
the issues and principles here, as in the rest of the study,
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largely apply to project planning and implementation in
general.
3.1 Right to Choose at the Local Level
A basic problem is that local decision makers do not have
the right to choose among alternative technologies.
Specifications are set at the -federal and provincial levels
to insure quality control and standardisation. Decision
making over which technology to adopt can, however, be
devolved to local government while maintaining some control
over quality and standards at the central level. The LGRD
technical departments at the provincial level, for example,
could design alternative specifications for the main
construction projects - feeder roads, small water supply
schemes, community buildings - for groups of districts with
similar resource and climate conditions. These alternatives
could range from the minimum acceptable indigenous
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technology to a more import-intensive alternative with some
intermediate possibilities in between.5
These specifications could be presented as guidelines from
which the local authorities (the LGRD project manager, local
council, or a village project committee) could either make
direct choices or select with modifications. The
specifications, which represent progressively higher
construction standards, would also serve as guidelines for
improving the construction over time.
This approach, instead of "let the locals design," is more
realistic given the likely resistance of provincial
construction departments to relinquishing technical control
and given the existing technical capabilities at the local
level. The valid concern of technical departments at the
central level for preserving some control over standards
5. Establishing alternative specifications is simpler than
may appear. This author over a short period designed six
alternative detailed building specifications of
progressively higher standards by simply combining
specifications of progressively higher standards by simply
combining specifications already given in government
technical documents (Government of West Pakistan, 1967).
These specifications range from the indigenous sun-brick and
timber roof type to the fired-brick, reinforced concrete or
pre-cast roof components type of building technology. The
specifications would be applicable to a large area of
central Punjab (see Table for summary of these
specifications). Together the specifications are both
guidelines for alternative choices and ways to incrementally
upgrade buildings as local conditions improve.
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would also be addressed while meeting the objective of
devolving (guided) choice down to the local level.
Being given a range of possible options would not be
sufficient to ensure appropriate choices, however.
Information has to accompany choice.
3.2 Informed Choices
Informed choices, fully cognisant of costs and benefits and
how these are distributed among the various groups - have to
be made.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of information and
simple methods to obtain and analyse data on indigenous
technologies is a major obstacle to their development.
Unchallenged by information to the contrary,
import-intensive technologies are widely accepted as
superior to their indigenous counterparts. There is also
little appreciation of how the interests of the local elites
and the low-income groups may be affected by shifts of
technology choice.
Without adequate information clearly established and
presented to all groups affected by alternative choices, it
is easier for a few to influence selection to serve their
individual interests.
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This study offers one method to analyse alternative
technologies for a whole range of criteria and to identify
and present in a comprehensible way the magnitude and
distribution of costs and benefits. Such analysis could
accompany the exercise to establish alternative
specifications carried out at the provincial level. More
simplified methodologies for studies done locally could also
be developed. The analysis and discussion on the findings
could become an integral part of the planning process
whether at the provincial or the local level.6
A system to provide adequate and accurate information on
which to base informed choices, by showing which choices are
truly advantageous, would do more to insure the selection
of appropriate choices than a simple push to "let the locals
choose."
However, indigenous technologies will only be selected if,
from such an understanding of the costs and benefits, the
influential decision makers perceive tangible benefits
accruing to them from that chioce.
6. This would apply at the national policy level, for
example, among government industrial planners deciding
whether to support agri-waste or coal fired Kilns through
improved supply of the alternative fuels and at the village
level among village or project committee members being asked
to choose between two alternative technologies for their
primary school.
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3.3 Incentives to Select the Appropriate Technology:
Sharing the Rewards
Our two most significant findings about influencing choices
towards indigenous technologies are first, that these
technologies are more cost-effective (in terms of
construction and maintenance costs over the buildings life
span in construction7 and in terms of lower production
costs in production); second, that the benefits resulting
from a shift to such technologies are substantial.
Not only do the local low-income groups benefit through job
creation, but the central government and the local elite
benefit as well through construction savings, higher profits
in local enterprises, and increased local government income
from taxes. Perhaps most important, much of these benefits
7. The first finding also addresses the most frequent and
rational reason advanced for adopting import-intensive
technologies (i.e., such technologies are more
cost-effective and efficient). If this claim is unfounded in
any specific case, it permits the planner or analyst to
pursue, perhaps with the advocate of the import-intensive
alternative, other, possibly still valid reasons for
adopting that alternative. Or else it frees both to consider
how to promote the more effective option.
Tendler (1979) suggests that demonstrating the cost-
effectiveness of the alternative technology is of limited
value because other institutional and vested interest
reasons underlie technology choice. While we agree such
reasons are perhaps most important and have examined them in
some detail here, we believe that these reasons cannot be
confronted, either in analysis or in discussion with
decision makers, until the costs, the factor that
legitimise choice are first dealt with in a convincing
fashion. Moreover, cost factors must be first carefully
analysed because under certain conditions the indigenous
technology option may indeed be more expensive.
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flow to local government and the local elite - the key
actors in determining technology and in designing and
implementing successful local programs and projects.
Thus the basis exists for' incentive systems designed to make
these potential benefits tangible and realistic
possibilities to the affected groups. Around such systems, a
coalition of national and local interests could be built in
support of indigenous technologies. 8
The following illustrates how incentives could be built into
project implementation so that it would be in the interests
of both the more centralised and the local groups to select
indigenous technologies. It also illustrates how incentives
systems combined with the necessary information on the
implications of alternative choices and with the mechanisms
8. No doubt, the widespread adoption of indigenous
technologies will be, in principle, at the expense of the
import-intensive alternatives and therefore the interests
committed to these alternatives. Our evidence suggest that
such interests are not as strong at the local level. That
is, the same entrepreneur could gain greater benefits from
producing or supplying the inputs of indigenous technologies
if these were adopted widely at that level.
To affect the national commitment to import-intensive
technologies requires a substantial expansion of the
indigenous alternative and an encroachment into the markets
now being served by the former alternative. Whether such
expansion and encroachment will eventually occur deserves
study but is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
That the suggestions made here do not presuppose a major
diversion of funds or policy changes immediately adverse to
the interests of the import-intensive technologies reduces
the likelihood of opposition from such interests.
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to benefit from those choices can become an important
impetus for local development.
A basic incentive to adopt indigenous construction
technologies is the resulting savings in construction and
maintenance costs. If these savings accrue to the central
(federal or provincial governments) authorities, that is,
the technology choice makes it possiblt for the center to
reduce the construction budget and reallocate the funds to
other uses, the local government and the beneficiary
community(ies) of the construction project would resist
adoption of the indigenous technology. Conversely, if budget
allocations at least equal the current levels for
import-intensive technology, and if the local area is free
to choose a much cheaper indigenous alternative and keep all
the resulting savings, support at the center for such a
measure would be weak. Savings must therefore accrue to
both.
One way to do this is for the central authority to allocate
to the constructed facility the same budget as is currently
provided (equal to the cost of the most import-intensive of
the technology options that have been specified for that
type of facility) less, the value of the inputs that can be
contributed through community participation. The latter
amount is then the savings made by the central authorities
(in the case of Pakistan, this would amount--to a savings for
235
the central authorities of approximately twenty-two percent
(Table 15 and Figure 15).
If the local authority, the local government or the project
committee desires, it can construct the facility using the
most import-intensive option. It will, however, have to make
up the difference in contributions from the beneficiary
community. Alternatively, the local decision makers could
decide to adopt the indigenous technology alternative and
save the difference in costs (this would amount to savings
of approximately seventy-one percent, see Table 22 and
Figure 15).
These savings could be deposited in a "construction account"
at the local bank. Not only would the interest cover annual
maintenance costs but would also provide a regular income
for the community to implement other projects, or to use as
matching grants to solicit further government assistance.
Community contributions towards construction and maintenance
would mean more savings and a more substantial deposit in
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the construction account earning further income for the
community. 9
Thus the construction budget would fund the facility, its
maintenance, and most important, a revolving fund for
meeting other felt needs of the community. The same budget
would otherwise provide only a building or infrastructure
facility likely to be soon in a state of disrepair. Every
community allocated the budget for a primary school, a
health centre, or sharing a feeder road would now have the
chance to develop such a financial mechanism. Most valuable
perhaps, is the experience gained in making development
choices and managing the development of ones own community.
This experience and the awareness and skills emerging from
it is fundamental to development. Thus a crucial learning
process is setin motion through the above system of planning
and implementing construction projects.
9. For example, the current budget for a primary school
using the import-intensive technology is Rs 35,000. The
government reduces the budget allocation to Rs 28,000(current cost less savings of twenty-one percent from
community contributions), saving the Rs 7,000 that the
community could contribute in unskilled labour. If the
commmunity constructs the school using the indigenous
technology and deposits the difference, Rs 20,000 (current
cost less savings of seventy-one percent) at ten percent
interest it will be. earning Rs 2,000 every year of which it
need spend only Rs 1,100 (eleven percent of 10,000) on
maintenance leaving an annual income of Rs 900 for other
community projects. The above does not include additional
savings possible through community contributions. The
community can of course choose to use the Rs 20,000 saved on
some other projects rather than putting it in the bank.
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Given the scale and spread of community facilities
programmed for construction in the Sixth Five Year-Plan
1983-88, this system could have a significant impact on
development at the local level. An appreciation of the
importance of technology choice and the mechanisms and
incentives to make the right choice can broaden the limited
use of construction budgets for physical development to also
encompass those: of social and economic development in the
community.
The extent to which suggestions such as the above are
feasible and the amount of modification required could best
be identified through a "learning by doing" -process.
3.4 Projects for Learning, Training, and Demonstration
The successful design and implementation of development
programs and projects depends heavily on the "learning by
doing" process as it emerges from practical projects. For
our purposes, this process is critical. The physical
performance of a technology has to be tested and developed
in practice. So must the institutional capacity required to
promote its adoption and development. Huch of the technical
and organisational training necessary to implement
construction projects and supportive measures outlined
above are most economically and effectively done "on the
job." And when questions of tastes, preferences, prestige,
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and status are so central to the success of an approach,
those who set the trends must adopt the approach in a
practical and demonstrable fashion.
Practical projects to learn from, to train persons in, and
to demonstrate the viability and advantages of the above
approaches using indigenous construction technologies are
thus an essential part of a program to promote such
technologies.
It will be easier to designate fully government-funded LGRD
projects as the first "learning by doing" demonstrations of
the program than it will be to convince council or community
funded projects to adopt the approach. Understandably, low-
income communities and councils with restricted budgets will
view such projects as experiments and resist risking their
resources on them until such projects are proven to make
sense. Furthermore, local communities are more apt to accept
such approaches if they see that those who propound them
adopt them first. Such technologies and the approach in
general would be perceived as more prestigious by the
community if they are first adopted by government agencies.
Most important, adoption by the agency integrates the
"demonstration projects" into an existing institutional
structure. All too often projects (and programs) implemented
in an institutional vacuum are not replicated once the
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demonstration or pilot phase is over. The importance of
locating the program within an appropriate institutional
structure cannot be -overemphasised: "the effectivenes of a
given program design is at least as dependent on the
presence of an organisation with a well developed capacity
to make it work as it is on the specifics of the design
itself (Korten, 1980:20)".
"Ravvaj nahhee heh (there is no example anymore)" was a
frequent reply among locals to why certain apparently soind
technical practices were no longer adopted. In a CARE
housing project which unsuccessfully sought to popularise
soil-cement blocks in the district, the caretaker wondered
how the donor organisation expected people to adopt the
technique if the government itself did -not do so.iO Similar
reservations have been expressed by people in other
countries (Skinner, 1983:147).
We know by now that the reasons for technology choice
unfavourable to indigenous technologies are more complex
than simply a lack of demonstration by trend setters. But
such demonstrations, and more so the government agencies
taking the lead by adopting such technologies in their own
buildings, are an essential component of what needs to be
10. The CARE is a development and welfare agency. A village
extension of fifty housing units and a community cantre was
constructed. Without ongoing institutional support -
financial, technical, or prestige enhancement - no one
adopted the technology once the project was completed.
240
done to promote indigenous technologies.1 1 And we have
seen how in Pakistan the LGRD is probably the most
appropriate agency to initiate such a move.
The entire process of selecting technologies, implementing
construction and managing a revolving fund as outlined
previously can be used as a vehicle to train local
councillors, community residents, and builders. The training
would deal with the issues and techniques related to
planning and implementing development projects, touching on
such matters as the tradeoffs between alternative choices
(e.g., alternative construction standards), mobilising
savings through participation and selection of more
cost-effective project alternatives, income generation
through banking, record keeping, budgeting, managing
construction, and maintenance.
An indication of the utility of using community facility
projects as "learning-training-demonstrating" vehicles can
be gauged. by noting the large number and spread of community
projects in any one year in Sahiwal district (see Tables 12
and 13). Small, manageable, inexpensive they are
nevertheless ubiquitous in almost every community. By the
same token the technology and approach have to be adapted to
11. In a region in Iran, several indigenous practices such
as arched brick lintels (in place of reinforced concrete
ones) became fashionable again, after the local regioanl
development project began adopting these practices in its
buildings (Daraie, et. al., 1977).
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the variations in local conditions among the different
communities.
Compare this to the typical large, expensive, demonstration
housing projects (as in the CARE project) restricted in
relevance and visibility to one physical context, or to the
demonstration units so popular in public housing projects
but whose credibility is cast in doubt because next to it
the government may be constructing units that do not adopt
the technologies it [the government] supposedly promotes (as
in the demonstration units of the Karachi, Lines Housing
Project cited earlier).
The learning and demonstration effect of such projects, even
if such technologies and methods are initially adopted only
by the LGRD and by the local councils can thus be
substantial. For the same reasons of being so widespread,
such projects could be most effective in popularising
indigeneous technologies among the private sector.
4. Nine Do's and Don'ts for the Program
What then have we learned about what a program to promote
indigenous technologies should or should not do if it is to
be successful? Here are some of the main points.
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It should demonstrate that the indigenous technology is
significantly more cost-effective than the import-intensive
alternative. Unless this basic point is convincingly made,
indigenous technologies cannot be promoted among either
policy makers or users. Besides, the analysis is required
since it may be that under certain conditions the import-
intensive technology is the more cost-effective alternative.
Its initiation should not require a major commitment of
government funds. Any new initiative needs to overcome
inertia and resistance to change. Resistance will be strong
if implementing the program means diverting funds from other
uses. Government support for such reallocations will be weak
because the promotion of indigenous technologies per se is
unlikely to be a high government priority (despite
statements to the contrary). The linkages with other
important objectives such as employment promotion is likely
to be perceived as too indirect or too insignificant to
warrant a major reallocation of funds until demonstrated as
otherwise.
For the same reasons, the program's implementation has to be
linked to those of some other prevailing major objectives of
the government and to the interests and institutional
structure in support of these objectives. In Pakistan, these
other objectives are decentralisation to the local
government system, the expansion of constructed facilities
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in small towns and rural areas, and gaining the support of
rural groups. Linking the development of indigenous
technologies to this existing set of powerful interests,
institutional structures, and committed funds obviates the
need for creating a new set of channels and resources, a
difficult task.
The program has to demonstrate to influential groups - the
politicians, bureaucrats, and business interests at
national, provincial, and local levels - that they will
benefit from the promotion and selection of indigenous
technologies. Emphasis. has to be placed, for example, on the
far greater coverage in constructed facilities that
government, politicians, and bureaucrats can take credit
for, for the same budget. Similarly, the greater efficiency
and productivity of indigenous production technologies
should be stressed to government industrial planners; the
higher profit margins, to entrepreneurs.
Its promotion should not pose a threat to other major
government commitments such as those to import-intensive
industries. Given the development strategies adopted by many
Third World countries like Pakistan, import-intensive
industries are likely already established with strong
interest lobbies, even if they are running inefficiently. A
program to promote indigenous technologies should not be
seen as too obvious a threat to such industries.
244
Give the technologies and their products prestige value.
Except under severe resource constraints, indigenous
technologies will not be adopted if the individuals,
communities, or agencies involved suffer a loss of status
and self-esteem as a result. Prestige value also attracts
funding whether from government or from international aid
agencies. Prestige can be imparted by projecting an improved
indigenous technology such as soil-cement as an innovative
technological development, by getting trend-setters such as
the government to adopt the technology, or even by playing
up the side effects of the technology and the program, such
as "X" number of more jobs created for the same investment.
Which points are to be emphasised depends on who is to be
attracted to adopt the technology: the individual house
builder, the government, or a donor agency.
It is essential to incorporate a maintenance system in
publicly constructed facilities using indigenous
technologies. The funds and personnel for this system must
not require increasing allocations or government personnel
but must instead be incorported within existing budgets and
personnel availability.
International donor agencies should help make the preference
for indigenous technologies, where cost-effective, part of
the "inner dynamic" of the country. It follows that their
programs need to be consistent with the above points. Donors
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can use their influence to call attention to the importance
of technology choice in specific development activities or
to pioneer in efforts to develop such technologies and the
organisational capacity to implement them.
However, as several studies of international development
assistance have shown, effective donor assistance will
require major changes in how donors design, review, and
implement development projects. Political and bureaucratic
imperatives of donor agencies influence what types of
programs and projects can be funded. Their primary function
is to provide foreign exchange, which encourages imports;
their assistance is biased towards large, capital- and
import-intensive projects; their concepts of project design
and management are derived largely from the experience of
manufacturing and large construction industries (Korten,
1980; Rondinelli, 1982; Tendler, £975). Development
organisations with close personal and business links within
the Third World countries may be better able to avoid these
problems. Unless donor agencies build up their respective
capacities to provide assistance in ways that are favourable
to the development of indigenous technologies, national
interest (in indigenous technologies) will last only as long
as the external funding does.
Hake the preference for indigenous technologies part of the
"inner dynamic" of the local decision-making and
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implementing organisation. Part of the rewards for selecting
such technologies should accrue to such organisations.
Rewards could be praise given for savings realised and
control over the use of such savings resulting from adopting
the cheaper alternative; recognition for achieving coverage
(given a minimum acceptable construction standard) rather
than for unwarranted quality; making the achievement of such
objectives as generating local employment an explicit
objective. Praise and promotion for helping achieve these
objectives would do much to make local officials support
indigenous technologies.
5. In Conclusion
There are no failsafe methods. We learn and modify as we go
along. In retrospect, one sees problems.12
Central authorities - national or provincial - unwilling to
relinquish control to the local bodies and unhappy with the
use of indigenous technologies, may obstruct or delay
the implementation of local projects, or worse frustrate the
initiative of local bodies by witholding approval, technical
assistance, and most important, funds.
12. Similar problems and the measures to circumvent them
have been documented in studies of local institutions in
rural development, see for example, Honadle and Klauss,
1979; Esman and Uphoff, 1984:181-238; Leonard and Marshall,
1982).
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Learning-training-demonstration projects are personnel- and
administrative-intensive as indeed is maintenance. Although
the tasks involved can be shared among members of the
community, responsibilities associated with local
development efforts may very well compete with the need to
make a living.
In tsocieties where the distribution of wealth is -unequal,
control and leadership by the elite may subordinate program
goals to their own vested interests. The local councillor
may also be the cement retailer, or his brother may deal in
steel. And even if neither is true and nothing stops him
from opting for local materials, who can ensure that the
local councillor with control over the savings does not
misappropriate them? And the necessary regular audit is
again personnel-intensive. The list goes on.
The questions we asked at the outset have been answered;
more have been raised in the process. The fact is no assured
blueprints exist, at most just directions worth trying.
Much of the success of the approach suggested will depend on
learning from the experience of designing and implementing
it. Most important, a program to promote indigenous
technologies must make the selection of such technologies a
natural preference of decision makers - make it part of the
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"inner dynamic" of technology choice rather than a futile
appeal or a short-lived imposition.
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APPENDIX A
CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND HOUSING:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1. Introduction
Here we examine how the regional-rural development and
housing fields have treated the subject of building
construction in the rural areas particularly the subject of
building technology.
Although the importance of construction and the technology
adopted is accepted, the regional-rural development
literature does not examine the technological implications,
while the housing literature deals largely with the urban,
large city context. The significance of alternative
construction and materials production technology choices on
development in the small town and rural sector has yet to be
systematically investigated.
2. Regional-Rural Development
Conventional growth-oriented development strategies, which
focus on industrial development in the large urban areas,
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have proved unable to spread the benefits of development
either spatially or among lower income groups in most
Third World countries. Alternative "bottom up" strategies
have been tried to stimulate development directly where the
poor reside: in lagging regions, small towns and rural
areas. Variations of the latter strategies include: "basic
needs" (Streeten, 1979), integrated rural development
(Ruttan, 1975), "urban functions in rural development"
(Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1976 and 1978), "agropolitan
development" (Friedmann, 1979), "selective spatial
enclosures" (Stohr and Todtling, 1976), "informal sector
and employment" (ILO, 1973), and so forth.
An important component, either explicit or implicit, in the
above approaches is public investment in construction -
infrastructure and buildings. This component has three
objectives: (i) to provide the economic infrastructure
necessary to achieve external economies and to decrease
production costs, and thereby, induce economic activities
and help these become competitive with metropolitan based
industries; (2) to house the "basic needs" "urban
functions" facilities - health clinics, schools, water
supply, etc., - provided in these areas; (3) to generate
demand multipliers, particularly local income and employment
multipliers, through construction investments and their
backward and forward linkages (World Bank, 1975:5; UN,
1978; Stohr and Todtling, 1978:101; Rondinelli, t976:23).
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Lipton (1976:225) underscores the importance of construction
when he urges that "the composition of nonfarm output,
especially in building and construction, should be moved
in a more rural direction.* The building requirements
implied by the long list* of proposed *urban functions,"
"agropolitan activities," etc., suggested by Rondinelli
(1976:275,277,279-80), Friedmann (19yy) and others further
support this point
For the above development approaches, a proposed "regionally
adequate" technology is one that: (1) minimises waste of
scarce resources, usually capital, and maximises use of
regionally abundant resources: human, natural, and
institutional; (2) contributes to the recovery of renewable
resources and the preservation of non-renewable ones
(Furtado, 1978); (3) uses idle local resources to improve
local infrastructure, possibly by community self-help; (4)
is sensitive to local culture, and (5) is simple to learn
and is quickly implemented (Vacca, 1978 cited .. in Stohr and
Taylor, 1981:65)
Rondinelli sums up by saying that:
"the technology and design schemes for building ..[must
be) appropriate, low-cost and labour-intensive so that
they are easily adapted and generate income earning
opportunities among the local people (Rondinelli,
1978:191).0
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Advocates of small towns and rural areas, seem to agree on
the importance of construction, including building
construction, and on the criteria for the type of technology
that would most contribute to this development approach. But
research on technologies that would meet these criteria has
not been done in the regional-rural development field. What
research there is has emerged out of the housing field.
3. Housing
Two types of research -relevant to our topic have been done
in housing: on low-cost technologies, and on housing and
employment studies.
3.1 Low-Cost Housing Technology
Research on low-cost housing technology, whether on
construction or on materials production technology, has
attempted to -demonstrate how, through design and engineering
manipulations, the lowest cost output can be achieved for a
given product (e.g., Goodman, 1979 and UNIDO, 1980).
Although this type of research is necessary, it overlooks
the social and economic context within which the
technologies would be applied. Thus on application such
"solutions" have proved to be still too costly or socially
unacceptable for their intended markets.
253
3.2 Housing and Employment
Advocates of public investment in housing were for sometime
preoccupied with contradicting the claim of growth
economists that housing is nonproductive and resource
consuming. To justify increased funds for housing, most
housing studies compared housing with other sectors.
Arguments marshalled in support for housing included housing
as a stimulus for savings, housing's contribution to capital
formation and to the training of an industrial labour force
(Burns and Grebler, 1977).
Housing and employment studies took a similar approach.
Most compared employment multipliers from housing with those
from other manufacturing sectors (Grimes, 1976) instead of
comparing the effect of varying housing technologies on
employment.
More recently Ganesan (1979) found from studies in Sri Lanka
that the employment multipliers of low-income, traditional
housing were much higher than those of upper-income, modern
housing. He also raised the issue of cost in concluding
that, given the country's financial- especially foreign
exchange - constraints, Sri Lanka could only meet its
housing targets by increasing the share of traditional
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(i.e., lower cost, more indigenous resource-using) housing
in its output.
Strassman's (1976) finding that employment multipliers were
higher in provincial cities than in capital ones gave a
spatial dimension to the employment question. Building upon
these findings, Shaw (1980) proposed a migration strategy to
"bend back the urbkn flow" to the metropolis by encouraging
residential construction in the provincial cities.
However, none of the research in housing and employment went
farther into the rural sector nor were the spatial
distribution of the costs and benefits of their proposals
investigated.
3.3 The "Informal" Housing Sector
Studies on informal sector housing and employment similarly
overlooked the rural areas, but these studies seemed more
aware of this oversight. As Bromley observed in the
introduction to one such set of studies:
"... there is a curious tendency to view the informal
sector as exclusively urban ... it is surely not
possible to deny the existence of similar enterprises
- and situations in the rural areas. The %rural
informal sector' should receive at least as much
attention as the *urban informal sector' and the
general term informal sector should logically include
primary production when it fits the descriptive
criteria which describes the sector (Bromley,
1979:1034)."
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The descriptive criteria of the urban informal sector cited
by Bromley as applicable to the same sector in rural areas,
may be summarised as follows: (i) ease of entry, (2)
reliance on indigenous resources, (3) family ownership of
enterprises, (4)small scale of operation, (5) labour-
intensive and adapted technology, (6) skills acquired
outside the formal school system, and (7) unregulated and
competitive markets.
Informal sector activities are largely ignored, rarely
supported, often regulated and sometimes actively
discouraged by the government.
The characteristics of formal sector activities are the
converse of the above: (1) difficult entry, (2) frequent
reliance on overseas resources, (3) corporate ownership, (4)
large scale of operation, (5) capital-intensive and often
imported technology, (6) formally acquired skills, often
expatriate, and (7) protected markets (through tariffs,
quotas and trade licenses) (ILO, 1972:6).
Lacking directly relevant studies, we can use the above
characteristics as reference points to contrast against our
own observations of the rural informal sector.
3.4 Rural Housing
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3.4 Rural Housing
The dominant view has been that the housing problem is urban
and that land allocation is the key issue; hence, sites and
services should be provided. The poor can deal with the rest
- building construction - through self-help. In rural
areas, land and the building materials are readily
available, hence there is no problem, or at least it is much
less urgent (Van Huyck, 1977). In one formulation housing
technology and rural housing are thus marginalised as policy
issues.
Rural housing in relation to urban housing is today just as
the latter was in relation to other economic sectors some
years ago: struggling to make a case for itself. The
potentials for using rural housing construction to modify
population distribution and. to improve health,
productivity, employment, and income distribution have all
been raised and examined with varying degrees of success
(United Nations, 1978; Soysa, 1979). But the *theory* is
still in its infancy, limited by the dearth of relevant
rural sector studies to develop an understanding and a case
for this sector. With the paucity of research, the theory
(ironically and unsatisfactorily) draws heavily in some
aspects - such as productivity, employment, and income
effects - on studies competitor for funds (United Nations,
1979).
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Nevertheless, a case for more attention to the rural housing
sector has been developed. It can be summarised as follows:
(1) The population of most Third World countries will remain
rural for sometime. This is especially true if small towns
as rural support centers are included, as they should be,
in the rural sector (Soysa, 1979; World Bank, 1978:15;
Lipton, 1976:225).
(2) Despite apparently more time, space, and access to
construction materials, rural housing conditions
particularly in the rapidly growing small towns can be as
bad as in most cities (Zaki, 1981).
(3) These small towns will require much building
construction if they are to serve as rural support centres.
(4) The self-help, mutual aid traditions of rural areas
could also be utilised in building construction.
(5) Rural skills and materials industries could adequately
meet most public and private building needs in rural areas,
offering better quality at slightly higher costs to the
low-income groups and much cheaper buildings at slightly
lower quality to the upper-income groups and the
government.
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What is required is research and development on rural
technologies and the results applied in rural building and
materials production programs. This should be coupled with
technical assistance to builders and materials entrepreneurs
in areas like skills training, credit, and guidance in
production methods and their management.
(6) A rural housing industry thus developed would offer low-
cost outputs for the rural and urban low-income markets,
make the physical improvement of rural areas more
affordable, and generate rural employment and income
distribution through the high degree of local multipliers
in such an industry (United Nations, 1978; Soysa, 1979).
Several countries have rural housing policies, some
reflecting the above viewpoint. However,the effect of such
policies has been mostly limited, because of both the lack
of knowledge about the rural housing sector and the lack of
a serious commitment by the central government. Government
efforts in rural building are largely a few public buildings
absorbing a large proportion of construction expenditures or
are special case efforts - refugee relief, resettlement
schemes - or at best some highly subsidised experimental and
isolated projects such as the Ghanain roof "loan" scheme
(Humtaz,1981) or the Iranian construction, materials
industry and training efforts in the Selseleh Regional
Project (Daraie, et. al., 1977).
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As for the technology adopted in rural areas by governments,
the observation of Stohr and Todtling accurately reflects
most cases, they note:
"Local infrastructure investment - done by central
agencies - favours the introduction of core-region
based construction technology, building materials, and
other extraregional inputs. This 'tends to' reduce
potential regional employment effects and the
mobilisation of other regional resources (buildltng
materials etc), create leakages and thereby
considerably reduce the expected regional impact of
such transfers of public investment. If administered
by centrally steered agencies, it will also fail to
help develop peripheral areas' abilities to mobilize
and handle their own resources (Stohr and Todtling,
1978:101)."
Several conclusions about building construction in rural
areas may be drawn from the foregoing. First, local
resource utilisation, low cost, generation employment and
[local] participation are cited as major criteria of
appropriateness for technology choice. Second, empirical
studies on such building technologies and what is involved
in implementing them in rural areas are lacking. Third,
governments and international agencies often ignore these
criteria or apply them unsuccessfully in rural construction
programs.
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APPENDIX B1.
THE TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION MODEL DETAILED
Both the construction and production models go through four
stages of analysis. Each of the first three stages tests the
performance of the technology against a distinct set of
criteria. The fourth stage then compares this performance
among alternative technologies. These stages of analysis
are: (i) a construction-maintenance or production analysis
(the first stage of the construction aand production models
respectively) from which basic criteria such as cost,
productivity, and employment are derived; (2) a cash flow
and cost-benefit analysis, the former shows how construction
expenditures result in income distributed spatially and by
income group; the latter takes into account the time and
true scarcity values of resources in estimating costs,
benefits, and income distribution; (3) a savings' impact
analysis, and (4) the net effect of switching from one
technology to another on all the criteria (for a flow chart
of the models see Figures I and II).
The main difference between the construction and production
models is at the first stage of analysis, as will be made
clear below. Both translate case studies or engineering
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specifications of construction or production methods into a
prototype that is the basis of each model.
1. The Construction-Maintenance Analysis (Flow Chart I and
Tables I.1.O to 3.2 Box Ic)
The construction analysis presents the inputs (materials and
labour) and their variables: quantities, costs, and
construction duration for each stage of construction (Table
I.1.1 and I.i.2). Costs are expressed in total values and in
coefficients (i.e., as a proportion of total costs). This
information is then summarised by type of input (Tables
1.3.1 and 1.3.2 box Ie). The effects of changes such as
those in input prices, project scale, or labour mix on the
above variables and on the criteria derived from it
(mentioned below) are captured by the model.
The maintenance analysis presents maintenance patterns and
costs by type of maintenance and by type of inputs required
over the project life (Tables I.2.1 and 1.2.2). It models
the changes in these patterns and in the costs arising from
changes in assumptions about the type and extent of
maintenance required.
The first set of technology choice criteria - the basic
criteria are derived from the construction input analysis
described above (Tables 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 box Ic). These
criteria are spatial efficiency (internal space per unit of
built area), cost effectiveness (cost in Pakistani Rupees
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[Rs] per square foot constructed and Rs per man-day of
employment created) and labour productivity (man-days
required per square foot constructed). A full list of the
criteria is shown in Table 4, chapter 2.
2. The Production Analysis (Flow Chart II, Table II.i.i and
II.1.2, Box IA)
The production analysis is essentially a receipts,
expenditures, and income statement commonly used by
entrepreneurs to assess the profitability of their
enterprise. The receipts by type of product sold, the types
of expenditures (e.g., -capital, materials, labour, taxes,
and interest), and their quantities and costs are
specified. .The analysis has two stages: first, a detailed
statement, which is the intermediary between the case
studies and the second stage, which is the the prototype
production model.
The basic set of criteria derived from the production
analysis are cost per unit of output, profitability, capital
and labour productivity, and employment. The production
model simulates how all these and profitability, in
particular, vary with price and with capacity, output,
financing, and production season.
Besides being the basis of the technology choice models,
the construction-maintenance and production analyses are
useful planning and management tools. For example, the
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construction- maintenance analysis can anticipate the type,
quantities, costs and timing of inputs required for
construction and maintenance of a school construction
program. The planner and the communities involved can
then, for example, divide the construction and maintenance
tasks between the community and the government, and
schedule implementation.
Both models are also designed with the specific
characteristics of small projects and the informal sector in
mind. For example, the capacity to model effects of
variations in output levels and production seasons on
profitability is very important in planning or analysing
small, informal sector projects. In such projects, output
can fluctuate widely with demand and the weather (thus
affecting receipts), but labour, a major expenditure, can
remain fixed for the duration of the production season.
(Labour then becomes the fixed cost affecting profitability,
rather than capital, a factor of greater importance in the
analysis of large-scale projects than in small-scale ones.)
Summary input tables are derived from the construction and
production models. These tables categorise materials into
local and non-local (i.e., from within and from outside
the district), and labour into skilled and unskilled
(Tables II.i.i and II.1.2 box IA.2). These tables are the
basis for the next analytical stages: the cash flow and
cost-benefit analysis. Both analyses are pursued because
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they measure different things and because each type has
its own user group.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis (Tables I.4.1, 1.4.2, II.2.1 and
11.2.2)
Reduced to its essentials, cost-benefit analysis takes into
account three factors
analytical steps and the
(1) Financial Analysis.
value of the project
investment value of
alternative return the
have obtained over the
obtained by discounting
in three analytical steps.
factors involved are:
The
This step measures the present
taking into account the time-
resources used, that is, the best
investment in the project could
same period. This present value is
the project's costs and benefits by
rates (sometimes interest rates) equal to the best
alternative returns. The assumption is that the investor
could have put his resources into this next best
alternative.
(2) Economic Analyses. This step measures the costs and
benefits of the project using the true scarcity values of
the resources used, that is, their production cost or
border price plus transport cost from source to the site.
For goods not tradeable internationally (nontradeables),
production costs are obtained by subtracting transport
costs, government tariffs, taxes, and subsidies from the
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market price. For tradeable goods, we apply border import
or export prices (border price in dollars multiplied by the
shadow price of foreign exchange plus local transport). The
economic (shadow) price thus obtained represents the true
cost to society of supplying that good, either through
domestic production or through imports.
(3) Social Analysis. This step measures the income gains,
losses, and distribution resulting from differences between
the best investment and price alternatives and those
obtained by the project, as they affect the groups involved
- the project, consumers, businessmen (materials suppliers),
workers, and the government (appendix B2 gives a more
detailed discussion of cost-benefit analysis, its concepts,
application in this study, and effects on the results).
The model is set up so that the variables - sometimes the
assumptions - such as discount rates and shadow prices are
clearly presented as well as the effects on income
distribution resulting from a change in these variables.
4. Cash Flow Analysis (Tables I.3.1, 1.3.2 ,II.1.i and
II.1.2)
For most people involved in housing and materials production
- the house builder, private developer, materials
production entrepreneur, community representative,
government officials, and politicians influencing and
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overseeing such investments - cost-benefit analysis, even
in its simplified form, may be too esoteric to grasp and
apply or may simply be irrelevant to their concerns. Cash
flow analysis, showing the distribution of expenditures
resulting in income gained or lost by such persons or their
constituents, may be more tangible and meaningful.
The cash flow analysis traces the distribution of
expenditures in construction and materials production among
the suppliers of inputs grouped according to their location
and income levels. The expenditures thus represent income
distributed spatially and by income group: between the
target area (the rural district in this case) and the rest
of the country; between urban and rural areas within the
district; among upper- and lower-income groups, and the
local government.
The analysis is in two steps. First, coefficients of
distribution for the cash flow of inputs involved are
obtained from the case studies of the cash flow of the
inputs involved. Second, these coefficients are applied
to the actual expenditures in the construction or
materials production type being analysed to get the
total distribution of income resulting from each type
(for example, summary cash flow analysis of cement
supply in Table IV.3 gives the, coefficients to be
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applied to the share of expenditures on cement in the
imported construction technology type, Table .I.2).
5. The Savings Impact Analysis (for example, Table I3.i
box IIA)
The income distribution information from the cost-benefit
and cash flow analyses is the basis for assessing the
savings impact. To obtain the effects on savings, the
savings impact analysis simply applies marginal propensities
to save (mps) of each income recipient group to the income
obtained by the group from construction expenditures. The
mps can be those usually adopted by government or obtained
through case studies and interviews.
Together, the construction/production, cost-benefit, and
cash flow, and savings analyses quantify the performance
of the technologies relative to their respective major
criteria.
6. Met Switching Effects
The net effect of switching from one technology type to
another, is obtained by subtracting the performance values
of one alternative from that of another. The employment
effect, for example, of switching from the indigenous to
the imported construction technology is a loss of 1.35
man-days per Rs 100 of construction expenditures (0.72 man
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days per Rs O1 in imp fed construction minus 2.07 man-
days per Rs 100 in inttigenous construction. Tables I.5.1
and 1.5.2).
At the construction/production analysis stage, all values
are reduced to the common denominator of per Rs 100 of
construction expenditures. These values are in effect
coefficients that are at a scale easier to manipulate. The
coefficients can then be applied to different construction
expenditures to obtain the full measure of the effects on
the criteria considered. The coefficients, for example, can
be applied to the government's district construction
expenditures to measure, the employment and income gains and
losses resulting from their choice of building technology.
The above analysis may be done in its entirety. Construction
or production, cost-benefit and cash flow, and savings
analyses may be integrated so that performance values are
obtained for the whole range of criteria. The effect of
changes in assumptions or conditions in any one analytical
step are reflected in the subsequent steps and performance
values. Alternatively, each analytical step, a submodel by
itself, can be used independently so long as the base
information is obtained.
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fable I . Flow Chart of TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION MODEL: applied to CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY
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7 STAGES I SPECIFICATIONS 1100 /Unit :Total : /Unit : Total /100cf: Total :6 Unsk. :/?day :Total ::
a c d fk i k : a | 0 aq r I t | v x z ab ad ae
9 Input Constant :Output:Iaput :Output Constant :output :output :Input :Output::Output output
0 =======a==--=== ====== 3======== =========== ==========--- " " a"".""""""""" """""*I
11 CRITERIA: 33") TOTALS 2.17 2260 Total: 85| 11.01: :1832:: 4092:: 844 1886
2 TOTALS (sf) 55.23 Unsk: 62 :100.00 I 44.77 100.00N
1.0 FOUNDATION t FOOTINGS: Sub-Tot. 2.41 ::18912.5 1.72 258 447 107 185
I Total (cf) :1a a4.62 14.68:15.63 6.30 10.92 H
1.1 Excavation 1'6'2'6' 2.41:a UnskIed 1.05 2.5 0.42 15 38
(17.1-5,32,VU2) H1
1.2 Footings 18 * vide of 1.89 Earth (cf/100cf) 35 66: 0.55 36 ::Skilled 1.50 2.8 1.42 40 113
sun-bricks in mud-tortar upto 1.89 ::Sun-bricks (l/100cf) 1350 2552 0.06 153 Unskilled 3.75 7.1 1.18 15 106 H
ground level.(21.1,69,v13) -a a a
2.0 VALLS Sub-Total H 7.89H791 42 :1 5.47 924 1715 117 217
I Total (cf) 19.33 49.17 49.64: 22.59 41.92::
2.1 13.5' thick of sun-brick 1: 7.89 Earth (cf/100cf) 35 276 0.5 152 ::Skilled 1.50 11.8 5.92 473
in mud-wortar(21.15,69,13)i H 7.99 Sun-bricks (/100cf) 1350 :10652 0.06 6.39 U.nskilled 3.75 29.6 4.93 15 444
2.2 Extra labour for archvork |1 0.10: a.a1::Skilled 1.00 0.1: 0.05 40: 4:: aa
(21.2,66,019) H: 0.10 Unskilled 2.00 :0.2:0.03: 15 3
3.0 ROOF Sub-Total 2.50 H 1: 1113 :a a 9 a 1.21 204 1317 82 -527
I Total (sf): .:: 27.21 !! |10.79: |10.95s 4.98H32.19
3.1 Mud roof of 4' mud
I 1' mud plaster ovo
1 layer each of grav
sarkanda & sirkee r
(NA, MA,6)
Providing, placingB
4"28':1
Providing, placingB
(aa,84,M79)'2.5"t3'
2.50 ::Strav (lbs/100sf) 34 : 85 : Free : 0 ::Skilled 0.33 1 0.8 1 0.41 1 40 33
er 2.50 ::grass (sf/100sf) 100 : 250 : Free : 0 :Unskilled 1.60 | 4.0 | 0.67 15 601:: H
ss, |. 1 2.50 sarkanda (sf/100sf) 100 a 250: a .3 a 83
eed sats 2.50 :sirkee (sf/100sf) 130 : 325 : 0.44 : 144
i: 2.50 Earth (cf/100sf) 55 a 138 | 0.55 : 76:
Beams (No.):: 2.00 :Accacia Beans 1 2 :225.00 450 ::Skilled/6bas. 1.00 0.3 : 0.17 40 13
14'2 z (cf): | 6.10:: 1.2: 7 Unskilled/Sbas. 3.00: 1.0: 0.17 15: 15::
Battens.(No.):: 45.00 ::Accacia Battens 1 45 8.00 360 ::Skilled/30btns. 1.00 1.5 | 0.75: 40 : 60 H
6'?45 z(cf):: 13.95:: 1.2: 17: Unskilled/30btns. 1.00: 1.5: 0.25 15 23
H H. a: a a0'a a1a1
a ________________ a. ______________________________________ a a
-: : : .- : :-:-:: ~ a __________________ a
48 : 4.0 FLOOR Sub-Total1: 2.17 ::a91 5 : 0.54 1 95 194 44 89
49 : 1 Total 11 (sf) H2.42 6.39 1 4.93 2.31 4.74
50 -----
1 4.1 6'copacted earth with 1 :: 2.17 ::Straw (srs/100sf) 17 37 Free 0 :Skilled 0.25 0.5 0.27 40 22
52 : *ad plaster and dung : 2.17 :.Earth (cf/100sf) 82 178 : Q.!5 98 U::leskilled 2.25 : 4.9 | 0.81 15 73
53 : finish (24.2,87,W20) 1 2.17 Dung (cf/100sf) 0.75: 2 Free 0
54: 2.17::Clay (cf/100sf) 0.75 2 0.75 1
55
57 : 5.0 RENDERS Sub-Total 14.28 67 16 2.08 352 419 25 29
58 : I Total (sf) 1.65 0.39 0.05 8.59 10.24
59 |:-
60 : 5.1 0.5' mud plaster on walls: 14.29 :clay (cf/100sf) 6 96: 0.75 | 64 ::Skilled 0.17 2.4 | 1.21 40 97
61 : inter'nal:567s,external:744sf 14.28 strav (srsl00sf) 9 | 114 Free 0 !!Unskilled 0.75 10.7 1.79 15I 161
62 | (25.7,97,020) | a a a a0.0
63 : 5.2 Dung plaster on valls t roof: 16.45 ::clay (cf/100sf) 0.25 4 | 0.75 : 3 ::Skilled 0.12 2.0| 0.99 40 79
64 : roof:217sf.(25.7,101,v34) 16.45 ::dung (cf/100sf) 0.25 41 Free : 0 Mnskilled 0.06 | 1.0 | 0.16 15 Is
271
13:
14
15
16:
17
18
19
20:
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33:
34:
35 :
36 : 
37 :
389
39|
40 1
41
42 |
43
44:
45
3.2
A
! xwm=ILXZXXZXJMXILZZSUazuz=zxzltzzz*SXWSLXXZssiLszzzx=xamxzxz.I I za=ra= 1. .1 zanxzsxxxzzaz 11
- - -- - --: =3
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Table I. 1. 2 Construction Stages, Specifications, Costs
and Duration: Import-Intensive Technology of
Coal and Oil-Fired Brick Walls and Reinforced
Concrete Roof
- --------------------- I, - - -- --------------- 11 ---- ::-------------
VARIABLES IIRUANTITYIl MATERIALS + 1 LABOUR = IITOTAL MRATE (Rs/100sf)
--- ------------------------- - -------------------------- -- --
lIsI,cI,kgIl Type Quantity I Cost (Rs) It Type 8ty.(Kan Days) / 2Sk., 2 ICost (Rs) lINat+Lab MLabour Mat.4Lat
STAGES I SPECIFICATIONS 1:1100 1 /Unit I Total I /Unit Total 11 1/100 ITotal 6 Unsik. 6 1 Nday Total I 1. - L Mel'
c d II Input II Constant I I k I Input * I - Constant q I s I u linput x 1 1z ab ac
CRITERIA =a) TOTALS 1I 2.17 11 I I 15595 11 Total I 147 41 1 4895 :1 20490 11 2256 944.
I TOTALS 1 (si) I I I 76.11 I ' Unskilled I 99 100.00 I 23.89 : 100.00::f
:1.0 FOUNDATION Sub-Total I 42.06 1I I 1 3259 I 1 25.0 5.6 1 673 :1 3932 |1 16 93
i FOOTINGS: I Total 11 (cf) II I 1 15.90 11 I 16.92 13.75 1 3.29 11 19.19 if
.I- --- II-- -------------- -- I------ -------------------------------------------
1.1 Etcavation 2'6'12'6'. I1 3.90 I I IlUnskilled 1.05 1 4.1 0.7 1 20 82: 9182 1 210 21C
(17.1-5,32.112) II II I I I1I11ifl
1.2 Cement concrete bed 11 1.17 IICement(cwtllcf) 4.50 1 5 1 72.50 392 :Skilled 0.25 1 0.3 0.1 1 60 181
9'12'6'. Cem:Snd:Agg. 1 1.17 IISand(cf/lcf) 39.00 1 46 1 4.00 193 1Unskilled 5.50 1 6.4 1.1 1 20 129 1
1:7:20.(20.I,52.v4) I 1.17 IlAggregate(cf/Icf) 111 I 130 1 6.50 844 I sub-total 1 6.7 1.2 146 11 15551: 125 1325
i I sub-total I I 1408 I11I.1
1.3 Footings 9' thick of 1I 1.89 IlBricks(IIlcf) 1350 1 2552 1 0.33 842 UISkilled 2.00 I 3.8 1.9 1 60 227t1 .
fired-bricks in cemtsnd. I 1.89 IliCeent(cwt/cf) 3.00 1 6 1 72.50 411 1Utnskilled 4.80 1 9.1 1.5 1 20 191 11
mortar 1:1 upto flir.lyl. II 1.89 IlSand(cf/lc) 26.50 I 50 1 4.00 200 1I sub-total I 12.9 3.4 1 4081 1962 1: 216 98
(21.1,64,v12) I f i sub-total I I 1453 I111H
1.4 Damp roof course II 0.44 IlCement(cvt/Isf) 2.25 I 1 1 72.50 72 UlSkilled 0.65 I 0.3 0.1 1 60 17'1
(d.p.c.) 1:2:4. 1.5' I 0.44 IiSand(cf/Isf) 5.50 1 2 1 4.00 10 MUnskilled 2.25 1 1.0 0.2 1 20 20::
thick v/ 2 coats hot II 0.44 1!Bitumin(lbs/Isf) 34.00 I 15 1 17.80 266 U! sub-total 1 1.3 0.3 : 37 434 H 84 996
bitusin I polythene 1 0.44 IlAggregate 11.00 1 5 I 6.50 31 11 1*1
sheet .5 gauge. 1: (i) II(cf/sf) I I |HI1I
(na,59,w90) 11 0.44 1:Polythene(sf/Isf) 100 1 44 1 0.40 19 1I
II I sub-total I 1 397 11
------------------- ::-- --- ---- ------- 1I-------- 11--------------------- --------------- ---------- ----- :1---------
2.0 WALLS Sub-Total !1 4.92 I, I I 4028 I 1 40.7 11.0 1 1314 .1 5342 261 1086
1 Total I1 (cf) '1 I 19.66: 1| 27.6 26.8 6.41: |. 26.07::
- - ------------------------------------ --------- II -------- ---- --- I- ------------ 1 --------- I--- -- :- ----
2.1 Fired bricks 9' thick in !: 4.92 1:Bricks(I/lcf) 1350 1 6642 I 0.33 2192 I:skilled 2.50 1 12.3 6.2 1 60 7391 1|
ces.snd. sortar 1:7 l 4.92 ICement(cMt/cf) 3 I 15 1 72.50 1070 1HUnskilled 5.58 1 27.5 4.6 1 20 549 :1
(21.1,64,012) 11 4.92 l:Sand(cf/Icf) 26.50 1 130 1 4.00 522 o1 sub-total I 39.8 10.7 1 1297 11 5071::! 262 1031
II II sub-total I I 3783 I1i
2.2 6 Lintels of reinforced I 0.10 IlCement(cwt/cf) 17.60 1 2 1 72.50 128 !:Skilled 1.00 1 0.1 0.1 160 6::
cement concrete (r.c.c.) 11 0.10 I"Sand(cf/Ic) , 44.00 1 4 1 4.00 18 ItUnskilled 6.50 1 0.7 0.1 1 20 13::
ces.snd.agg. 1:2:4. w/ 2 11 0.10 !!Aggregate(cf/cf) 88.00 a 9 1 6.50 57 IISkilled/50kg 0.50 1 0.1 0.1 . 1 60 6:: |
as bars (20.4,52,14) 11 0.10 Ias bars 3/8'(kg/Zkg) 100 1 10 1 4.25 43 IlUnskilled " 0.50 1 0.1 .0 1 20 2: ! |:|
|H 0.1011l sub-total 1 I 245,1: 1 sub-total 1 1.0 0.23 1 27::1 272 :: 270 719
----------------- H--- -- I -------------------------- I----11.a --- ------- --- 11-------------- 1-- ----- ,,-----1 I ------
3.0 ROOF Sub-Total 1 0.91 I I 1 5998 I I 36.1 11.5 I 1386 I 7383 |1: 523 8114
1 Total II (cf) 111 1 29.27 I1 1 24.5 29.3 1 6.76 I 36.03 |
--- --- 11--11---- --------------------- i-- ------------------- - -'
3.1 R.C.C. slab 4.5' thick. !1 0.91 IlVood Forework:Rented I I Ii
a) preparing surface for 1I 2.50 lIIl:Columns;Rs2/day/7days 6 1 6 1 34.00 204 IlLabour for Formwork Only: I 1I.
r.c.c. fnct. forevork of 1I (sf) 112:DeassiRs2/day/17days 2 1 2 1 34.00 68 i!Skilled I 2.00 1.0 I 60 1201, i
vood supports,brick, i1 113:Battens;Rs.5/day/17days 39 1 39 1 8.50 332 IlUnskilled 1 6.00 1.0 1 20 120is
earth, I sand under- II IlBrIcks;l152/288damaged 288 1 289 1 0.33 95111 sub-total 1 9.00 2.0 1 240 11 /Isf if 96 423
surfacing, 14 days in 11 . Earth;1.5'thick(cf) 35 1 35 1 0.55 19 lIforavork:MaterialstLabour-I 1 105811
place. II IlSand;negligable I I I I/Total I I 5 1 1
H1 I Carriage 1 I 100 11I1
II II sub-total8 I 11891
b) laying slabs incl. 1 0.91 lCement(cwt/cf) 17.60 1 161 72.50 1161 ;!Labour for formvorkflayingslab:
pouring,compacting, curing 11 0.91lSand(cfllcf) 44.00 1 40 1 4.00 160 Mkilled 12.00 1 10.9 5.5 1 60 654 1
rendering. Cemssndtagg: I1 0.91 IlAggregate(cfllcf) 99.00 1 90 1 6.50 521 flUeskilled 13.30 1 12.1 2.0 1 20 242 :1 U
I:2:4:(20.4,52.w4) 11 (cf) .I sub-total 1 1942 11 sub-total 1 23.0 7.5 I 996 11 3556 a1 995 390
:3.2 fabricating mild steel I1 3.00 I:.S.Darsl/2'0g/Ikg) 100 1 300 1 4.50 1350 lSkIlled 0.50 I 3.0 1.5 1 60 I9o f1 :1
(m.s.) reinforcing bars; it0.06 Ilfinding ire(lbs/cwt) 0.25 1 0 1 7 0Iinskilled 0.50 1 3.0 0.5 1 20 60 Ill If
cutting, bending, 11 111sub-total 1 1 1350 11I sub-total I 6.0 2.0 I 240:111590i11 g90 5Y
laying, jointing Iif 11I
fastening plus cost of I II111
bending vire, steelI1II11
wastage I rust removal. 11 I1IIif
(851,55,5) IllI11if
3.3 Cement slab coated v/ 34 U 2.17 IlCement(cvtllsf) 0.50 I 1 1 72.50 79 lSkilled 1.2S I 2.7 1.4 1 60 163 11 :1
lbs. bitumin, sand :12.17 IISand(cf/Ksf) 3.00 1 71 4.00 26 tnskilled 2.00 1 4.3 0.7 20 9711 1 1
blended, I polythene II12.17 UEarth(cf/Isf) 55.00 I 119 1 0.55 66 11 sub-total 1 7.1 2.11250 I12239 i 115 1031
sheet covered wl 4' : 2.17 IITlls(I/Ksf) 350 1 760 1 0.55 419 It1I
earth I I' mud plaster 34.00 I 741 17.90 1313 1I11
v/out straw, finished v/ 11 2.17 IlPolythene (sf/lsf) 100 I 217 I 0.40 0911Iit1 :1
fired clay tilts II (s) II sub-total 1 I 1989 1:111
9'14.5'32' grouted w/ 1H II1I1 I111I1 i
ces.snd. mortar 1:3. 11 11
(23.1,76,v25) It II I 1II1 I1
----------------- I------ --------------- ---------------- --------------------------- ---- I--------- I--------- --
4.0 FLOOR Total :1 2.17 :1 1 1366 1I10.9 2.0 1 244 U:1610 1 112 74
I Total 11 (if) I1I 1I6.67 1 7.3 5.0 1 1.19111 7.961'
--- I---------------------__11-I-----.-t---------------- - - -- - - ---------- :- 
-:I------------
4.1 Earth bed, moistened I 11a2.17 IlEarth(cf/Ki) 70.00 I 152 1 0.55 94ISkilled 0.13 1 0.3 0.1 1 60 1711 !1
ramed to 6' thickness 11 2.17 :1linskilled 1.25 I 2.7 0.5 1 20 5411 if
(24.1,67,020) 11 2.17 II 1 I 11 sub-total 1 3.0 0.6 : 711I' 15511 33 71
4.2 Sand filling of3 if 1.17 USand(cf/lcf) 130 152 1 4.00 609 ISilled 0.13 1 0.2 0.1 1 60 9 It.
layers, each 3' thIck II .1:iInsild40I 47 09 I20 41
compacted after i .7I I u-oa . . 0 1 1 9 0
saturation down to 2', 1: I 11[ :
totalling 6'(24.2,97,e4 I II 1UIII
1.1.1) I I I I lII
4.3 rck ballast, 2' gauge II02 idblat10I 31 35 10 lnsild30I 0. 01 120 71 1511 6 44
dry rammed to l.5'layer I c)I~fIf UII:
(20.1,51,w4) I II I ~ lII:
4.4 Cement concrete bed, I02Ilentctcf1761 5I725 35 kild10I 0. 01 160 71U
1.5' /ces:sndt agg: II02IIndclc)4.01 114.0 4 Insled651 1. 03 I20 31: I
1:2:4:(20.1,52,w4) II02Ilgeatcfcf 990I 25 6.0 10II sbttl I 21 04 15: 6011 90 24
5.0 RENDERS . Total I 64 II I94III3. 07 1 17 122 1 7 3
- Total I s)I .11112. 61 I 62 11.5I
5.1 Cement pointing In I .0I~mn~v/s)07 17.0 44Ikle .01 97 44 I6 2 I I
struck joints on walls I .0I~n~fKf .0I 1 .0 6 :Us~ld12 09 19 12 1 I :
exterIor. Cemisnd. Ii2. I .0I u-oa 1 : u-oa 96 62 I70I 26I i 4
(25.9,99.w33)II II I lI111 1
5.2 Cement plaster .5' thIck I .3I~ms~w/s)05 25 1 :S~Id07 . . 0 291
on wll Intr~o. 1 5.93 lSand(cf/Zcsf) 44.00 1 4221 4.00 ~ 1  skIled 125 I 10.9 5.2 I 20 13954
cem~nd.16II 5.3II sub-total I I 130 :1 sub-total 1 11.0 32 397 l 69 !1 70 534
5.3 Cesent plaster 3/8' 11 2.17IIement(cet/Ksf) 0.66 I I I 72.50 -104 ,IlSilltd 0.75 I 1.6 0.9 1 60 9911
thick under slab 1I 2.17 IISand(cf/lsf) 2.55 1 61 4.00. 22 1IInskilled 1.25 I 2.7 0.5 I 20 5411
cemxsnd. 1:3. (25.1-6,98,02)1I 2.17 11 sub-total I I 126 |11 sub-total 1 4.3 1.3 I 15211 279 I1 70 128
---------------- - - - -- - - -- - ---------------- I----------- III-- --------------- I ------------------------ If-----11
Table 1.2.1
CDNSTR1CTION & KAINTEMANCE PATTERNS (Over 20 years) Indigenous Construction Technology it Sun - Brick Walls, Timber Roof
na:Itenance Patterns I Costs; it TYPE OF IA1NTENANCE REQUIRD
VARIABLES Constr.| Raintenance .o)
YEARS: It 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 |TOTALS I
MAIN TENAHCE REDUIRED bc 11 bd bf bg bh bi bj bk bi be ha be bp bq br bs bt bu by bu bi by ca
Input :Outputsz..)
I, m5a.........--xwzz..x ... r.3 3 .3323  33. 33ma 3was3m m33aim33m --.............................. 23... .............. ...:.
TOTALS (Rs) 1 4092 380 380 546 390 380 546 390 380 380 1353 380 380 546 380 380 546 380 380 380 2159 1: 11015
Area 1i
Repair :1
Year 0: Construction 0.00 : 4092
Yearly: Re-render External H H
Valls, Floor & Roof 1.00: 380 380 380 380 380 390 330 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 1 318 2
3 Yearly: Re-render External, H 21
Internal Walls, Floor, Roof 1.00 546 546 546 546 546 546w 3277 2
10 Yearly: Rebuild 25 of
ualls, Roof I noor
20 Yearly: Rebuild 501 of
Walls, Roof & Floor
0.25:
0.50
807
1613 H 1613 1
Construction Kaintenance -) |MAINTENANCE :CST.+MNT.: 11: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
YEARS:
/Rs1O0 ::Total
H! 0
INPUTS !
IS52tu 33mE33u3mVtmz3
TOTALS (Rs) 100.00 :: 4090
Materials 55.21 :!
Local:(lov isport/transp) 55.21 :1,
Dung, Strav, Grass. 0.00 H2
Earth & Clay 10.52 !!
Reed Rats 5.51 ::
Tiaber Beams I Battens 19.90
Sun-Bricks 19.37 :2
4on-Local:(high import/transp 0.00 :!
Labour
Skilled
Unskilled
44.79 ::
21.98 :!
22.92
|TOTAL :/Rsl00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 : 2On|Ant.
H ca 2 cb
; az3zz5m3t3g52Rmgzgmazz3~z~~233sa35zaz~ 3 335333353333333  32=333233 =~=. '33923WS.333: S
381 381 544 381
90
90
0
90
2258
2258
0
430
226
810
792
0
1832
895
937
14
/R&
Ra381 544 381 381 381 1350 381 381 544 381 381 544 381 381 381 2157 :1 11020 100.00
61 90 61 6 61 591 61 61 90 61 61 61 6 61 61 1091:: 2901: 26.33 1
61 90 61 61 61 591 61 61 90 61 61 90 61 1 61 1091 :: 2901 : 26.33 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 1 0.00 
&1 90 61 61 51 172 61 61 90 61 61 90 61 61 61 253 1 1643 : 14.91 1
57 114 :2 171 2 1.55 1
203 405:: 608: 5.51 :
160 320 :1 479 : 4.35
0: 0.00:
320 454 320 320 320 760 320 320 454 320 320 454 320 320 320 1065 8119 : 73.67
160 220 160 160 160 372 160 160 220 160 160 220 160 160 160 523 : 4019 | 36.47 1
160 234 160 160 160 388 160 160 234 160 160 234 160 160 160 542 :: 4100 1 37.20 :
100 I
cd
00.00 :2..)
34.14 1
34.14 1
0.00 1
13.72 1
2.62 : -)
9.38 1
8.41 1
0.00
65.86 1
32.52 1
33.34 ',
I (01) (101) (201)
ci cj ck
15110 9270 6322
1 5159 3190 2700
5159 3190 2700
2 0 0 0
1 2074 1076 712
1 396 264 238
* 1419 949 853
* 1271 901 926
1 0 0 0
1 9951 5080 3623
: 4914 2504 1782
1 5037 2576 1840
Table 1.2.2
CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE PATTERNS, COSTS I VENETS (Over 20 Years) imported Construction Technology I: Fired - Brick Malls, Reinforced Concrete Roof
1: Maintenance Patterns & Costs; BY TYPE Or NAINTENANCE REQUIRED
* VARIABLES
RAINTENANCE REQUIRED
C23au=3= mminzinm s
YEARS -==>
Input
u3xma :
TOTALS(Rs) \/
Area (I)
Repair
1.0 tear 0: Construction
2.0 5 yearly:
2.1 Re-render 331 of Eit. Nall
2.2 Re-toncrete 331 of floor
3.0 10 yearly:
3.1 Re-render 331 of lat. 1all
3.2 Repair 10? of Roof
4.0 20 yearly:
4.1 Repair 102 of waill
0.00
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.10
0.10
;;Lonstr. Raintenance Sm)=
|| 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 TOTALS
bc bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl be bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu by bv by
gjagagmonss, Saugus Saugus* Ragusa an 33Sussawas ax3Zawaz2a ass: I'mrmns
|| 20398 0 0 0 0 619 0 0 0 0 1676 0 0 0 0 619 0 0 0 0 2210 : 5125
H: I
:: 20399 N I
415 415 415 415 H 1658 1
205 205 205 205 919 1
0
319 319 I 638
738 738 :1 1477
H 0
H1 534 534:
.33 I
2: Kaintenance Patterns and Costs; BY INPUTS (in TOTAL VALUES of Construction Costs/Expenditures
::MAINTENANCE CST.+MXT
Construction Raintenance a==) .TO1AL i/Rs100 :/Rs100
I INPUTS /Rs100 'Total on haint I
YEARS:-> ! 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 by ca I cd 1
TOTALS (Rs) 100.00 11 20398 619 1676 619 2210 5125 100.00: 100.00
35 3,0 33 1 6.7 73 1
1.0 haterials 76.00 H: 15503 358 199 359 1501 3314 64.67 73.73
1.1 Local:(low import/transp) 31.28 6380 37 222 37 435 791 S 15 3 21.10
I Earth, sand, foravork 13.83 N -' 2821 37 180 37 234 | 489 9.53 I 12.97 1
: Coal-Fir edBricksTiles, 11st 17.45 | 3560 42 261 ! 303 5.91 | 15.13 1
1.2 Non-Local:(high isp./transp) 44.72 :! 9122 321 -87 321 1006 |: 2523 1 49.23 : 45.63 I
Ditumin, Polythene 8.26 1684 140 140 :: 280 1 5.46 1 7.69 1
Ageregate 7.91 :i 1613 53 105 53 111 || 321 1 6.27 : 7.58 1
Cesent 21.72 II 4430 268 4% 268 616 ! 1649 0 32.15 : 23.81 1
I Steel bars 6.84 :: 1395 135 139 |1 274 : 5.35 : 6.54 1
: 2.0 Labour 24.00 :! 4895 262 578 262 70 9: 1911 35.33 : 26.27 1
: 2.1 Skilled 14.31:: 2920 178 332 178 467:: 1214: 23.63 : 16.20 1
: 2.2 Unskilled 9.69 :! 1976 94 186 84 243 591 1 11.64 1 10.08
Sacs)
R=ss)
I: rINANCIAL ANALYSIS I
(01) (101) (201) 1
cg ch ci I
25523 21906 21015 1
19817 16457 15886 1
172. 404
3309 2957 2973 1
3862 3614 3573 1
11645 9885 9440 1
1964 1759 1710 1
1935 1716 1658 
6077 4943 4651
1669 1468 1420 1
6706 5449 5129 I
4134 3293 3078 1
2572 2156 2051 1
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
i
min, 1. 11MqP1"' 1 -119 Im
I ___ I
Table 1.3.1
INDIGEOUS CONSTRUCTION lechnology 1: San- Brick Walls, Timber Roof.
Model of Variables Ir Effects onBasic, CASH - FLOW, & Savings Criteria
C CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS: BY INPUTS. ummary One.
VARIABLES UDUANTITIES !COSTS 1Rs)
ITotal
c d IINPUTS
TOTAL EIPENDITURES
Materials + Labour COSTS
Contractor's PROFI (Iof M+L)
1.0 MATERIALS
1.1 Local (Low-import/Transp) !!
Earth Icf) 13
Clay (cf) 1!
Dung tcf) H!
Straw (lbs) a,
Grass (sf)
Reed Mat; Sarkanda 1sf) all
Sirkee is() 1!
Accacia Beass:4'8l4'f4) :|
Uncut Timber Required (c1f)!
* Battens:2.5'13'16'(4) !
Uncut Timber Required (cfl |1
Sun - Bricks (A) N|
1.2 Non-Local(Hi'Jmport/lransp) ||'
LABOUR (Man Days)
Skilled
Unskilled
/00Rs ! /Unit
g IINPUTS
=m== /
\/ =====ft
658 16.09
91 2.24
6 0.14
236 5.77
250 6.11
250 6.11
325 7.95
2 0.05
7 0.18
45 1.10
17 0.41
13203 322.80
0 0.00
85 2.07
22 0.55
62 1.53
azz)
Total /100RS
Ik L I
4499 100.00
! 4090 90.91 
1 10.00 1 409 9.09 1
| 2258 50.19 |
1 2258 50.19 1
| 0.55 : 362 8.04 1
| 0.75 1 69 1.52 1
IFree 1 0 0.00 1
:Free 1 0 0.00 1
:Free ! 0 0.00 1
I 0.331 83 1.83|
I 0.44 1 143 3.18 1
:225.00 : 450 10.00 1
1 0.00 1 0 0.001
| 8.001 360 8.001
I 0.00 1 0 0.00 1
! 0.06 792 17.61 
3 0.001 0 0.00 1
3 1
3 3 1832 40.72 1
140.00 1 95 19.89 1
15.00 | 937 20.83
,II.A: CASH - FLON ANALLS1S; Spatially I by Income Groups.
1I.C.2)INPUTS: Susarised For | Costs
Cash - Floe Analysis /RsI0
q 6S
TOTALS 100.00
Mat. + Lab. EXPENDITURES 1 90.91 
I Contractor's PROFIT 1I 9.09 1
1.0 haterials 11 50.19 |
1.1 Local:(lo'laport/Transp) 13 50.19 |
Dung,Stram,Grass(Free) |1 0.00 1
I Earth & Clay || 9.56 1
Reed Mats 5.01
Timber Beams t Battens :1 19-00
i Sun-Bricks U 17.61 
1.2 Non-LocaI:(hi'lmprt/Trnsp)l 0.00
1 2.0 Labour ,1 40.72 1
1 2.1 Skilled 1! 19.9
1 2.2 Unskilled 1I 20.83 1
:1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
Spatially IBy Income Group
.Ext. Dst. :Within District ILocal
IUrb. Rur. :Up Y Lo Y |govt.
I e n * INPUTS: ac ad ! af
====== == S! a=========
\/I
0.00 1.00 1
0.00O 1.00
0.00 1.00
0.30 0.71
0.02 0.98
0.01 0.99
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00
0.47 0.24
0.12 0.86
0.15 0.85
0.50 0.50 |
0.00 1.00 1
0.50 0.50 |
0.50 0.50
0.50 0.50
0.22 0.48
0.74 0.24
0.32 0.68 i
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00 i
0.00 1
0.00
0.00 1
0.03
0.01 1
0.02 |
0.00
0.00 |
:2: DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTRUCTION EIPE DITURES (/RsI00)
:Spatially :By Income Groups
External District Ibithin District I flocal
:Urban Rural :Up Y. Lou Y. |Sont.
akan ap aq : as
2.04 98.01 1 17.10 81.08 1 29.39 68.75 1 0.69 1
1 2.04 98.92 | 17.10 71.99 24.94 64.20 ! 0.68 1
0.00 9.09 | 0.00 9.09 : 4.55 4.55 1 0.00 1
=s)
48.20 1
49.20 |
0.00 |
9.56 1
3.56
17.64 1
17.43 |1
0.00 |
40.72
19.89
20.83 i
41.22 :
41.22 1
0.00 10
9.56 |
1.20 1o
15.48 1.
14.97 I
0.00 1
30.78
9.95 I
20.83 .
24.94
24.94
0.00
4.79
1.10
13.32
5.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
23.48 |
23.48 
0.001
4.79 3
2.41 |
4.32
11.97
0.00
40.72
19.9
20.83
!TECHNOLDGY CHOICE CRITERIA 3.a: IMPACT ON SAVINGS
I\/
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA
Criteria ::Description Value !
I Spatial Efficiency: 1internal Space/Built Area 0.75
2 Lost Effectiveness: M) Internal Space/Rs100 (sf) 4.92
fSpace I Employment Achieved 1 Rsisf of Internal Space (Rs) 20.73 1
/Rs 100 Expenditure) .21 Onsite Esployment:Total(Mdl 2.07 1
a Unskilled 1.53
3 Labour Productivity: U:andays/sf of Internal Spacetid 0.39
:111.A: SAYINGS ANALYSIS 11 :Distribution of Savings
!NET !Spatially
TOTAL External District :Nithin
i ',Urban
:By
District
Rural Up
income Groupsi I
Govt. I
Y Lou Y. I
Distribution of Expenditures U 2.04 89.92 17.10 71.99 24.84 64.20 0.69
Marginal Propensity to Save (INPUTsw) 0.10 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.20
:SAVINGS DI TRIBUTION ! 0.20 1.70 1 0.51 1.44 2.49 Q.00 0.14 1
SAVINGS TOTAL ||1.98 1.98 1.95 2.48 1
--- - ------- - -
I
Table 1.3.2
IMPORTED CONSTRUCTION Technology 1: Fired - Brick Malls, Reinforced Concrete Roof.
Model of Construction Variables & their Effects onBasic, CASH - FLOW & Savings Criteria.
II.A: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA: CASH - FLOW FROM CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES
!1.C: CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS: BYINPUTS. ummary One.
INPUTS !!9UANTITIES COSTS Rs)|
|:Total 110ORs 1/UNit I Total /100Rs 1
c d :1 Input I !Input i I
TOTAL COSTS / I \/ 1 22517 100 1
Mat.+Lab. EIPENDITURES 20410 91
1 Contractor PROFIT(Iof M+L) 110.00 2047 91
1.0 MATERIALS 1: 1 1 15514 69
1.1 Local fLow-isport/Transp) 1 1 6392 29
| Earth (cf) 301 1.50 0.55 1 169 0.75
1 Sand fcf) 497 2.38 4.00 1 1949 8.65
Mood Forms (17 days rent) :: 704 3.13 1
Coal-Fired Bricks (1) 1 9492 46.32 10.32 1 3034 13.49
Coal-Fired Roof Tiles(t) 1 760 3.71 0.55 1 419 1.96
Brick Ballast (cf) 31 0.15 :3.50 ' 109 0.49
1.2 Non - Local ini'laport/Transpl I 9192 41
Bitusin (Ibs) 1 99 0.43 117.90 1 1584 1.04 1
Polythene (sf) 1 261 1.28 :0.40 1 104 0.46
Aggregate fcf) U 248 1.21 16.50 1 1613 7.17 1
Cement (cwt,50kg,Ibag) 62 0.30 72.50 1 4495 19.96
1 Mild-Steel Bars 112'0 (kgl) 310 1.51 4.50: 1395 4.20
2.0 LABOUR (Man Days) 1: 147 0.72: 4896 23.92
1 0.1 Skilled :1 49 0.24 :60.00 1 2920 12.97 1
0.2 Unskilled 1 9 0.49 120.00 1976 8.78
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA .- BASIC RITERIAI
Criteria If~escription
I Spatial Efficiency: f:lstv nil Space/Built Area 0.931
I1 2 Cost Effectiveness: 111) Internal Space/RsIOO lsf1 1.071
(Space I Employment Achieved '., Rslsf of Internal Space (Rs 93.521
IRs 100 Expenditure) 1:21 Onsite Employmnt-Totalfmd) 0.721
3 1.50 Unskilled 0.49 1
3 Labour Productivity: l:Kandayslif of Internal SpactiM 0.61
11WSH FLON YSIS; Spatially It by Income Groups.
I.C.2) Summary Two 1!Costs I
!o p
wmx), TOTAL COSTS
Mat.+Lab. EXPENDITURES
I Contractor PROFIT
1.0 MATERIALS
1.1 Local: fLos Iport/Trnsp)
Earth
Sand
For sior k
Bricks,Tiiles, Ballast
1.2 Non-LocalfHI'laport/Trsp)
Bitusin,Polythene
Aggregate
Cement
Steel Bars
LABOUR
Skilled
Unskilled
!: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
1Spatially
||/Rs100 I :Ext. Dst.
I I r I .1 V I
1! r 1 ! y s
11100.00 1 en:
90.91
! 9.09
1|66.931
1 26.00 1
1 0.75
9.65 1
U! 3.13 1
:115.81:
1 40.82|
I 7.50 1
1: 7.17 1
| 19.96 1
1! 6.20 1
j I I
11 21.74 1
!1 12.97 1
1! 8.78
IBy Income Group I
'Within District :Local 1
'Urban Rural :Upper Lower GSovt. I
I y INPUTS: ab ac | ae I
332w 323323\2ww3
1 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 |
."**"" ".uxu""".w 11 "3W-"."33w33 .| 1
1.00 |
1.00 |
1.00 1
0.43
0.07
0.20 |
0.06 1
0.10 1
1.00
1.001
0.07 0.00 1
0.20 0.00 1
0.06 0.001
0.10 0.00 |
0.75 0.25
0.00 1.00 1
0.04 0.03 I
0.19 0.02 1
0.06 0.00
0.09 0.02
0.00 1.00
0.00 1.00 |
0.00 1
0.03 1
0.00 |
0.01 1
0.00 1
0.01 |
0.00 1
0.00
0.00 1
0.0 1
:l1l.A: ITEHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 3:
12: DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTRUCTION EIPENDITURES (/RsO0)
Spatially 3By Income Groups
.External Districtllithin Distric |Local
:Urban Rural |Upper Lower 16ovt.
I ai aj | al an I ao ap f ar
33n3333 3---.33--w3 mm3w ......... 3 3 ..
46.06 53.94 B 32.97 20.97 1 24.75 29.19 1 0.49
46.06 44.85 1 23.88 20.97 15.66 29.19 1 0.49
| 0.00 9.09 1 9.09 0.00 1 9.09 0.00 1 0.00
1 46.06 23.10 114.15 8.95 1 15.66 7.44 10.49
1 9.01 19.33 1 10.38 9.95 f 12.38 6.95 1 0.42
0.00 0.75 : 0.00 0.75 1 0.37 0.37 | 0.00
1 0.00 8.65 1 6.14 2.51 6.66 1.99 :0.26
| 0.00 3.13 1 3.13 0.00 1 3.13 0.00 1 0.00
S.) 9.01 6.80 1 1.11 5.69 1 2.21 4.59 1 0.16
1 37.05 3.78 1 3.78 0.00 1 3.28 0.49 1 0.07
1 6.97 0.52 1 0.52 0.00 | 0.30 0.22 1 0.00| 5.73 1.43 | 1.43 0.00 1 1.29 0.14 1 0.07
1 18.77 1.20 1 1.20 0.00 1 1.20 0.00 1 0.00
5.59 0.62 1 0.62 0.00 1 0.50 0.12 1 0.00
21.74 1
12.97
8.78 1
12.02
3.24
8.79
21.74 N
12.97 1
8.78 
IMPACT ON SAVINGS
1: IDistribution of Savings
!NET :Spatially Ily Income Groups
1TOTALlExternal District!lithin District Ilocal
1. 1 !Urban Rural !Upper Lower !Gevt.
1asxwr a s z x a= ww2~33 www smawo3urn w23wm~* sxz"x wa a2
Distribution of Expenditures It 1 46.06 44.85 |23.88 20.97 :15.66 29.19 1 0.49
'Marginal Propensity to Save Input.) 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 10.20
:SAVINGS DI TRIBUTION 1 4.61 0.90 I 0.72 0.42 | 1.57 0.00 10.10
|SAVINGS TOTAL !5.50 | 5.50 1 1.14 : 1.57 I
16
17
1s
19
20
21
22
ru 23
4 24
@ 25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Table 1.4.1
INDIGENOUS CONSTRUCTION Technology I: Sun-Brick Walls, Timber Roof
Model of Variables & Effects on Basic, COST-BENEFIT, & Savings Criteria
:11.8: COST - BENEFIT ANALYSES.
6 1I.C: CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS: DY INPUTS. Summary One.
71
VARIABLES :QUANTITIES
I Total
c d IlNPUTS
TOTAL EIPENDITURES
I Materials + Labour COSTS
I Contractor's PROFIT(I of H+L)
a.
1.0 MATERIALS |!
1.1 Local (Low-isport/Transp) ||
Earth (cf) H1
Clay 1c)
Dune (cf) ||
Straw (lbs)
brass sf) 11
Reed Mat; Sarkanda (si) 11
Sirkee 1sf) !!
Accacia Beaas:4'R8'1l4'(I) !!
Uncut Timber Required (cf 1
* attens:2.5'13't'(9) ||
Uncut Timber Required (cf) 1!
Sun - Bricks (1) 1!
1.2 Non-LocalI(Hi'Import/Transp) 11
2.0 LABOUR IMan Days) ||
0.1 Skilled 1!
0.2 Unskilled !!
659
91
236
250
250
325
2
7
45
17
13203
0
85
22
62
/lOORs
16.08
2.24
0.14
5.77
6.11
6.11
7.95
0.05
0.19
1.10
0.41
322.80
0.00
2.07
0.55
1.53
ICOSTS (Rs)
1 /Unit 1 Total /10ORs I
IINPUTS I k L
I | 4499 100.00 1
I II
1 ! 4090 90.91 |
1 10.00 1 409 9.09 |
s || " "- 
- = =
| \/ i 2259 50.19
1 2258 50.19 1
| 0.55 362 8.04 1
| 0.75 1 69 1.52 I
|Free 0 0.00 1
IFree 1 4 0.00 1
:Free 1 0 0.00 1
S0.33 | 83 1.831
0.44 1 143 3.19 1
:225.00 | 450 10.00 1
* 0.00 1 0 0.001
| 9.00 360 8.00 1
: 0.00| 0 0.00 1
I 0.06 1 792 17.61 1
1 0.00 1 0 0.00 |
- | 1932 40.72 |
140.00 | 895 19.899
1 15.00 | 937 20.83 1
5i.C.2)INPUTS: Summarised For !!Costs 1
Cash - Flow Analysis ||/Rs100 I
p q ||s
as*). TOTAL EIPENDITURES || 100.00 1
Materials + Labour COSTS |I 90.91
Contractor's PROFIT 11 9.09 1
aa u a wa asm m m||a=|ainasllzawzzx
| 1.0 Materials || 50.19 i
1 1.1 Local:(lo'Import/Transp) !: 50.19 1
Dung,Stram,Grass(Free) 1| 0.00 1
Earth 1 Clay 11 9.56 |
Reed Mats 11 5.01 1
limber Beams t Battens 1| 18.00 1
Sun-Bricks || 17.61 1
1.2 Non-Local:(hi'Iaprt/Trnsp): 0.00 1
* 2.0 Labour H! 40.72 1
: 2.1 Skilled i| 19.89 1
: 2.2 Unskilled 1! 20.83 1
1: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS:
I(Using Market Prices)H
1(01) (101) (201) I
(Discount Rates)
lv m :1
:100.00 90.91 93.33 i
4499 3749
1 9.09 8.26 7.59 1
1 50.19 45.62 41.92
50.19 45.62 41.82
0.00 0.00 0.00
9.56 8.69 7.97 1
5.01 4.56 4.18 ==>
1.00 16.37 15.00 t
17.61 16.01 14.67 1
0.00 0.00 0.00
1 40.72 37.02 33.94 1
1 19.89 18.09 16.58 1
!20.3 19.94 17.36 1
(Construction Costs-Eapenditures Discounted Over One Year)
|ADJUSTMENT FACTOR: AF |
(To Get Shadow Price)
Tradable AF Neighted:
:Content AF I
I ab ac ad
.. u.--INPUTSa=n=.|
* 1.00 -0.20 -0.20
:2: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS |
I(Using Shadow Prices)
: (01) (101) (201)
i (Discount Rates)
* ah ai aj
3a3s22z.3ms2=avs~UU
95.83 87.12 79.861
4312 3593 1
m a wnxzxzc2*
9.09 8.26 7.59
1 50.19 45.62 41.82
50.19 45.62 41.82 |
0.00 0.00 0.00 :
9.56 9.69 7.97 1
* 5.01 4.56 4.19 wa>
i 18.00 16.37 15.00 i
* 17.61 16.01 14.67 1
0.00 0.00 0.00
36.56 33.23 30.46 |
19.89 18.08 16.58 i
16.67 15.15 13.09 
3M SOCIAL ANALYSIS
!(Incoec Distribution)
(At 01 Discount Rate
lProj. Urkr. Bisns. Govt
I. an ao ap aq
1-4.17 4.17 0.00 0.00
|-4.17 4.17
11
1I.B: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA: IMPACT ONSAVINGS
At 01 Discount
:Funding Source;
SGovt.Or Low YWrkr. isns. Sovt.
2 2- =2- CZ-X S=e a.: :2mm SaxwaasSUUUmauss zmn
:Income Distribution 1-4.17 -4.17 4.17 0.00 0.00
tMarginal Propensity to SavefIMP 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.29
:SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION - |-0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0(
TECHNOLOGY CMOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA
Criteria ::Description
Emmsm am mwm
I Spatial Efficiency: !,Internal Space/Built Area 0.75 1
2 Cost Effectiveness: 1:1) Internal Space/Rs100 (sIf) 4.82 I
(Space I Employment Achieved H! Rs/sf of Internal Space (Rs) 20.73
/Rs 100 E.penditure) |:2) Onsite Employment:Total(Mdl 2.07
!! * * * Unskilled 1.53
3 Labour Productivity: 8!Mandays/sf of Internal Space(Md 0.39
:NET EFFECT ON SAVINGS
if Project funds from:
|a) Government
'b) Low-income Person 0.0(
- -- --------- --- - --------
Table 1.4.2
IMPORTED CONSIRUCTIION echnology I: Fired - Brick walls, Reinforced Concrete Roof.
Model of variables I their Effects on Basic, COSI-BENEFIT & Savings Criteria
--.:ECNL- CE C--RE 2---- - --- - --------HAD- P NC  ----  CS E ---- E D-RBT -
BII.DTCNN OOY CHOICE CRITERIA 2.1) EFFECT OF DISCOUNITING  SHADOW PRICING ON COSTS, BENEFITS & INCOME DISTRIBUTION
:11.1: C51 - BENEFIT ANALYSES. Construction Costs Discounted Over One lear.
1I.C: CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS: BY INPUTS. Summary One.
INPUTS !8UANIITIES :COSTS (Rs)
c d
TOTAL COSTS
!!To
Mat.#Lab. EXPENDITURES
Contractor's PROFIT (IofM1)
1.0 MATERIALS |1
1.1 Local (Low-import/Transp) U
Earth (cf)
Sand (cf)
Wood Forms (17 days rent) !1
Coal-Fired Bricks (1) !
Coal-Fired Roof TilesIN 11!
Brick Ballast Icf) ||
1.7 Non - Local (Hi'lport/TranspU!
Bituain (lbs) 11
Polythene (if) !!
Aggregate (cf) ||
Cement (cat,50ke,bag) ':I
Mild-Steel Bars 1/2*0 (kg)!|
2.0 LABOUR (Man Days) 611
0.1 Skilled 1!
0.2 Unskilled !!
tal /loos
nput 9 !
306 1.50 1
487 2.38 !
9492 46.32 |
760 3.71 1
31 0.15 i
89 0.43 |
261 1.28 1
248 1.21 
62 0.30 !
310 1.51 
/Unit Total /l00Rs
Input j k
22517 100
20470 90.91
10.00 2047 9.09
1 15574 69
1 6382 28
0.55 : 169 0.75
4.00 1 1949 8.65
1 704 3.13
0.32 1 3034 13.48
0.55 i 418 1.86
3.50 1 109 0.49
1 9192 41
17.60 I 1584 7.04
0.40 1 104 0.46
6.50 1 1613 7.17
72.50 1 4495 19.96
4.50 i 1375 6.20
60.00 1
20.00 14
1.C. INPUTS: Sussarised For I!Costs 1 (
I Cost-benefit Analysis U/Rsoo
a p . r I
am): TOTAL COSTS 1 100.00 k a=> 1
Mat.+L ab. EXPENDITURES 90.91 =
Contractor's PROFIT 9.09
|1 ! =maammamammaz w n ""m "
| 1.0 MATERIALS 11 69.17 |
1.1 Local:lLow laport/Trnsp) : 28.34 1
Earth, Sand, Forawork | 12.53 1
1 age) Bricks,Tiles, Ballast 11 15.81 1 -as):
! 1.2 Non-Local(Hi'Iaport/Irsp)1I 40.22 1
I litusin,Polythene !! 7.50 |
I Aggregate 11 7.17 1
I Cement ! 19.96 1 |
1 1 Steel Bars | 6.20 1
| |:
12.0 LABOUR (Man Days) 1! 21.74 1
1 2.1 Skilled 1: 12.97 1
1 2.2 Unskilled 1! 9.78
: FINANCIAL ANALTYIS
Using Market Prices)
(O1) (101) (201) 1
00.00 90.91 83.33 1
22517 19764 |
9.09 8.26 7.50
69.17
29.34
12.53
15.81
40.82
7.50
7.17
19.96
6.20
21.74
12.97
8.78
62.86 57.641
25.77 23.62 |
11.39 10.44 1
14.39 13.18 la=)
37.11 34.02 :
6.82 6.25 1
6.51 5.97 1
18.15 16.64
5.63 5.16
19.77 18.12
11.79 10.81
7.99 7.31
:ADJUSTMENT FACTOR (AF):
(To Set Shadow Price) 1
'Tradable AF Weighted',
:Content AF
Input Input ad I
| \/ \/ I
1.00 -0.05 -0.05
1.00 7 0.00
0.20 7 0.00
1.00 -0.34 -0.34
1.00 - .22 -0.22
1.00 -0.20 -0.20
22 1
12.97 1
8.79 1
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA
Criteria !,Description
"1.XX-2f=vmwa2=wzruh- 
- a =zaa=a==*X== **==avma:|a
I Spatial Efficiencys !!lnternal Space/Built Area 0.83 1
2 Cost Effectiveness: 1) Internal Space/Rsl00 (sf) .07
(Space It Employment Achieved :! Rs/sf of Internal Space IRs) 93.82
IRs 100 Expenditure) .:2) Orsite Eoploysent:lotallMd) 0.72 1
!!1 ' = * Unskilled 0.48 
3 Labour Productivity: UfMandays/sf of Internal SpacelMd 0.61
.2: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
!(Using Shadow Prices)
| 01) (101) (201)
ah ai aj
1 89.30 61.1Y 74.42
i 20108 16757
|==================7====8
9.09 8.26 7.58
!3: SOCIAL NALYSIS
UIncoae Distribution I
!At 01 Discount Rate
!Proj. Nrkr. BIsns. Govt.
an aD ap aq
|-10.70 1.76 1.36 7.58
| 60.23 54.75 50.19 !
1 27.55 25.05 22.96 I
I 12.53 11.39 10.44 1
ian) 1 15.02 13.66 12.52 1 m) -0.79
32.67 21.70 27.23 1 I
1 7.50 6.82 6.25 | 0.00
1 1 7.17 6.51 5.97 ! ! 0.00
13.19 11.98 10.99 1 1 -6.79
| | 4.83 4.39 4.03 | -1.36
1 1 19.99 18.17 16.66
1 1 12.77 11.79 10.81 |
7.02 6.39 5.85 !
0.00
0.00
1.36
-1.76 1.76
:111.9: TECHNOLOGY FHDICE CRITERIA 3b: IMPACT ON SAVINGS
NAt 01 Discount
::Funding Source!
IlGovt.OrLow Y. lhrkr. Bsns. Govt.
~amaaR2ma~t2mnwz: I xe:gmaztugumazI sawmUs aims s me
Income Distribution U-10.70 -10.70 1.76 1.36 7.58
Mareinal Propensity to Save 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.20
:SAVIN6S DISTRIBUTION -2.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.52
:NET EFFECT ON SAVINGS
:If Project Funds from:
..a) Governaent
|1b) Low - Income Person
-0.49
1.65
I -- ----------- ||---
Table 1.5.1
SWITCHING From Indigenous to Imported CONSTRUCTION Technologies.
From Sun-Brick Wall, Timber Roof Type to Fired Brick Wall, Reinforced Concrete Roof Type Technolo
NET EFFECTS on Income Distribution, Costs, Employment, Productivity I Savings.
(Comparing Results of CASH - FLOW Analysis)
A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION :Through Cash - Flow from Construction Expenditures
!Spatially I :By Income Group
::External District Within District !Local Govt,
'Construction Technology Type I Urban Rural 1 Upper Lower 1
c d f g i j I 1 a * a
:Indigenous (Sun-Brick Walls, Timber Roof)U 2.04 98.01 1 17.10 81.08 1 29.39 68.75 I 0.68
:mported (Fired Brick Walls, RCC Roof) 46.06 53.94 1 32.97 20.97 1 24.75 29.19 1 0.49
--- - -- -- - - - - - - - - - 1- - :- - -1 -
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 44.02 -44.07 1 15.87 -60.11 : -4.64 -39.56 I -0.19
:NET INCOME EFFECT :1 -0.05 -44.24 1 -44.20 1 -0.19
1B: CONSTRUCTION COST-EFFECTIVENESS
s 5
:Indigenous
!Imported
:NET LOSSES(Rs,#s)
aValue/sf (Rs)
I; 1 Y
:1 Rs/sf sf/Rs10O 1
1: u v
U 20.73 4.82
93.82 1.07 1
---------- ------
-73.09 -3.76 1
20.73
Cl: EMPLOYMENT (MDays/RsIOO) '
(Onsite)
'Total Unskilled:
z ab Ac
:Indigenous 2.07 1.53
!mported 0.72 0.48
:NET
EMPLOYMENT | -1.35 -1.05
:D: SAVINBS THROUGH: UDl: Income Distribution
.Spatially IBy Income Group
::External District Within District :Local Govt!
!Urban Rural 1 Upper Lower 1
:Net Income Distribution U 44.02 -44.07 1 15.87 -60.11 1 -4.64 -39.56 1 -0.19
Marginal Propensity to Save (Input => 0.10 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 I 0.20
---- - ------- i--------------|---------|----
SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION I; 4.40 -0.79 I 0.48 -1.20 ; -0.46 0.00 : -0.04
:NET SAVINGS 3.61 II 3.61 i -0.73 ! -0.46 : -0.04
'Total Value of sf Lost (Rs) -77.90 I
a i
D02: Construction Cost Differences |
fMarg.Prop.to Save
SAVINBS Effect
aFrom: I) Rs/sf
Y) sf/Rs100
.:lf Consumer is:
::Govt. Low Y.
0.20 0.00
-14.62 0.00
1 -15.58 0.00
:NET SAVINGS EFFECT U
:D1 + X) Rs/sf: -11.01
ID! + Y) sf/Rs100: || -11.97
3.61
3.61
D3: Net Wages I
:Net Esploysent! -1.35 1
Wages/Mday 1 30.00 i
:Net Wages -40.50 I
1M.P.to Save 1 0.00 1
a
!SAVINGS EFFECT! 0.00 1
|NET SAVINGS 1 1
i :(D24D3): 1 3.61
-- - - - - -- - - - - -
Table 1.5.2
SWITCHING from Indigenous to Imported CONSTRUCTION Technologies
(Fros Sun-Brick Wall, Timber Roof to Fired Brick Wall, Reinforced Concrete Roof Types)
NET EFFECTS on Income Distribution, Costs, Employment, Productivity 6 Savings
(Comparing Results of COST-BENEFIT Analysis)
:A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION Groups Affected:
Project Bsnss.Wrkr. Central:
:Construction Technology Type Govt. I
c e f g h j
:Indigenous(Sun-Brick Walls,Timber Roof): -4.17 0.00 4.17 0.00
laported(Fired Brick Walls, RCC Roof) 8 -10.70 1.76 1.36 7.59 1
- -- -------------
!NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1 -6.53 1.76 -2.81 7.58
I- - ---------- -- ----------
B: CONSTRUCTION: COST EFFECTIVENESS 1
a Rs/sf
n Input
I1ndioenous :1 20.73
:lmported 93.82
:NET LOSSES(Rs,sf) 8 -73.09
Vailue/sf (Rs) It
y I
sf/Rs100!
q
5.31
1.17
-4.14
20.73
!TOTAL Value of lost sfiRs) -85.82
Cl: EMPLOYMENT (Man Days/Rs100)|
(Onsite) !,Total Unskilled.
n p r
:Indigenous 2.07 1.53 1
laported 0.72 0.48
:NET
!EMPLOYMENT -1.35 -1.05
mat
\I
:D: SAVINGS THROUGH: ;:D1: Income Distribution
If Project is:.IBusnesWorkerCentral:
SlGovt.orlow Y. 1 Goyt.
:Net Income Distribution !1 -6.53 -6.53 :1.76 -2.91 7.58
:Marginal Propensity to Save. (Input == 0.20 0.00 :0.10 0.00 0.20
- -------- : ------- -----
:NET SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION :: -1.31 0.00 :0.18 0.00 1.52
:NET SAVINGS EFFECT
:If Project Funded by: :!a) GoVernment
8b) Low-Income Person
0.39 1
1.69
lD2:Construction Costs Savings/Losses
!:If Funder is:
::Govt. Low Y.
0.20 0.00IMarg.Prop.to Save
:SAVINGS Effect 1:---------
!From: X) Rs/sf -14.62 0.00
Y) sf/Rs100 -17.16 0.00
:NET SAVIN6S EFFECT::
==) D1a + X) Ri/sf -14.23
1.69
'I
;3: Net Wages
!Net Employment: -1.35
:Wages/Mday 30.00
Net Wages ::-40.50
IM.P.to Save !1 0.00
:SAVINGS EFFECT:: 0.00
ma . aa, a
:NET SAVINGS
!Dib) + Y) sf/Rs1008 -16.78 !===)!D1a) + D2 + D3:1-16.78 |
1.69 1 IDib) + D2 + D3!! 1.69 1
16
17
19
C2: LABOUR 1
PRODUCTIVITY1
(ManDays/sf)
u
0.39
0.61
-0.22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
-- ~ ------------------------ -
Table II .A.Flow Chart of TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION MODEL: applied to PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
DATA:
Production Process,
Receipts, Expenditures,
(Income) quantities and
costs analysis through
case-studies of
production units.
: ------------------- |
I.A. PRODUCTION ANALYSIS:
.1 | 1) detailed I
a aa a
;Receipts, Expenditures,
===> :Income related to
:Capacity, Output,
:production Period &
:Financing.
1I.A. ANALYSIS
| 2) susarised
:annualised
|cash-flov
| /Rs.100
:of Receipts
.......---------
'ai
ai
a==> ||
a,||
a.||
| m
|----- -------------------------------- a
Il.A. CASH FLOW: Distribution of Production
===> :Expenditures through respending in capital,
! aterials,labour,tax & interest: 2nd. rnd. effects!
Spatially, by Income Group t to Local Government.
1. Coefficients 2. CASH-FLOW
[CRITERIA 2.a) |
-------------------------------------------
DATA:
Case-studies
of Inputs
-----------------
III.A. SAVINGS Effect
[CRITERIA 3.aJ (-
----------------- !
!Expenditures in Capital,:
,Materials, Labour,
'Tax, Interest.
------------------------
[CRITERIA 1]
!Production Costs
:Profitability,
,Productivity
Employment
-------------------------
----------------------a
I11.B. SAVINGS Effect i
[CRITERIA 3.bl (=
------------------------a a
a = > 11I.B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
1. Financial ===> Adjust-
(Present sents
Value)
-------------------- a
aa
DATA:
Shadow
Prices
(discounted cash-flows) [CRITERIA 2.b]
==> 2. Economic ===> 3. Social
(Present (Income
Value) Distribution) ===
-a-- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
DATA:
Savings
Propensities
Table II.1.1
INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION Technology 1: Mall Type, Agri-Waste fired, Brick Kiln.
Production Variables and their Effects on Basic, CASH - FLOW, & Savings Criteria.
5 :I.A. PRODUCTION ANALYSIS; Sumary One.
6:|
7: VARIABLES 1. Ilnput :Description
I : -, . ..sm  .. =32 ==M==. %/ \ .Z....u...==z. z 2==2 = ==Z 2===== =. =z=== zz =
I I I Capacity:3ricks/load/year|| 200 200 K Bricks/30days/load. 9 s/year 1800 K brick:
10 ' 2Output: Production Cycles!! 4 4 loads/year. 00 K Bricks
I1I1 3 Production Period Is 6 6 months. December toJune
12 : 4 Financing :0.372 CRF for 5 year loan at 251 interest
13:
II.A: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 2.a. CASH - FLOW FROM ATERIALS' PURCHASES. (Distribution of Receipts)
1II.At CASH/INCOME - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' EIPENDITURES
is: \-%/
16 Y VARIABLES 2. HETY. (K Bricks) a
17 |:/load
18 Ic d ! g h
19 :*.=Xznnannan="xzznzunm!ax .n.zs .. nnuzzz ====== z
20 :A: RECEIPTS ! 200 i
21 3: EIPENDITURES ||
22 :C: INCOME ma a
23
24
25
3: INPUTS (EXPENDITURES) HQUANTITIES
a VARIABLES 3. 1:/kiln /Krs. /Rsl00
=sumzazms n= " =z===||n==33nu=3=333
29 11.0.Capital ||Input orOutpl
30 :1.1.Plant H , ::
31 11.2.Equipment (is) :H \/
32',N
33 :2.0.Kil Land (Ac.) | 0.6 0.003
34 1 Hm
35 : :1/load /Kbrs.j
36 3.0 Materials I'l
37 :3.1 Local (Lov lport) |H
38 1 Clay Land (Acres) | 0.14 0.0007
31 : Mater.(brs) ma 6 0.03
40 Sand (cf) am 600 3
41 Mood (ads) :H 160 0.8
42 Agri-Waste(Truckz25Ocf)!! 42 0.21
43 aN
44 :3.2 Transport (trucks) || 42 0.21
45 am
46 1 ::/kiln Md/Krs.
47 4.0 Labour (is,ManDaysRs) |H 21 3.94
48 14.1 Skilled/Up.Y.(Rs/mth) :1 1 0.19
43 14.2Unskilled/Lo.Y(Rest) 1! 20 3.75
50 Piece Morkers(Rs/Kbrs) |: 18 3.38
51 Wage Morkers(Rs/ath) : 2 0.38
52|
53 |5.0 Miscellaneous
54 Taxes(Rs/year)
55 Interest(Rs/year)
Iut
0.001140
/Rs 100
0.0003
0.01
1.14
0.30
0.08
0.09
/Rs 100
1.50
0.07
1.43
1.28
0.14
'TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA
I Cost Minimisation: Production Cost/Unit Output
2 Profitability: Net Return on Expenditures
3 Capital Productivity: 1) Capital Investment/Unit C
2) Capital lavestment/Unit E
4 Labour Productivity:Mandays/Unit Output
PRICE (Rs)
IKBrs:/load /year :/KBrs /RsIOO
Input: 1 1 o p
\/ ===snxx..mun..z33s3zzzgnexu
263 | 52600 210400 :263.00 100.00
| 44727 178908 :223.63 85.03
a 7873 31492 : 39.37 14.97
COSTS(Rs)
1 /unit|/load /year I/KBrs. /RslO0
\/ ---- namnzztxzz ====--===
2923: 453 1813:1 2.27 0.861
2134 | 331 1324 1 1.66 - 0.63
| 789 1 122 489 0.61 0.23
3000 | 450 1800 2.25 0.86
I /unitI/load /year 1/KBrs. /Rs100
1 | 32496 129992 :162.49 61.78
a a 16958 67832 84.79 32.24 1
:3000 1 420 1680 1 2.10 0.80 I
| 20: 120 480 1 0.60 0.23:1
I 0.67 402 1608 | 2.01 0.76
1 14: 2240 8960 1 11.20 4.26
| 329 | 13776 55104 :68.98 26.191
1 370 15540 62160 177.70 29.54
1 luniti/load /year /KBrs. /RsO00
10850 43400 :54.25 20.63 1
700 | 1050 4200 5.25 2.00
a a 9800 39200 49.00 18.63
43: 1 8600 34400 43.00 16.35 1
800 | 1200 4800 6.00 2.28
/KBr 1 476 1903 2.38 0.90
7 350 1400: 1.75 0.67
a 126 503 0.63 0.24
Output
Employment(Md)
(Unskilled)
Annualised.
I.A.2)PRODUCTION :Cash Flow
ANALYSIS: /Rs100
Summary Two.
u U
1 nz: inuzzzz=z:= mn=zz:z=l,
A: RECEIPTS :1! 100.00
:B: EXPENDITURES 8195.03
:C: INCOME . 14.97:
B: INPUTS
(EIPENDITURES)
:1.0.0 Capital ||0 0.96 |
1.1.0 Plant :: 0.63 1
:1.2.0 Equipment ||. 0.23
12.0.0 Kiln Land H: 0.96
3.0 Materials Hl 61.78 |
3.1 Local(Lov Import)::: 32.24 1
3.2 Transport(Trucks):; 29.54 1
4.0 Labour |: 20.63
zm) 4.1 Skilled/Up.Y. || 2.00
4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y M!! 18.63 |
|HI
5.0 Miscellaneous ||I 0.90
Taxes .! 0.67
Interest ||| 0.24 1
1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
'Spatially llncome Groups
:Et. Dst. :Vithin District :Gvt.
a Urb. Rur. |Up.Y.Lo.Y.a
Iaa ab Iad ae :ag ab l.aj
)0.00 1.00 :0.25 0.75 10.50 .50 10.00 ==>
0.03 0.97 0.10 .79 10.27 0.70 :0.00
:0.50 .50: 0.40 0.10 10.25 0.25 10.00 1
10.00 1.00 :0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
)=)
!0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 :0.70 0.30 :0.00
10.33 0.66 :0.66 0.00 :0.33 0.33 10.01
:0.00.00 :0.00 .1.00 81. 0 0.00 :0.00
10.00 1.00! 0.00 1.00 :0.00 1.00 :0.00
:0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 |0.75 0.25 11.00
:0.00 1.00 :0.50o.50 11.00 0.00 0.00
2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts ( From Materials' Expenditures)
Spatially :By Income Groups
External District|Nithin District !Govt.
:Urban Rural !Upper Lower I
an ao I aq ar : at au a am
9.8 99.82 : 24.07 65.75 | 43.62 46.20 1 0.96
9.88 74.85 | 20.32 54.53 36.13 38.72 0.96
0.00 14.97 | 3.74 11.23 1 7.48 7.48 0.00
1 0.14 0.73 0.21 0.52 0.23 0.50 0.00
0.02 0.61 0.11 0.50 0.17 0.44 0.00
0.12 0.12 0.09 0.02 1 0.06 0.06 0.00
0.00 0.6: 0.00 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.00
9.75 51.74 19.50 32.24 32.32 19.42 1 0.30
0.00 32.24 1 0.00 32.24 1 22.57 9.67 0.00
9.75 19.50 1 19.50 0.00 1 9.75 9.75 0.30
0.00 20.63 1 0.00 20.63 2.00 18.63 0.00
1 0.00 2.00 1 0.00 2.00 1 2.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 18.63 : 0.00 18.63 ! 0.00 18.63 0.00
0.00 0.90 0.62 0.29 1 0.74 0.17 | 0.67
0.00 0.67 1 0.50 0.17 ! 0.50 0.17 1 0.67
0.00 0.24 1 0.12 0.12 1 0.24 0.00 1 0.00
aII.A: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA: EFFECT ON SAVINGS
Distribution of Savings
aNET | Spatially 'By Income Groups
ITOTAL External District!Within District 'Govt.
aUrban Rural :Upper Y.Lower Y.a
:Distribution of Receipts : | 9.8 99.82 | 24.07 65.75 | 43.62 46.20 1 0.96
:Marginal Propensity to Saveilnputs=) 0.1 0.02 : 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 : 0.20
:SAVINGS Distribution |: : 0.99 1.80 : 0.72 1.32 1 4.36 0.00 I 0.19
SAVINGS TOTAL: 12.78 2.79 1 2.04 4.36 1 0.19
a/Kbrs /RsIO0
a223.63 85.03 1
a 39.37 14.17
a 2.27 0.96
a 0.58 |
a 0.60:
a 3.94 1.50
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.'Table 11.1.2
IMPORTED PRO UCTION Technology 1i Trench-Rotary Type, Coal - Oil fired Brick Kiln.
Model of Production Variables & their Effect on Basic, CASH - FLOW, i Savings Criteria
3
4 
-.-RU----------------------------------
IlUnit Description I
II(Inputl
i \ / nu m nuww..".wwwu ww.wnuww mwwwuun.ww w.w
II 400 400 K bricks/30 days/load.9 loads/year 3600 K brickis
II 6 6 loads/year. 2400 K bricks
I1 8 1 sonths. October toJune. 5year lease
11 0.372 CRF for 5 year loan at 251 interest
I lty. (Krs.) I Price (Rs.) I
VARIABLES 2. If/load I /Krs. I/load /year I/Kbrs /RslOO I
d If I g h IInputil I m I o p I
""""""""w"aswwwwgwwwu wlImwu wwwwna"nowwwww". wwnwww".wwwwwwnmunw.wzww.. w.." ww
RECEIPTS (Benefits)
EIPENDITURES (Costs)
INCOME (Net Value)
II 400
Iii INPUTS (EXPENDITURES) IIltUANIIES
I VARIABLES 3. fl/kiln /Krs. /RslO0
Il(nput or Outputl
I"""ww"""ww "wwwuwwnww nww lwffwm .muwf wwwwmwwww"
11.0. Cap ital
fl.I.Plant
Ii.2.Equipment (is)
II
12.0.Kiln Land (Ac.)
13.0 materials
13.1 Local (Lov lport)
I Clay Land (Acres)
I Water (hrs)
I Sand (cf)
I Wood (Ids)
13.2 Non Local(High lIport)
I Oil (drum.50 galls)
I Coal(Truck.i0ions)
I Transport (coal trucks)
I
I
1 4 Labour (is,ManDays,Rs)
14.1 Skilled/Up.Y.(Rs/mth)
14.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y(Rest)
I Piece orkers(Rs/Kbrs)
I Wage orkers(Rs/mth)
15.0 miscellaneous
I Taxes(Rs/year)
interest(Rs/year)
1I \/
303 I 121200 727200 1303.00
I 119118 700710 1295.30
I 3082 19490 1 7.70
100.00 I
97.46 I
2.54 I
I COSTS(Rs)
I /unit I/load /year I/Krs. /RsMO I
I (Inputil I
'I
1.5 0.0039 0.0012 1
I I/ioad
II
/Kbrs. /RslOO I
I
11
Il 0.29 0.0007
II 12 0.0300
I1 1200 3.0000
I1 990 2.2000
I1
i1 49 0.1200
8I 9 0.0200
I 9 0.0200
if
Il/kiln Md/Krs.
I[ 59 4.92
I1 2 0.17
I1 57 4.75
1I 50 4.17
II 7 0.58
fIl
If
I
0.0002 I
.0099 
.9901 I
.7261 I
.0396 I
.0066 1
.0066 I
I
/Rs100 I
1.62 I
0.06 I
1.57 I
1.38 I
0.19 I
1
1
\/ Inu nn"uzwwww.". w.wwww-n.uwf
67460 I 1636 9915 I 4.09 1.35 I
60000 I 1000 6000 1 2.50 0.83 I
7460 I 636 3815 1 1.59 0.52 I
3000 1 750 4500 I 1.8 0.62 1
/unit I/load /year I/Klrs. /RsfOO I
I 96332 517992 1215.83 71.23 I
I 14204 95224 I 35.51 11.72 I
3000 I 840 5040 I 2.10 0.69 I
20 1 240 1440 1 0.60 0.20 I
0.67 1 804 4924 I 2.01 0.66 I
14 1 12320 73920 130.80 10.17 I
I 72128 432769 1180.32 59.51 I
434 I 20832 124992 1 52.09 17.19 1
2762 1 22096 132576 1 55.24 18.23 I
3650 I 29200 175200 1 73.00 24.09 I
I I I
/unit I/load /year I/Klrs. /RsIOO I
I 27000 162000 1 67.50 22.28 I
1550 1 2067 12400 I 5.17 1.71 I
1 24933 149600 1 62.33 20.57 I
50 1 20000 120000 1 5 .00 16.50 1
3700 1 4933 29600 1 12.33 4.07 I
I I 1
/Kr I 2401 14403 I 6.00 1.98 I
7 1 467 2800 I 1.17 0.39 I
I 1934 11603 I 4.83 1.60 I
59 ------------------ ----------------------------------
60 II
61
62 1
631 TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA I: BASIC CRITERIA
641
651 CriterIa -liescription-- I/Kirs. /Rsl00 I
66 f w s" uu ."u n.l I.....n.."u ..... "..".."-.u ... .w".......
67 11.0 Cost Minimisation IlProduction.Cost/Unit Output 1295.30 97.46 I
69 12.0 Profitability IllttRetiin on Expenditures I 7.70 2.54 1
69 13.0 Capital Productivity 1ll) Capital Investment/Unit Output I 4.09 1.35 I
70 I 1f2) Capital Investaent/Unit Employment(Mdays) Total I 0.83 1
711 1 i * ' / ' Unskilled I 0.96 I
72 14.0 Labour P oductivity fiflandays/Unit Output I 4.92 1.62 I
73 1--------------------- -------------------
I.----ECH--L---C--- CE-C--- ER-A-ASH-FL-- FR ATE-ALS'-PUCHASES:-r-u-o--Rceipt-ptially-adby---c---Gr111.9, TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA CASH-FLOW FROM MATERIALS' PURCHASES: Distribution of Reieipts; Spatially and by Iucme Gops
IIliAnnualisedl
IlI.A.2) PRODUCTION IlCash flow I
I ANALYSIS: I 1x I
I Susmary Tvo !I/s100 I
I u II w I
IA RECEIPTS 11 100.00 1
1 EXPENDITURES I 97.46 I
IC INCOME 11 2.54 I
----- ------
I
III INPUTS
(Expenditures)
------------------
11.0 Capital
11.1 Plant
11.2 Equipment -(is)
2.0 Kiln Land (Ac.)
)3.0 Materials
3.1 Local(Lov Import
3.2 Non-Local(Hi'lmi
0litincl.transp
Coal(ecl.Trans
Transport(Coal 1
. 4.0 Labour4.1 Skilled/Up.Y.
4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
5.0 miscellaneous
5.1 Taxes
15.2 Interest
-- - -- -- -
I I
If
II
t) Il
port) II
port) I I
sport) III
[rucks)lI
II
lII
lII
Il
II
il1
1.35 I
0.83 1
0.52 1
0.62 1
71.23 I
11.72 I
59.51 
17.19 I
19.23 I
24.09 1
22.29 I
1.71 I
20.57 I
1.99 I
0.39 1
1.60 I
ass)
l'l.A: C SH - FLON ANALYSIS; Spatially & by Income Group
!Spatially Hlncome Group
Ext. Dst. iNithin District !Govt.!
lUrb. Rur. 1Up.Y.Lo.Y.!
aa ab ad as :ag ah |aj 1
zizzlnputz.w....z...m
)10.00 1.00 :0.66 0.33 !1.00 .00 :0.00
0.40 0.60 10.20 0.40 10.20 0.40 :0.001
0.50 .50 10.40 .10 :0.25 0.25 :0.00
0.00 1.00 . .00 1.00 :1.00 0.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 :0.00 1.00 :0.70 0.30 :0.001
0.90 0.20 10.20 0.00 10.10 0.10 10.011
1.00 .00 10.00 0.00 110.00 .00'10.00 1
1.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00!
0.00 1.00 :0.50 0.50 :0.00 1.00 M.00
0.00 1.00 !0.00 1.00 :0.00 1.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 # .75 0.25 10.75 0.25 :1.00 1
10.00 1.00 .50 0.50 !1.00 0.00 a0.00|
2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
:Spatially Income Groyps
-External BistrictlWithin District :Local
|Urban Rural :Upper Lower |GoYt.
an ao i aq ar I at au l am
56.67 43.33 1 7.43 35.89 ! 15.26 28.07 1 0.56
1 56.67 40.79 1 5.75 35.04 1 12.72 28.07 1 0.56
a.) 0.00 2.54 1 1.68 0.94 1 2.54 0.00 I 0.00
a/\
0.59 0.76: 1 0.37 0.38 1 0.30 0.4610.00
ww:)1 56.070.00
56.07
13.75
18.23
24.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50 1
0.26 1
0.62 1
15.16 1
11.72 1
3.44 I
3.44 1
0.00 1
0.00 |
22.28 I
1.71 1
20.57
1.99 
0.39 1
1.60 |
1.60 1 0.90 0.90 1 0.00 1 0.00
0.17 0.33 1
0.21 0.05
0.00 0.62 1
3.44 11.72 1
0.00 11.72 |
3.44 0.00 1
3.44 0.00 1
0.00 0.00 1
0.00 0.00 1
0.85 21.42 1
0.95 0.85 |
0.00 20.57 |
1.09 0.89 |
0.29 0.10 1
0.90 0.80 1
0.33 1
0.13 |
0.00
5.23 1
3.52
1.72 1
1.72 1
0.00 1
0.00 1
22.28 1
1.71 1
20.57 1
0.10 1
0.10 1
0.00 |
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.17
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.39
0.39
0.00
!TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 3.a: EFFECT ON SAVINS
ISpatially !By Income Groups
:111.A: SAVINGS ANALYSIS. 1NET lExternal District|Within District 'Local
!!SAVING| :Urban Rural !Upper Lower |Govt.
!Distribution of Receipts || 1 56.67 43.33 1 7.43 35.98 | 15.26 28.07 1 0.56
IMareinal Propensity to Saveinputsz) 0.1 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 1 0.10 0.00 1 0.20
|SAVINGS Distribution 11 | 5.67 0.87 0.22 0.72 1 1.53 0.00 1 0.11
SAVINGS TOTAL: :116.53 1 6.53 1 0.94 ! 1.53 1 0.11
------------------------------------------------------
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6 1 --- ---- --
i VARIABLES I
10 I I Capacity:Bricks/load/year
i I 2 Outputi Production Cycles
12 1 3 Production Period
13 1 4 financing
14 1------------
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
49
49
50
51 
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
------------------------  - -- - -------------------------------
I -------------------------------------------
I ---------- --- -----------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
-
It: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution I
l
Table II.2.1
INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION Technology 1:Vail Type, Agri-Waste Fired, Brick Kiln.
Production Variables I Their Effects on Basic, COST - BENEFIT, & Savings Criteria.
5 :I.A.1) PRODUCTION ANALYSIS. ummary One
6 |
7I VARIABLES 1. !Ilnput :De
U: :1! \/
9 1 1 Capacity:Bricks/load/year 1[ 200
10 1 2 Output; Production Cycles !! 4
Il 3 Production Period II 6
12 1 4 financing 1:0.372
13:-
14:
15\
16: * !!TY. (K B
17 : VARIABLES 2. ::/Ioad
I | c d ! ( f I
19 2==z=zzzza ==a=== xz==z===z==llz=u z
20 :A: RECEIPTS (Benefits) |1 200
21 :B: EXPENDITURES (Costs) ||!
22 IC: INCOME(Net Present Values)||
23 -/\ -
24 I!
25
26
27
28
.9: INPUTS (EIPENDITURES)
VARIABLES 3.
!==-----'== =*
29 I1.0.Capital
30 11.1.Plant
31 |1.2.Equipment (is)
321:
33 I2.0.Kila Land (Ac.)
341
351
36 13.0 Materials
371:3.1 Local (Lov laport)
38 H Clay Land (Acres)
39 W Mater (hrs)
401 Sand (cf)
41 : Wood (ds)
42 Agri-Maste(Trucks
431
44 13.2 Transport (trucks)
45
46:
471|4.0 Labour (Us,Ranays,
48 4.1 Skilled/Up.Y.(Rs/mI
491|4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y(ResI
50 Piece Vorkers(Rs/
51 | Wage Norkers(Rs/a
52
531|5.0 miscellanebus
541 Taxes(Rs/year)
55 Interest(Rs/year)
s250cf)
;,Rs)
Ith)t) -
/Kbrs)
Ith)
56
57
58
59 :TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1:
60 1 1 Cost Minisisation:
61: 2 Profitability:
621 3 Capital Productivity:
631
64 |
b5 1 4 Labour Productivity:
66
scription
200 K Bri
4 loads
6 sonth
CRF for
--------
cks/30days/load. 9 loads/year 1800 K brick'
;/year. 800 K Bricks
s. December toJune
5 year loan at 251 interest
-------------- - ---- ----
ricks)
g h 1
--=----==--==---
PRICE (Rs)
/KBrsh/load /year :/KBrs /RsIO0
Input: 1 1 I o p
\/ z=z=zzz======z=====zz==== = =I
263 ! 52600 210400 :263.00 100.00
1 44727 178908 1223.63 85.03
1 7873 31492 1 39.37 14.97 1
11.9: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA: EFFECT OFDISCOUNTING & SHADOW PRICING QN COSTS, BENEFITS & INCOME DISTRIBUTION.
|11.B: COST - BENEFIT ANALYSIS. Discounted Over 5 Ters
I.A.2)PRDUCTION
ANALYSIS:
Susary Two.
t u
IA: RECEIPTS
19: EIPENDITURES
=22) IC: INCOME
'Annualised.
ICash Flow
11/RsIOO
100.00 |
95.03 |
14.97
-- I
|DUANTITIES I COSTS(Rs)
/kiln /Krs. /Rs100 I InputI/load /year 1/K~rs. /R 100 |
1 ahuzuz=zzz== \/ 3==== = ===zzzz=zu=zz=zzz====
H Input or Output 1 2923 1 453 1913 2.27 0.96 1
!: 1 21341 331 1324 1 1.66 0.63 1
/ 1 78991 122 4891 0.61 0.231
111 111
1: 0.6 0.003 0.001140 13000 450 1800 2.25 0.86
./load /Kbrs. /Rs00 I/unitl/load /year 1/Krs. /Rs100 1
I: 1 1 32498 129992 1162.49 61.79 |
1 116958 67832 184.79 32.24 |
110.14 0.0007 0.0003 1 30001 420 1680 1 2.10 0.80 1
1 6 0.03 0.01 1 201 120 480 1 0.60 0.231
!! 600 3 1.14 10.67 402 160891 2.01 0.76|
1 160 0.9 0.30 1 14 2240 8960 1 11.20 4.26 1
1 42 0.21 0.09 1 329 1 13776 55104 1 68.88 26.19
42 0.21 0.08 370 15540 62160 177.70 29.54
/kiln Rd/Krs./Rs100 /unit:/load /year 1/KBrs. /RslO0
1 21 3.94 1.50 | | 10850 43400 | 54.25 20.63 1
1| 1 0.19 0.071| 7001: 1050 4200| 5.25 2.001
|| 20 3.75 1.43 1 1 9800 39200 149.00 18.63
11 18 3.38 1.28 1 43 8 9600 34400 143.00 16.35 1
|1 2 0.38 0.14 8001 1200 4800| 6.00 2.281|
it 41 0I
1H 1 /Kgr 1 476 1903 | 2.38 0.90
11 1 71 350 14001 1.75 0.671
it 1 1 126 503 1 0.63 0.24 1
19: INPUTS
(EIPENDITURES)
11.0.0 Capital
11.1.0 Plant
11.2.0 Equipment
|2.0.0 Kiln Land
mm.) I
3.0 Materials
3.1 Local(Low Import)
3.2 Transport(Trucks)
4.0 Labour
4.1 Skilled/Up.Y.
4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
5.0 Miscellaneous
Taxes
Interest
0.86 1
0.63 |
0.23 |
0.96 |
61.78 1
32.24|
29.54 1
1| 20.63 1
! 2.001
1| 18.63 1
1! 0.90 1
1| 0.67 |
1I 0.24 |
1: FINANCIAL(Market Prices)l
0l 101 201 |
1 aa ab ac 1
1 500.00 379.08 299.06
1 425.16 322.34 254.30
a=) 1 74.84 56.74 44.76
1 4.31 3.27 2.58
| 3.15 2.39 1.98
1 1.16 0.88 0.70
4.29 3.24 2.56
x> 1 309.92 234.21 194.77 1
1 161.20 122.21 96.42 1
1 147.72 111.99 88.35 1
| 103.14 78.19 61.69
| 9.98 7.57 5.97 1
1 93.16 70.63 55.72 1
I
1 4.52 3.43 2.70
| 3.33 2.52 1.99
| 1.19 0.91 0.71
IAdjustment Factor(AF)
ITradbl. AF Utd.
|Content AF
Iag ah ai
Inputs
\/
0.33 -0.12 -0.04:
1.00 -0.2 -0.201
2: ECONOMIC(Shadov Prices)
01 101 20%
am an ao
500.00 379.08 299.06:
1 400.68 303.78 239.66
==>: 99.32 75.30 59.41 >
19.86 11.88
4.31 3.27 2.59
1 3.15 2.39 1.88
1.16 0.89 0.70
4.28 3.24 2.56
zzu>1 303.07 229.77 181.27 1=a
161.20 122.21 96.42
1 141.87 107.56 94.961
94.51 64.07 50.54
9.98 7.57 5.97
74.52 56.50 44.571
1 4.52 3.43 2.70 1
3.33 2.52 1.99
1.19 0.91 0.71
III.: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 3.b.
3: SOCIAL (Income Distribution)
At 01 discount
Proj.orCnsmr. Bsnss. Urkr. Govt.
as at au av av
Annual
SOCIAL
INCOME
ay
|100.0
S1 80.1
-24.48 -24.48 0.00 18.63 5.85 19.86
1-5.95 5.85
-19.63 18.63
||I:
EFFECT ON SAVINGS \/
:At 01 Discount
:Proj.orCnsmr. Bsnss. Urkr. Govt. NET
= SAVINGS
Income Distribution -24.49 -24.48 0.00 18.63 5.85 1
!Marginal Propensity to Save Input=:) 0.2 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.20
:SAVINGS DI TRIBUTION 1 -4.90 -4.90 0.00 0.00 1.17
NET EFFECT ON SAVINGS if: 1a) Project Bears Economic Costs: -3.73
1b) Consumer Bears Economic Costs: | -3.73
-
----------------- 
--------------------------------- 
--
BASIC CRITERIA . /Krs. /Rs100
1|Production Cost/Unit Output 1223.63 95.03 1
|:Net Return on Expenditures 1 39.37 14.97|1) Capital Investment/Unit Output : 2.27 0.86
:2) Capital Investaent/Unit Employment(Md) 1 0.58
a' * / * (Unskilled) | 0.60
||Mandays/Unit Output t 3.94 1.50
---------------------------
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Table II.2.2
IMPORTED PRODUCTION echnology It Rotary - Trench Type, Coal - Oil Fired Brick Kiln.
(klcoimi) Model of Production Variables I their Effects on BASIC, OST - BENEFIT, I SAVINGS CRITERIA
5 lI.At PRODUCTION ANALYSIS: 1)Summary One.
6
7I VARIABLES I IlUnit Description I
I Illinpull
10 I I Capacityelricks/load/year I 400 400 K bricks/30 days/load.9 loads/year 3600 K brickil
I1 I 2 Outputj Production Cycles I 6 6 loads/year. 2400 Kbricks 1
12 1 3 Production Period iI 9 9 months. October to June. 5year least I
13 1 4 FinancIng 11 0.372 CRF for 5 year loan at 251 interest I
1- 
-------------------------------------- 
- - -------17 1 Iuoty. (Kirs.) I Price (Rs.)
19 1 VARIABLES 2. II/load I /Kirs. I/load /year I/Kbrs /Rsl00 I
191 d II 9 h I inputil I mII o p 1
20
21 IA RECEIPTS (Denefits) I 400 I 303 I 121200 727200 1303.00 100.00 1
22 13 EIPENDITURES (Costs) II I I 118119 709710 1295.30 97.46 1
23 IC INCOME (Net Value) I I I . 3082 18490 1 7.70 2.54 I
24 1 
---------------------
2351 Il
I\ /
18: INPUIS (EIPENiiiRES)----UA-----ES iCOSIS(Rs)- -- ----- --- -- -- --I
I VARIABLES 3. Il/kiln
I il(Input
."*""=""""""" ""I ...
i1
II 1.5
II/load
II
I I
I 0.29
11 12
I1 1200
1 goo80
II
i1 48
II/kln I
I1 59
iI 2
II 57
II 50
I 7
il
II
II
31 II.0.Capital
32 II.I.Plant
33 I1.2.Equipment (Is)
34 1
35 12.0.Kilm Land (Ac.)
36 1
37 1
38 13.0 Materials
39 13.1 Local (Low Import)
40 1 Clay Land (Acres)
411 Water (hrs)
42 1 Sand (cI)
431 Wood (ids)
44 13.2 Non Local(High Import)
451 Oil (drue=50 galls)
46 1 Coal(lruck.10tons)
471 Transport (coal trucks)
49 1
49 1
50 I 4 Labour (Is,ManDays,Rs)
51 14.1 Skilled/Up.Y.(Rs/Sth)
52 14.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y(Rest)
53 1 Piece Uorkers(Rs/Kbrs)
541 Wage Norkers(Rs/mth)
55 1
56 15.0 Miscellaneous
571 Tixaes(Rs/year)
59 interest(Rs/year)
/Krs. /Rs100I I/unit I/load /year I/Krs. /RsO00 I
or Output) I (Inputil I I
..I .............I \ / I.......===..=.. ==. ==.===...
I 67460 I 1636 9815 I 4.09 1.35 I
I 60000 I 1000 6000 1 2.50 0.83 I
I 7460 I 636 3915 I 1.59 0.52 I
I I I I
0.0039 0.0012 1 3000 I 750 4500 I 1.8 0.62 I
I I I I
/Kbrs. /Rs100I /unit I/load /year I/Kirs. /Rs100I I
I I 86332 517992 1215.83 71.23 I
I I 14204 85224 135.51 11.72 1
0.0007 0.0002 1 3000 I 940 5040 1 2.10 0.69 I
0.0300 0.0099 I 20 1 240 1440 1 0.60 0.20 I
3.0000 0.9901 1 0.67 I 904 4824 I 2.01 0.66 I
2.2000 0.7261 I 14 1 12320 73920 130.80 10.17 I
I I 72128 432768 1180.32 59.51 I
0.1200 0.0396 434 I 20932 124992 1 52.09 17.19 I
0.0200 0.0066 I 2762 I 22096 132576 I55.24 18.23 I
0.0200 0.0066 1 3650 I 29200 175200 1 73.00 24.09 I
I I I I
Md/KBrs./Rs100 I /unit I/load /year I/Krs. /RIOO I
4.92 1.62 I I 27000 162000 I67.50 22.29 I
0.17 0.06 I 1550 I 2067 12400 I 5.17 1.71 I
4.75 1.57 I I 24933 149600 I62.33 20.57 I
4.17 1.38 I 50 I 20000 120000 1 50.00 16.50 I
0.58 0.19 I 3700 I 4933 29600 1 12.33 4.07 I
I I I I
I /KBr I 2401 14403 I 6.00 1.99 I
I 7 1 467 29001 1.17 0.39)1
1 I 1934 11603 I 4.93 1.60 I
II.Bi: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA EFFECTS OFDISCOUNTING & SHADOW PRICING
I HlAnnualisedl
II.A.2) PRODUCTION IlCash Flov I
I ANALYSIS: I 01 I
I Susmary Tvo I1/RslOO I
I a I1 v I
IA RECEIPTS I 100.00 I
n 1 ETPENDITURES I 91.46 I
IC INCOME 11 2.54 1 m-3
- ----------------- I
It I
13: INPUTS II
(Expenditures) I1
I I
I -----------------
11.0 Capital
11.1 Plant
11.2 Equipment (s)
2.0 Kiln Land (Ac.)
3.0
3.2
Materials
Local(Lov Import)
Non-Local(Hi'lmport)
Oil(incl.Transport)
Coal(excl.Transport)
Transport(Coal trucks
14.0 Labour
4.1 Skilled/Up.Y.
4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
5.0 Miscellaneous
5.1 lanes
15.2 Interest
-----------I
I1 1.35 1
11 0.93 1
I 5 0.52 1
II 0.62 1
II 71.23 I
II Ii.72 I
II 59.51 I
II 17.19 I
lI 19.23 I
I) 24.09 1
It I
I1 22.28 I
II 1.71 I
If 20.57 I
i 1.98 I
II 0.39 I
i 1.60 1
111.3: COST - BENEFIT ANALYSIS. Discounted Over 5 Years
ll:FINANCIAL;Market Prices I
I 02 101 201 1
sia ab ac I
I 500.00 379.08 299.06 1
1 487.29 369.44 291.46 I
I 12.71 9.64 7.60 I
-------------------I
I----------------------I
6.75
4.13
2.62
3.09
356.16
58.60
297.56
85.94
91.16
120.46
111.39
8.53
102.86
0.00
9.90
1.93
7.98
5.12
3.13
1.99
2.35
270.02
44.43
225.60
65.16
69.11
91.33
94.45
6.46
77.98
0.00
7.51
1.46
6.05
4.04 1
2.47 1
1.57 I
1.85 1
213.02 1
35.05 1
177.98 I
51.40 I
54.52 1
72.05 1
66.62 1
5.10 1
61.52 1
0.00 I
5.92 I
1.15 1
4.77 1
I ------------ ----- I
Adjustment factor(AF)I
XTradbl. AF Wtd., I
IContent AF I
ag ah ai I
I (Input) I
=I Ii
I1.00 -0.05 -0.05 I
1 1.00 0.06 4.06 1
I 0.33 -0.12 -0.04 I
11.00 -0.20 -0.201
I 1
12: ECONOMIC(Shadow Prices) I
1 01 102 201 1
I I
1 am an ao I
1 500.00 - 379.08 299.06 1
1 463.12 351.12 277.00 I
"s)l 36.88 27.96 22.06 1
1I---- ------------- I
1 7.39 / 4.41 I
I 11 I
I II I
------------
6.75 5.12 4.04 1
4.13 3.13 2.47 1
2.62 1.99 1.57 1
3.09 2.35 1.85 I
352.56 267.29 210.87 I
58.60 44.43 35.05 I
293.96 222.87 175.82 I
81.64 61.90 48.83 I
96.62 73.26 57.79 I
115.69 87.71 69.20 I
90.81 68.95 54.32 :
8.53 6.46 5.10 I
82.29 62.39 49.22 1
9.90 7.51 5.92 I
1.93 1.46 1.15 I
7.98 6.05 4.77 1
I---------------------------I
a)
13: SOCIAL (Income Distribution)
lAt 01 discount :SOCIAL 1
!Proj.or Cnser. Bsnss.Wrkr. Govt. INCOME/Yr
I as at au av aV : ay
1 100.00 I
1 I 92.62 1
1 -24.17 -24.17 0.00 20.57 3.60 1 7.38 1
I-
i Il
------------------------
1 3.60
1 -3.60 3.60
!-4.30 . 4.30
I 5.47 -5.47
1 -4.77 4.77
1 20.57
I -20.57 20.57
I-------------------------------------------
\/
ITECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA -111.3: EFFECT ON SAVINGS
I------------- ------ --------- ------ ---------------
At 201 Discount
IProj.or Cnsar. Bsnss.Wrkr. Govt. :NET
I================== ========================SAVINGS 1
llncome Distribution 1 -24.17 -24.17 0.00 20.57 3.60 1
IMarginal Propensity to Save:Input.) 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.20 I
1----------------------------------I------------------------1- I
ISAVINGS DISTRIBUTION 1 -4.83 -4.83 0.00 0.00 0.72 1
60 I1
61
62 1
------------2 -- -- ----------------------------------------------------
63) TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA I BASIC CRITERIA
64 1
65i Criteria Illescription I/Kirs. /RsI00 I
66 1 at .Sta = ==== 2 11.ve. s ... = xrxzzrzwz===n===a=== azzm=. =.s= mn..a.......=...=.. ren 22222*2 2 2l
67 11.0 Cost Minimisation llProductlon Cost/Unit Output 1295.30 97.46 I
69 12.0 ProfitabilitylIet Return on Expendilures I 7.70 2.54 I
69 13.0 Capital Productivity Ill) Capital Iestment/Unit Output I 4.09 1.35 1
70 I 112) Capital Investment/Unit Employment(Mdays) Total I 0.93 I
711 II ' / 6 UnskIlled I 0.96 I
72 14.0 Labour Productivity IlMandays/Unit Output I 4.92 1.62 1
73 1--------------- -- .------ - -- - -- -- .---- .-- -  ----- -- - -- --- ----- -- -- -
INET EFFECT ON SAVINGS if:
I: I
la) Project Bears Economic Costs: I
lb) Consumer Bears Economic Costs: I
-4.Il I
-4.11 
285
----------------- ---- ------------- I
------ - --------- -------- ----------------------------- - -------------- 
--
I
Table 11.3.
SWITCHING FROM INDIGENOUS TO IMPORTED PRODUCTION TECHNOLOBIES:
(pdsvhbsc) Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type, Coal & Oil Fired.
NET EFFECTS ON BASIC CRITERIA: PROFITABILITY, CAPITAL i LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT.
A: Capacity utilisation: Wall Kiln = 661; Rotary-Trench Kiln = 751
BASIC CRITERIA :!PROFITABILITY(/Rsl00 Output) PRODUCTIVITY
''Financial :Economic Capital :Labour (Man Days)
:At Discount Rates Employment
:Production Technology Type(Kiln) 0 1 01 201 |/K Bricks /Rs 100 /Man Day /K Bricks /Rs 100 1
c d f | g i I k 1 a | o p
---------- I--- I-- -- a-------------------------- ---------
--- -- I- -- -- -- -- -- -- ----------- S
Indigenous:Wall,Agri-Waste Fired U 14.97 | 19.86 11.89 2.27 0.86 0.52 0 3.94 1.50
Ilaported:Trench,Coal-Oil Fired 2.54 | 7.38 4.41 4.09 1.35 0.83 4.92 1.62
:NET EFFECT U -12.43 | -12.48 -7.47 1 -1.82 -0.49 -0.25 1 0.98 0.12
B: At 1001 Capacity Utilisation
BASIC CRITERIA !IPROFITABILITY(/Rs100 Output): PRODUCTIVITY
a il S8
:.Financial :Economic Capital :Labour (Man Days)
!:At Discount Rates Employment
Production Technology Type(Kiln) U! 01 01 201 :/K Bricks /Rs 100 /Man Day /K Bricks /Rs 100 1
c d f g i k 1 o p
Indigenous:Wall,Agri-Waste Fired U! 18.14 1 22.89 53.88 1 0.76 0.29 0.29 1 2.63 1.00
Ilaported:Trench,Coal-Oil Fired U 5.96 I 10.59 46.52 1 2.04 0.67 0.55 | 3.69 1.22
NET EE-28 -.---------------------------------- --------------------------- -------------------------0.3-  .26 -
:NET EFFECT U -12.18 -12.30 -1.36 1 -1.28 -0.38 -0.26 1.06 0.22
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Table I 1.4. 1 SWITCHING From Indigenous to Imported PRODUCTION Technologies.
Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type, Coal 6 Oil Fired.
NET EFFECTS On Income Distribution, Materials' Costs, Employment, Productivity & Savings.
(Comparing Results of CASH - FLOW Analysis)
----- ------------------------ --------- ---------A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION ::Through Cash - Flow from Materials' Purchase Expenditures
!Spatially !By Income Group
IlExternal District Within District !Local
Production Technology Type(Kiln) !Urban Rural :Upper Y. Lower Y. :Governmenti
12 c d f g i j I 1 a 1 o
14 Indigenous:Wall,Aqri-Waste Fired 1 9.88 89.82 : 24.07 65.75 1 43.62 46.20 1 0.96 I
15 Ilmported:Trench,Coal-Oil Fired 8 56.67 43.33 7.43 35.88 15.26 28.07 1 0.56 1
16 -------- - ------ --
17 :INCOME DISTRIBUTION 46.79 -46.49 | -16.64 -29.87 | -28.36 -18.13 | -0.40
18 NET INCOME EFFECT 8 0.30 1 -46.51 -46.4? -0.4 1
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
'U
.3
'I
;D: SAVINGS THROUGH: 821: Income Distribution I
!!Spatially IBy Income Group
!:External District :Within District 'Govt.
*!8 !Urban Rural :Upper Y. Lower Y.
!Net Income Distribution !8 46.79 -46.49 ! -16.64 -29.87 ! -28.36 -18.13 -0.40
Marginal Propensity to Save: Input-> 0.10 0.02 | 0.03 0.02 : 0.10 0.00 0.20
:SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION !1 4.68 -0.93 | -0.42 -0.73 1 -2.84 0.00 -0.08
1B: SAVINGS/LOSSES THRU BRICK PURCHASE
I II
IRs/KBrs.Brs/Rs100
ac 8 Input af
indigenous 8 263.00 380
!Imported 8 303.00 330
:NET LOSSES(Rs,is) | -40.00 -50.20
!Value/Brick (Rs) | 0.26
;TOTAL Value of Bricks(Rs) -13.20
'a
SI
-2:avngsL- se Thru- ric- Purhs----------
:02:SavinqslLosses Thru Brick Purchase:
* a
* a
|:If Consumer is:
:|Govt. Low Y.
IMarg.Prop.to Save !8 0.20 0.00
!SAYINGS Effect 8 -------- --
From: X) Rs/K Brs.8! -8.00 0.00
Y) Brs/RsOO! -2.64 0.00
| Cl: EMPLOYMENT (MDays/RsIO0) I
!Total Unskilled!
u it* a a a
Indigenous 1.50 0.00
lmported ! 1.62 0.00
NET - -- - - -
:EMPLOYMENT ! 0.12 0.00
.3 Ia
a4II
* !!
IS
'a
'I
:D3: Net Wages I
I
1 Net Esplaysent8 0.12 :
!Wages/Mday 8 30.00 ;
!Net Wages 1 3.60 1
1M.P.to Save 8 0.00
:SAVINGS EFFECT 0.00
36 !NET SAVINGS
37
38
3.75 1!
-2.84 -0.08 ! ===:>NET SAVINGS EFFECT
---- IDa) + I) Rs/Kbrs:!: -4.25
!Dlb) + 1) 8! 3.75
lia) + Y) Brs/RsI0'! 1.11
IDIb) + Y) 8 3.75
----------------------------
==>NET SAVINGS
DI + D2 + D3> 3.75--- ------------ ------ - - - -- - - -
3. 75 i
Table 11.4.2
SWITCHING FROM INDIGENOUS To IMPORTED PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES.
(pdswhcbl) ( Ex. Brick Kilns; Wall Type, Agri - Waste Fired versus Trench Type,
NET EFFECTS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION, EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY,
(Comparing Results of COST - BENEFIT Analysis)
------------- 7---- ---- -----------------------------
A: INCOME DISTRIBUTION | Groups Affected:
!!Proj.Or Cnsmr. Bsness. Wrkr. Central 1
Production Technology Type il Govt. 1
c H1 e f g h i I
Indigenous (Agri-Fired Kiln):: -24.48 -24.48 0.00 18.63 5.85 |
Jaported (Coal-Fired Kiln) || -24.17 -24.17 0.00 20.57 3.60
---------------------------- :1----------------------------------------|
NET INCOME DISTRIBUTION || 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.94 -2.25 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
86
\/
D: SAVINGS THROUGH: |:D1: Income Distribution |
:Cnsar. is:
!Govt.or Low Y. Busness. Worker Govt.
Net Income Distribution :1 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.94 -2.25 |
Marginal Propensity to Save || 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.20 1
---------------------------- ::----------------------------------------|
NET SAVINGS DISTRIBUTION 1: 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.45 i
Coal i Oil Fired.)
PURCHASE COSTS, I SAVINGS.
|B: SAVINGS/LOSSES THRU BRICK PURCHASES
:: x Y
|:1Rs/KBrs.Brs/Rsl00
|| Input p
===================i \/ =====
:Indigenous | 263.00 380
:Imported | 303.00 330
| | ---------------
:NET LOSSES(Rs,Is) ! -40.00 -50.20
:Value/Brick (Rs) 0.263
TOTAL Value of Bricks(Rs) -13.20
\/
:D2:Savings/Losses Thru Brick Purchases
!Marg.Prop.to Save
:SAVINGS Effect
|From: X) Rs/K Brs.
I Y) Brs/Rs100
Hif Consumer is:
!:Govt. Low Y.
H 0.20 0.00
!-----------------
1! -8.00 0.00
| -2.64 0.00
NET SAVINGS EFFECT ::a) Government: -0.39 1
If Consumer is: H|b) Low - Income Person: -0.45 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
=====> INET SAVINGS EFFECT
D1a) + X) Rs/KBrs.
IDIb) + I) Rs/XBrs.
|Dla)+Y) Brs/Rs.100
Dlb)+Y) Brs/Rs00
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-8.39
-3.03
-0.45
-0.45
Table I I
Indigenous Produ
Production Variabl
H.A: PRODUCTION ANALYS
VARIABLES 1.
I Capacity:Bricks/loa
2 Output: Production
3 Production Period
4 Financing
VARIABLES 2.
c d
A: RECEIPTS
8: EXPENDITURES
:C: INCOME
INCOME/WORKER
3: INPUTS (EXPENDITURES
VARIABLES 3.
~1.D0.Capi tal
:1.2.Equipment (s)
:2.0.Work Land (Ac.)
(incl.in clay land)
3.0 Materials
:3.1 Local (Low Isport)
Clay Land (Acres)
Water (hrs)
Sand (cf)
:3.2 Non-Local(laport/Trai
:4.0 Labour (Is,Man~ays,Rs
'4.1 Skilled/Up.Y.(Rs/th)
:4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y(Rest)
Roulders(Rs/Kbrs)
Carriers(Rs/K~rs)
5.0 Miscellaneous
Taxes(Rs/year)
Ilnterest(Rs/year)
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CR1
I Cost Minimasation:
2 Profitability:
3 Capital Productivity:
4 Labour Productivity:
!A: PRODUCTION ANALYSIS; Summary One.
VARIABLES 1. ||Unit Description
ena nn.E~3U3.nn R |:= manag== nou x Un answ rs=u ... hhge.==.:h ..... ===
I Capacity:Mats/outh 11 70 70 Matis/30days. 0 months/year: 630
2 Output: Production Cycle |! 0 0 loads/year. 0 Mats
3 Production Period :1 0 0 months.
4 Financing || 0 CRF for 5 year loan at 251 interest
11
-- -- -- --
VARIABLES 2. IOTY. (/mat/19sf/l/7th.and: PRICE (Rs)
: ats /sat lTot./mth/year :/&at /RsO00
c dt f h 14:1 1 Ia p
k: RECEIPTS (/lMandss7mats 70 8 1 560 0: 8.00 100.00
each 6'3''l1sf) 
.44/sf
1: EXPENDITURES 367 0 1 5.25 65.61 zz)
INCOME : 193 0 1 2.75 34.39
INCOME/WORKER 39 0 : 0.55 6.8|
-- --- ~ ~~~~ --- -/ --- -- - --- --  - - --
B: INPUTS (EIPENDITURES) ::QUANTITIES SCOSTS(Rs)
VARIABLES 3. :;/unit /*at /Rsl00 /nth :Total /year I/sat /Rs100 1
1.0.Capital 1001 100 0 1.43 17.861
1.1.Plant (shop rent/month) 14 1 100 100 0 1.43 17.96 |
L.2.Equipment:l ick,2 rods.Ilnegligable 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 |
Z.0.Land 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 am)
/10ands /and /RsO0 /and I/10ands /year 1/mat /Rs100
3.0 Materials 252 0 | 3.61 45.07
1.1 Local (Low Import) 3.3 1 87 0 | 1.25 15.61
Reed Bundles (mnds) 3.3 0 0.0000 18.0 59 01 0.85 10.61
String(Rs.4/matRs2.8/andl 0 0 0.00 2.8 1 29 0 1 0.40 5.00 1
3.2 Non-Local(laport/Transp) II 6.6 0 0 1 25.0 1 165 0 1 2.36 29.46
Reed Bundles(mads) 11 6.6 1 20.0 | 132 1 1.89 23.57
3.3 Truck(/and) 6.6 5.0 33 0.47 5.89
Labour (1sManDays,Rs)
Skilled
Unskilled
11/shop Md/mat /RsI00
5 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 0.00
11 4 0.00 0.00
5.0 Miscellaneous Ia
Taxes;municipal(Rs/month) 1
lnterest(Rs/year)
I /unit /load
share i
profit'
1 01
/year
0
0
0
I/mat /Rs1O0 I
0.00 0.00 1
0.00 0.00 1
0.00 0.00 1
1 0.21 2.68 |
0.21 2.68 1
0.00 0.00 1
Table 111.2 Indigenous Production Technology 1: REED (Roof) MATS Making Workshop
Production Variables & Their Effects on CASH - FLOW, BASIC i SAVINGS CRITERIA.
Y: TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 2.a: CASH - FLOW (INCOME OBTAINED) THROUGH MATERIALS' PURCHASES (Distribution of Receipts)
l11.A: CASH-FLOW ANALYSIS; Spatially and by Income Group.
lI.A.2: PRODUCTION
ANALYSIS:
Summary Two.
u
IA: RECEIPTS
I8: EIPENDITURES
IC: INCOME
I8: INPUTS
(EIPENDITURES)
I1.0.Capital
11.I. Pl antt
11.2. Equipment
12.0.L and
13.0 Materials
13.1 Local:Low Import
13.2 Non-Local
14.0 Labour
14.1 Skilled/Up.Y.
14.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
15.0 Miscellaneous
InTaxest
IInt er est
IlAnnualisedl :1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
::Cash Flow ',Spatially :Income Groups I
1!/Rsoo Eit. Dst. :Within District IGut.
01 Urb. Rur. lUp.Y.Lo..
! v I A ab lad ae ag ah Iaj
34I lix. u:-sXml l.XZ~ZR::zzs::giZZXz=zZzzzmzzzzzzaZ
11 100.00 |
11 65.61
| 34.31 mn) 0.00 1.00 10.90 .20 10.00 1.00 10.00 liz:)
17.86 I
17.86 10.00 1.00 11.00 .00 11.00 .00 10.00
II 0.00 1 0.50 0.50 10.40 .10 10.25 0.25 10.001
II 0.00 1 0.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 11.00 .00 10.001
45.07
15.61 10.00 1.00 :0.00 1.00 :0.20 .00 :0.00
29.46 11.00 0.00 10.00 .00 10.00 .00 10.00
0.00
0.00 1 10.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 10.00
0.00 1 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 10.00 1
2.68 a
S 2.6 0.00 1.00 10.66 0.33 10.66 0.33 :1.00
0.00 :0.00 1.00 10.50 .50 1.00 0.00 :0.00 )
:TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 3.a:
lI1.A: SAVINGS ANALYSIS
2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts ( From Materials' Purchases)
Spatially - |By Income Groups
External District:Within District l6ovt.
|Urban Rural |Upper T.Lover Y.:
an ao aq ar : at au 1 Av
29.46 70.54 | 47.14 23.37 1 22.75 47.76 2.68
29.46 36.14 1 19.63 16.49 | 22.75 13.37 2.6(
0.00 34.39 27.51 6.88 | 0.00 34.31 0.C
0.00 17.86 17.86 0.00 17.86 0.00 0.0(
0.00 17.86 17.86 0.00 17.86 0.00 0.0C
0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
29.46 15.61 0.00 15.61 3.12 12. 49 0.0
0.00 15.61 0.00 15.61 3.12 12.49 0.0(
29.46 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.0
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.0
0.00 2.69 1 1.77 0.88 | 1.77 0.98 2.61
0.00 2.68 | 1.77 0.88 1 1.77 0.88 1 2.61
0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 | 0.00 0.00 1 0.0
EFFECT ON SAVINGS
!!Spatially :By Incose Groups
::Eiternal District:Within District I6ovt.
:Urban Rutal Upper Y.Lover Y.1
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA 1/Kbrs /RsIO0 |
I Cest Minimisation: Production Cost/Unit Output 5.25 65.61 |
2 Profitability: Net Return on Expenditures 2.75 34.39
3 Capital Productivity: 1) Capital nvestaent/Unit output 1.43 17.86 1
2) Capital Investaent/Unit EmployeentlMd) ERR I
/ (Unskilled) ERR I
4 tibour Productivity: Mandays/Unit Output 0.00 0.00
::::zzsz::x.:=z===z=== = s::=: 2a a:.e s===::a:: :3 iz.2 21 32E EEzEzEsEE1s33EEEEE2SI taxERai
Distribution of Reteipts || 29.46 70.54 1 47.14 23.37 1 22.75 47.76 1 2.6!
Marginal Propensity to Save 11 0.10 0.02 1 0.03 0.02 | 0.10 0.00 1 0.21
SAVINGS Distribution 1| 2.95 1.41 1 1.41 0.47 1 2.27 0.00 1 0.5
SAVINGS TOTAL: 4.36 ;; 4.36 | 1.88 1 2.27 1 0.5-
Table 111.3.1
Indigenous Production Technology 1: SAW-HILL for TIMBER Beams I Battens
(swria2) Production Variables & Their Effects on CASH - FLOW, BASIC k SAVINGS CRITERIA.
LI.A: PRODUCTION A ALYSIS; ummary One.
71
8 1 VARIABLES 1.
19 1 Capacity:cf/u
11 1 2 output: Produ
12| 3 Production P.
13 | 4 Financing
14:
is
161
17
1 a
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
::Unit IDescription
nit/month |: 1875
ction Period ! 1875
riod 1 9
||0.372
1975 cf 50 cf/treel.5 Trees/day,
9 months 16875 cf/year Sept. to June
9 months. September to June
CRF for 5 year loan at 251 interest
\I
VARIABLES 2. 1 IBTY. cf I PRICE
11/mnth /I,cf
I C d !f g h 1 j
|A: RECEIPTS (cf) Itree=5Ocf ! 1975
Beams:I5cf/tree(#)1=3.05cf8! 184 1 225
Fuelvood: 35cf (cf) || 1313 | 10
:B: EXPENDITURES
IC: INCOSE
(Rs)
* lmonth /year 1/cf fRsl00
1 1 10 p
54621 491588 1 29.13 100.00
* 41496 373463. 1703.13 75.97
| 13125 118125 | 10.00 24.03
| 31968 287631 ! 17.18 58.51
22753 203957 | 11.95 41.49
27 |/
28
29 |_\/
30 19: INPUTS (EIPENDITURES) ||gUANTITIES 1 COSTS(Rs)
31 | VARIABLES 3. :1/unit /cf /Rs1OO I /unit | /mth/25d /year I/cf IRs100
32 1= = = ==== v === =
33 81.O.Capital
34 I.1.Plant: I room, 2 shelters
35 11.2.Equipaent (is)
36 | Electric Motor(20hp)
37 Saw. 3'3" dia.
38 Saw sharpener
39
40 12.0.Land (Acres) 0.13
41 N
42 month
43 3.0 Materials
44 :3.1 Local (Lov Import) I.
45 1 Accacia Trees(50cf,50ands) 38
46 | (Itree=5Ocf=15cfhttns. .I1
47 ' 35cf fuel.18yrs.old)
48 ! Electricity 0
49 Grease for Saw 0
50 3.2 hon-Local(laport/Transp) 0
5'1 Replace blade I belt
52
53 ::/unit
54 |4.0 Labour (#s,ManDays,Rs/adayll 7
55 14.1 Skilled/first aver 1
56 14.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y 6
57 1 Second saver 1.
58I Helper . 1
59 | Tree Cutter/trnsp.1s,Rs/cflI 4
60 ContractRs2/cf;cut,transp)8
61
62 15.0 Miscellaneous
63 Taxes(Rs/year) Local Govt.:
64 Interest(Rs/year)
.000 ERRI
/cf cf/Rsl00
0.02 0.07 |
0 ERRI
0 ERR
0 01
Md/25cf /Rs400
2.90 0.40
0.30 0.04
2.60 0.36
0.30
0.30
2.00 0.27
22320 1
8000 1
14320 1
60001
8000
320
9000
/unit
650
0
0
0
0
/&day
27
180
17
13
150
65 -------------------- -- ----------------------- -----
66
67
68 : TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA 1: BASIC CRITERIA
69 | 1 Cost Minisisation: Production Cost/Unit Output
70 1 2 Profitability: Net Return on Expenditures
71 | 3 Capital Productivity: 1) Capital Investaent/Unit Output
87
/month
25630
25275
24375
Boo
100
355
355
/tooth
5450
Boo
4650
500
400
3750
/sonth
515
89
427
2232 1 0.13
900 1 0.05
1432 | 0.08
1040 0.06
/year I/cf
230670 13.81
227475 13.62
219375 13.00
7200 0.43
900 0.19
3195 0.19
3195 0.19
/year 1/cf
49050 2.91
7200 0.43
41850 2.40
4500 0.27
3600 0.21
33750 2.00
/year /cf
4639 0.27
800 0.05
3839 0.23
0.45
0.16
0.29
0.21
/RsI00
46.92
46.27
44.63 1
1.46
0.18
0.6%1
0.65
/Rs100
9.98
1.46
8.51
0.92
0.73
6.87
/Rs100
0.94
0.16
0.78
:/cf /Rso0
17.18 58.51
11.95 41.49
0.13 0.45
721 2) Capital Investment/Unit Employment(Md) 1. 14
73 * * / * (Unskilled) | 1.27
74 4 Labour Productivity: Mandays/Unit Output a 2.90 0.40
291
II
.==) 11
Table 111.3.2
.. . Indigenous Production Technology 1: SAW-MILL for Timber leans & BATTENS
(swaib2a) Production Variables 6 Their Effects on CASH - FLOW, BASIC & SAVINGS CRITERIA.
7 |
8 | VARIABLES 1. ::Unit
10 1 Capacity:c fiunit/sonth || 1875
11 I 2 Output: Production Period:: 1875
12 3 Production Period :: 9
13 4 Financing ||0.372
:Description
1875 cf
9 months
9 months.
CRF for
25 cf/tre.3 Trees/day,
16875 cf/year Sept. to June
September to June
5 year loan at 251 interest
17 VARIABLES 2. I|DTY. cf PRICE (Rs)
18 I |:/Wonth /1,cf I Imonth /year /cf /RsI00 |
19 i c d (If g h ji 1 1 I o p I
20 !=- - =========|=--========= = =====z===============
21 :A: RECEIPTS (cf) 1tree=25cf || 1875 27750 249750 14.80 100.00 I
22 Battens: 8cf (N)1=0.32cf 1875 8 15000 135000: 25.00 54.05 I
23 Fuelvood: 17cf (cf) 1275 10 12750 114750 (10.00 45.95 I
24 11
25 !B: EXPENDITURES N 26243 237006 (14.18 94.90
26 IC: INCOME 1507 12744) 0.62 5.10 ==>
27:
28
29 |_\/
30 |8: INPUTS (EIPENDITURES) OUANTITIES COSTS(Rs)
31 : VARIABLES 3. !/unit /cf /Rs100 /unit I lath/25d /year :/cf /RsO0
32 |===========. ======= == =
33 :1.0.Capi tal :.
34 :I.1.Plant: I room, 2 shelters.
35 |1.2.Equipment (is)
36 I Electric otor(20hp) 1:
37 i Saw. 3'3" dia.
38 | .Saw sharpener
39
40 |2.0.Land (Acres)
41
42
43 3.0 Materials
44 13.1 Local (Low Import) N
45 Accacia (25cf,25ands) Il
46 (1tree=25cf=8cfbttas.
47 &17cf fuel.10yrs.old) 11
48 Electricity
49 Grease for Saw
50 :3.2 Non-Local(lmport/Transp)
51 Replace blade I belt II
52
53
54 14.0 Labour (0s,ManDays,Rs/mda;I
55 14.1 Skilled/first aver
56 4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
57 Second sawer
59 Helper
59 1 Tree Cutters/transp.ts,Rs
60 ContractRs2/cf;cut,transplI
611
62 5.0 Miscellaneous
63 Taies(Rs/year) Local Govt:I
64 I Interest (Rs/year)
65
0.13 .000 ERR
month /cf /RsI00
75 0.04 0.271
0 0 ERR:
0 0 ERR:
0 0 0
unit Md/25cf /RsOO
7 2.90 0.78
1 0.30 0.08
6 2.60 0.70
1 0.30
1 0.30
4 2.00 0.54
223201
80001
143201
6000
8000
320 1
8000
/unit
250o
0:
0:
01
0
/mday
27:
190:
17:
13
150
87
/month
20005
19650
18750
800
100
355
355
lmonth
5450
900
4650
500
400
3750
/month
515
99
427
ly
1:
1i
2232
900:
1432
1040
oar |/
00045:
76850 I
68750 |
7200|
900
3195
3195 I
/year 1/
49050:
7200
41850
4500
3600 I
33750 t
/year /
4639
800
3839|
0.13 0.89
0.05 0.32
0.08 0.57
0.06 0.42
c f /Rs100
10.81 72.09
10.62 70.81
10.00 67.57
0.43 2.88 1
0.19 0.36 I
0.19 1.28 |
0.19 1.29 I
cf /Rsl00 I
2.91 19.64 |
0.43 2.88 1
2.48 16.76 I
0.27 1.80
0.21 1.44
2.00 13.51 I
cf /Rs100
0.27 1.86 |
0.05 0.32 I
0.23 1.541
TECHNOLOGY CHOICE CRITERIA I: BASIC CRITERIA
I Cost Ninisisation:
2 Profitability:
3 Capital Productivity:
Production Cost/Unit Output
Net Return on Expenditures
1) Capital Investment/Unit Ou put
2) Capital avestment/Unit Employsen (Md)
* / * (Unskilled)
74 4 Labour Productivity: Mandays/Unit Output 1 2.90 0.78 :
TECHNOLOGY CHOlI
I.A.2) PRODUCTION
ANALYSIS:
Summary Two.
C
:A: RECEIPTS
86: EXPENDITURES
:C: INCOME
:- IEPUTS
(EXPENDITURES)
1. 0. Capital
1. 1. Plant
1l.2.Equipment
I2.0.Land
:3.0 Materials
:3.1 Local(Low Impor
:3.2 Non-Local
:4.0 Labour
14.1 Skilled/Up.Y.
:4.2 Unskilled/Lo.Y
:5.0 Miscellaneous
| Taxes:Local Gov
i Interest
1/cf /Rs00|
94.90
5.10 |
0.89 |
1.14 1
1.27
292
Table IV.I
CASH-FLOW THROUGH PURCHASES OF SAND
(sand1)
1II.A: CASH - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' PURCHASES (Distribution of Receipts)
------------ a1----------------- - -
MATERIALS' MERCHANT :PRICE
./Icf /trailer /Rsl00
* a, /100cf
d f g h
------------------- ----
A RECEIPTS U 1.5 150 100.00
IB EIPENDITURES I 90 76.67
;C INCOME ; 60 23.33
--- 
- - - -
- - - - --- - - - -
INPUTS COSTS (Rs)
(Expenditures) U/unit /trailer /Rs100
a ,/100cf
:1.0 NON-LOCAL:Lawrencepur. U 0 0.00
High qity. only. 1 0.0 0 0.00
Not counted here. U 0 0 0.00
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
76.67
53.33
6.67
13.33
3.33
!a - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - -- - - -
:1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
Spatially !lncome Groups
'Ext. Dst. IWithin District I6vt.
aUrb. Rur. !Up.Y.Lo.Y.1
a o p r s u
a 0.00 1.0 0 0.00 .00 0.00 0,00=
1.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 :0.66 0.33 !1.00 0.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 :1.00 0.00 10.00 1.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 :0.50 0.50 :0.00 1.00 :0.00
i 0.00 1.00 10.66 0.33 10.66 0.33 11.00 1
a- ------------------------- ---
12: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
Spatially IBy Income Groups
ExternalDistrictiWithin District !Govt. 1
!Urban Rural |Upper Lower . 1
I y z ab ac I ae af : ah
0.00 100.00 74.07 25.37 178.87 21.10 ! 3.33
0.00 76.67 50.73 25.37 :55.53 21.10 1 3.33 1
0.00 23.33 23.33 0.00 123.33 0.00 i 0.00 i
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 76.67 |50.73 25.37 :55.53 21.10 1 3,33
0.00 53.33 135.20 17.60 153.33 0.00 1 0.00
0.00 6.67 ! 6.67 0.00 1 0.00 6.67 ! 0.00
1 0.00 13.33 ! 6.67 -6.67 1 0.00 13.33 1 0.00
0.00 3.33 1 2.20 1.10 ! 2.20 1.10 1 3.33
Source: Butt, materials merchant. Sahiwal
LOCAL (River bed/land)
Trailer owner(pays below)
Landowner
Labour
Octroi Tax
12.0
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
N N11"I " 0-
Table IV.2
CASH-FLOW THROUGH PURCHASES OF AGGREGATE
hIl.A: CASH - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' PUCHASES (Distribution of Receipts)
a---------------------- ---
MATERIALS' MERCHANT
d
a :PRICE
!/cf
!! f
itruck
/250cf
9
/RsI00
' h
; -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - :-- - - - - - - - -
|A RECEIPTS al 7 1750 100.00
1B EXPENDITURES I 1435 82.00
1C INCOME 315 18.00
INPUTS '.COSTS (Rs)
(Expenditures) 1:/unit /truck /Rs100
/250cf
:1.0 NON-LOCAL: Taxila 1400 80.00
11.1 Landowner.(Private/govt.)U 25 1.43
:1.2 Aggregate Co. 375 21.43
:1.3 Materials' Agency 75 4.29
11.4 Labour (to load:/truck) 8 25 1.43
11.5 Trucker (/truck) "! 900 51.43
.2.0 LOCAL:Sahiwal aa 35 2.00
:2.1 Octroi Tax(/truck) 10 0.57
12.2-Labour (to unload:/truck)U! 25 1.43
--- ---- - ---------
a a
a a
1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
:Spatially [Income Groups a
a Ext. Dst. :Within District BGyt.
Urb. Rur. Up.Y.Lo.Y.
a o p r s u
==>0.00 1.00 :1.00 0.00 :1.00 0.00 :0.00 )
1 1.00 0.00 !0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 i
10.00 1.00 :0.66 0.33 :0.66 0.33 :1.00
0.00 1.00 :1.00 0.00 0o.00 1.00 !0.00
a -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
:2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
Spatially !By Income Groups
IExternalDistrictWithin District "Govt.
!Urban Rural !Upper Lower 1.
y z ab ac 1 ae af I ah
80.00 20.00 119.81 0.19 18.38 1.62 | 0.57
80.00 2.00 19.81 0.19 0.38 1.62 : 0.57
0.00 12.00 :1.00 0.00 !18.00 0.00 0.00
80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
0.00 2.00 1.81 0.19 10.38 1.62 ! 0.57
0.00 0.57 | 0.38 0.19 10.38 0.19 ! 0.57
1 0.00 1.43 : 1.43 0.00 ! 0.00 1.43 1 0.00
- ---------------------------
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
29
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
(aggregi)
Source: M. Butt. Materials' merchant. Sahiwal City.
i
i
|
|
Table IV.3 CASH-FLOW THROUGH PURCHASES OF CEMENT
r --- ~~~---~~~~G~~~~~~~~-- - ------ ~U~~--~~~~--------------------------------- i of R
III.A: CASH - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' PURCHASES (Distribution of Receipts)
---------------------------------------
MATERIALS' MERCHANT :!PRICE
/50kg bag /truck /RsI00
200bags
d f g h
-- - ---------- --------
A RECEIPTS 70.50 14100 100.00
:8 EIPENDITURES 1: 66.38 13275 94.15
C INCOME 4.13 825 5.85
INPUTS !:COSTS (Rs)
(Expenditures) !/unit /truck /RsO00
200bags
!1.0 NON-LOCAL:Hyderabad 66.00 13200 93.62
:1.1 Factory 51.00 10200 72.34
:1.2 Truck to Sahiwal !. 15.00 3000 21.28
:2.0 LOCAL - 0.38 75 0.53
:2.1 Labour to unload - 0.25 50 0.35
:2.2 Octroi Tax 0.13 25 0.18
i -----Yh Kh.ee- gn-nr ia---------------
Source: Yahya Khan. Cement Agency Owner. Sahiwal City
1a : COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
Spatially Income Groups
Ext. Dst. Within District :Gvt.
:Urb. Rur. !Up.Y.Lo.Y.
a o p r s i u
= 0.00 1.00 11.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 10.00
i 11.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 10.00
0.00 1.00 0O.50 0.50 10.00 1.00 :0.00
0.00 1.00 11.00 0.00 :0.66 0.33 11.00
a 2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
Spatially !By Income Groups
a ExternalDistrict|Within District !Govt.
lUrban Rural :Upper Lower I.
y z ! ab ac : ae af I ah
93.62 6.381 6.21 0.18: 5.97 0.41 ; 0.18
93.62 0.53 :0.35 0.18 :0.12 0.41 : 0.18
===> 0.00 5.85 5.85 0.00 5.85 0.00 0.00:
93.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 !0.00
0.00 0.53 10. 35 0. 18 0.12 0.41 !0.18
1 0.00 0.35 !0.18 0.18 0.00 0.35 : 0.00
0.00 0.18 0.18 0.00 :0.12 0.06 ' 0.18
(cesent1)
Table IV .4
CASH-FLOW THROUGH PURCHASES OF STEEL RODS
(asrods1)
II.A: CASH - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' PURCHASES. (Distribution of Receipts)
a -------------- ------- !a, -- --- ------
MATERIALS' MERCHANT !:PRICE
:!/kg - /truck
a a /10tons
Ia f
S ------------- --
.A RECEIPTS !! 4.5 4500
:B EXPENDITURES 4122
!C INCOME i! 377
UTC------------
iINPUTS !:COSTS (Rs)
1 (Expenditures) !:/unit /truck
a a! /Iltons
11.0 NON-LOCAL (Lahore) 4110
11.1 Steel Merchant (/kg) !! 4.0 4000
11.2 Trucker /ton) Il 100 100
!1.3 Labour (to load:/ton) 10 10
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1s
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
12
2
10 10
!1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
i Spatially :Income Groups
/Rsl00 :Ext. Dst. !Within District :Svt.
I !Ub Rur. :Up.Y.La.Y.:
h a :0 p :r s '
0 100.00
5 91.61 1
5 8.39 =2) :=.= 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 11.00 0.00 :0.00
---- a
/Rs100 a
0 91.33 !:.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 !0.00
0 88.89 I
0 2.22 |
 0.22 1
5 0.29 :
5 0.06 i 10.00 1.00 :.oo 0.00 10.66 0.33 :1.00
0 0.22 ', !0.00 1.00 :1.00 0.00 :0.00 1.00 :0.00
12: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
:Spatially !By Income Groups
ExternalDistrict:Within District :Bovt. I
aUrbanRural !Upper Lower I.
y z :ab ac 1 ae af I ah
a 91.33 8.67 !8.67 0.00 1 8.43 0.24 1 0.06
91.33 0.28 :0.28 0.00 :0.04 0.24 : 0.06
0.00 8.39 !8.39 0.00 :8.39 0.00 :0.00:
1 91.33 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 i0.00
0.00 0.28 :0.28 0.00 : 0.04 0.24 0.06
0.00 0.06 10.06 0.00 : 0.04 0.02 10.06
0.00 0.22 !0.22 0.00 : 0.00 0.22 10.00
- ------------- 
-
33 Source: Iftikhar Haq, Rods, Birder Seller, Sahiwal City
:2.0 LOCAL (Sahiwal) I,:
:2.1 Octroi Tax /truck) H
:2.2 Labour (to unload:/ton):!
i
|
Table IV.5 CASH-FLOW THROUGH PURCHASES OF STEEL GIRDERS
girderl)
II.A: CASH - FLOW THROUGH MATERIALS' PURCHASES (Distribution of Receipts)
MATERIALS' MERCHANT ::PRICE
8/rft /truc
1/31.5kg /10to
d f gf
A RECEIPTS 8 19.50 55
1B EXPENDITURES 1! 18.85 53
:C INCOME 11 0.65 1
INPUTS !COSTS (Rs)
(Expenditures) 1:/unit /truc
/10to
!1.0 NON-LOCAL (Lahore) 18.82 53
11.1 Steel Merchant 18.50 52
:1.2 Truck to Sahiwal 11 0.28
1.3 Labour(load:Rs70/truck) 8 0.04
2.0 LOCAL (Sahiwal) 0.03
,2.1 Octroi Tax(/truck) 0.01
12.2 Labour (to unload:/ton)8 0.02
i ---------------- ------
:1: COEFFICIENTS of Distribution
'Spatially 8ncome Groups
k /slO!Ext. Dst. ',Within District IGyt.k /Rs100
1 1 IUrb. Rur. !Up.Y.Lo.Y.1ns
'b o13: p1 r s5, u
--------------
714 100.00
852 96.66
862 3.34 === 0.00 1.00!.o0 0.00 1.00 0.00 :.00
k /Rsl00 1
ns
757 96.49 :1.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00 0.00 :0.00
857 94.87 8
800 1.44 |
100 0.18 B
95 0.17 I
25 0.04 10.00 1.00 !0.66 0.33 10.66 0.33 11.00
A :0.00 1.00 !1.00 0.00 10.00 .00 10.00
IU V.A!
:2: DISTRIBUTION of Receipts
Spatially |By Income Groups
ExternalDistrict!Within District :Govt.
lUrbanRural Upper Lower 1.
y z ab at : ae af t ah
96.49 3.51 :3.50 0.01 3.37 0.14 10.04 1
96.49 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.14 :0.04:
:1=0 1 0.00 3.34 ;3.34 0.00 13.34 0.00 :0.00
96.49 0.00 |0.00 0.00 !0.00 0.00 0.008 8 8 8
0.00 0.17 :0.16 0.01 0.03 0.14 : 0.04
0.00 0.04 10.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 : 0.04
0.00 0.13 :0.13 0.0 0.00 0.0013 : 0.00
Source: Iftikhar Haq, Rods, Girder Seller, Sahiwal City
Ahead Iron Store, Pakpattan
%0
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i -- --- -- ------------------- - -----
APPENDIX B2.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS, APPLICATIONS, AND EFFECTS
We outlined in the last section the main parameters of
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and how they are used in our
general methodology. In this section we examine in more
detail -the concepts and application of CBA: how, in this
study, CBA is modified, how discount rates and shadow prices
are selected,. and what the effects of all these are on the
comparisons of the indigenous and import-
intensivetechnologies. Assumptions about what the
characteristics of an appropriate technology or project
should be given certain conditions such as income levels of
the area or users are implicit in the concepts underlying
CBAJ The way CBA is applied and the discount rates and
shadow prices that are selected can also heavily bias
results in favour of one or the other technology or project
choice. This section makes explicit the assumptions and
biases underlying CBA and our use of it (for a summary see
Table 3 and 5.
1. The terms technology and project, financial and market,
and economic and shadow are used interchangeably here as in
the rest of this thesis.
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1. Cost-Benefit Analysis
In its simplest form, CBA consists of measuring all costs
and benefits incurred in a project to obtain a net value,
the basic criterion of the project's performance.
For the construction technology assessments, least-cost
analysis is used. The least cost is a basic technology
choice criteriok Benefits are expressed as a physical
quantity: square feet of sheltered space achieved per unit
cost.
For the production technology assessments, benefits are the
receipts obtained from the sale of the product, costs are
the expenditures incurred in production, and the net value
of the project is the difference between the two or the
income or profit obtained by the project.2
We have not tried to quantify such benefits as the health
and productivity effects of better housing. The measurement
of such effects are of questionable accuracy and the results
are ambiguous (see for example, Burns, 1970).
The foregoing least cost and profit criteria measured at
market prices are major criteria for technology choice from
2. In addition to the above least-cost and profit criteria
for technology choice, there are other efficiency and equity
criteria such as productivity and income distribution
discussed here and elsewhere in the thesis.
299
the private individual's viewpoint. The performance of the
technologies against these criteria is obtained from the
first stage of the construction and production analyses.
Cost-benefit analysis takes three other considerations into
account: discount rates, shadow prices, and income
distribution effects.
2. Discount Rates
The discount rate is simply a number, usually the interest
rate, used to the discount the capital embodied in a project
over a time period. It serves two purposes. First, it
reflects the true value of the capital - costs and benefits
- embodied in the project. Second, it reduces the stream of
costs and benefits - their future value -incurred at
different times over the project's life to a single net
present value at the beginning of the project. Thus two
projects which differ in the timing of their costs and
benefits can be compared.
The true value of financial capital, money, is influenced by
such factors as the cost of borrowing it, the amount
available, the best alternative return the investment on the
project could have earned over the same period, and the time
period over which capital is spent or received. The actual
numerical value of the capital before discounting reflects
none of these factors.
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For example, if Rs £00 invested today can earn Ra 110 in Qnai\
year, the Rs £00 today is equal to the Rs 110 a year later,
In other words, Rs 110 of earnings a year from now has a
present value of Rs 100 and a discount rate of ten percent.
The higher the discount rate, the smaller will be the
present value of the figure discounted: the benefit or cost
incurred in the future. Similarly, the farther into the
future the figure - benefit or cost - occurs, the smaller
will be its present value.
Thus Rs 110 of costs incurred a year from now has a present
value of Rs 100 at a ten percent discount rate but a present
value of Rs 90 at a twenty percent discount rate. Similarly,
even at a ten percent discount, if the Rs 110 cost is
incurred two years from now, its present value is Rs 91.7.
2.1 How Discounting Affects our Comparisons (see Table 23)
This purely arithmetical characteristic of discounting
combined with the general assumption that capital scarcity
warrants higher discount rates relative to those of capital
abundance suggests the following.
Low-income communities are less willing to delay benefits
and more willing to delay expenditures than upper-income
communities. The higher implicit discount rate of those with
low-income as opposed to those with higher income reduces
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the present cost of their delayed expenditures but leaves
the present value of their immmediate benefits intact.
Projects with immediate benefits, though of a smaller
amount, but delay expenditures are more appropriate for such
communities. Alternatively, those projects demanding higher
start-up costs in return for greater benefits later are more
appropriate for and attractive to upper-income communities.
This conforms with the greater willingness of upper-income
persons who have larger amounts of both capital and benefits
to expend both at any point in time compared to lower-income
persons for whom both benefits and capital are in shorter
supply.
The implications of the above on the timing of costs and
benefits are different for construction projects compared to
other types. In most projects, costs occur early and
benefits, later. Consequently, the net present value
criterion favours projects with quick benefits, especially
if the conditions warrant applying high diScount rates. In
such cases, welfare projects like housing are at a
disadvantage relative to production projects. Benefits of
the former tend to materialise much later, besides being
more difficult to measure.
In construction projects, the distribution and timing of
costs can be of two types. Costs can either be incurred
largely in the initial construction stage with amaller
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amounts spread in maintenance thorougout the project's life
(as is the case when the more expensive but more durable
import-intensive technologies are used). Alternatively, they
can be incurred largely in maintenance spread out throughout
the project's life with only a small cost incurred in the
initial construction (as when the less expensive but less
durable indigenous technology is used). (Note that benefits
of the alternative technologies are not discounted because
they are expressed in physical space, square feet of shelter
- which in both cases is obtained within the first
undiscounted year.) The higher discount rate favours the
indigenous technology, since its later maintenance costs are
discounted thus reducing its present costs.
For reasons of affordability and employment and income
effects, the indigenous technology is also more welfare
serving than the import-intensive alternative. If the
construction project is financed under conditions of capital
scarcity, the high discount rate applied further reduces the
present costs of the indigenous technology. Thus in
construction projects there should be no conflict between
applying the appropriately high discount rate and selecting
the welfare serving technology. (For more on the effects of
discount rates on the selection of alternative projects, see
for example Mikesell, 1977.)
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But in practice there can be such a conflict. If the
evaluator-decision maker does not consider capital to be
scarce and therefore, either implicitly or explicitly,
applies a low or no discount rate to the flow of later
expenditures, the project's present costs may be higher than
that of its alternative whose expenditures are concentrated
in the beginning. For example, to the engineers of the
construction agencies who do not usually performd tCBA, the
cost of construction projects using indigenous, high
maintenance technologies appear ~much higher relative to
their low maintenance import-intensive counterparts. Such
circumstances and the problems these raise are discussed in
our case study. For now it is adequate to note how the
discount rate, distribution, and timing of costs and
benefits influence the performance rating of alternative
technologies.
In the production technology comparisons, the discounting of
later costs and benefits should also bias results in favour
of the indigenous alternative. The indigenous kiln's wall is
reconstructed annually. Its physical capital costs (and
benefits) are thus spread out over the kiln's life span and
are subject to discounting. The import-intensive kiln's
trench is dug in the first year; its capital costs are
concentrated in that year, which is not discounted. On the
other hand annual benefits, the entrepreneur's income, are
discounted in both kilns.
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To simplify the evaluation procedure, however, both costs
and benefits have been annualised for the two Rilns. By
spreading the import-intensive kiln's construction costs
over its life span, we discount them and thus understate the
present costs of this kiln. Because capital costs are small
for both kilns, the effect on present costs are small, but
this bias should nonetheless be noted.
2.2. Discount Rates Used
The choice of a discount rate is usually a debate between
selecting one that is the official government interest rate
or one that is the cost of borrowing from private
moneylenders. As suggested earlier, individual decision
makers may also implicitly apply discount rates that do not
reflect either figure. Given such uncertainty, we apply a
range of rates - zero percent, ten percent and twenty
percent - to see how the technologies compare from a variety
of viewpoints. Government interest rates in Pakistan range
from six percent on savings to fifteen percent on five-year
deposit accounts. Borrowers from private moneylenders in
Sahiwal quote rates of twenty-five to a hundred percent. The
higher rate (twenty percent) we use probably understates the
true value of capital, given capital scarcity in Pakistan,
our primary concern with the low-income communities, and the
high private rates of interest in Sahiwal.
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3. Shadow Prices
Shadow prices reflect the true cost to society of a
particular good, that is, the true cost of the resources -
capital, materials and labour - that go into producing that
good or into the project. The market price may not reflect
this true economic cost as we shall see below.
3.1 The Shadow Price of Materials (see Table 24 for prices
and derivations)
A material's shadow price depends on whether the material
used is replaced, how it is replaced, and the cost of its
replacement. If the material is not replaced, that is, its
use in the project results in a shortage, someone else or
society is deprived of its use. The shadow price then is
that individual's or society's willingness to pay for the
material, usually taken as the market price. If, as is usual
in nontradable or nontraded goods, 3 supply is increased
through domestic production, then the production cost plus
transport to the site of use is the shadow price. If, as in
tradeable or traded goods, supply is increased through
imports then the border price plus transport is the shadow
3. Goods not imported, exported or unlikely to be traded on
the international market.
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price.4  In the two latter cases, the effects of all
tariffs, taxes, and subsidies are removed from the market
price since these do not embody a use of resources.5
3.2 Shadow Prices Used
In this study, the market price is the shadow price for the
nontradables: earth, reed :mats and timber. Except for mats
whose supply can be quickly increased but whose production
costs are very close to the market price anyway, the use of
these materials decreases supply for others. For tradables:
cement, steel, coal and 'furnace oil, we use the border
4. If the border price used is the import price, local
transport costs to thesite is added to give the shadow
price. If the border price used is the export price, this
price is taken as the shadow price since transport from
production area to the border is already included in this
price. The latter case assumes transport costs to the border
are equal to the same costs to the project site. These
guidelines and much of the CBA adopted here follow the UNIDO
method (UNIDO, 1978:24).
5. Obtaining precise shadow prices by removing all the
effects of quotas, tariffs, taxes and subsidies is a
complex, if not impossible, task. Similarly, windfall
profits that cannot be considered payment for the use of
entrepreneurial resources or return on investment of
financial resources should strictly be removed from the
market price. In practiceit may not be possible to measure
such profits. The World BanR prefaces its shadow prices for
Pakistan with the following caveat from a study on shadow
prices undertaken by the Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics: "It is practically impossible to tell whether
petroleum products are taxed or subsidised by merely looking
at their official price structures - there are so many
stages at which (taxes) subsidies can creep in (Pakistan
Development Review, 1982:231)." Fortunately, for our
purposes, as often in practice, the border prices or an
equivalent approximation is acceptable. The border price is
also considered an acceptable representation of efficient
production costs reflected on the international market.
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price. For diesel oil and unskilled labour, World Bank
estimates are used (World Bank, 1981).
The border prices of cement and steel approximate their
domestic production costs (the production cost is obtained
by removing taxes, tariffs, and transport costs from the
market price). This correspondence in costs suggests the
domestic production of cement and steel is quite
efficient.6 Cement, steel. oil, and diesel are taxed.
Their economic costs are therefore lower than their market
prices. Coal is subsidised and its economic cost is higher
than its market price.7
3.3 How Shadow Prices Affect Our Comparisons (Table 23)
The difference between the market and shadow prices and
thus between the financial and economic costs of import-
intensive technologies is likely to be greater than that of
6. Since this study the State-owned Pakistan Steel Mill has
started operating. The Mill is not expected to achieve
efficiency levels required to produce steel at
internationally competitive prices for several years. Its
heavily subsidised products, however, are expected to
replace the increasingly taxed products of the private
rerolling mills, which have supplied most of the
construction steel to date. This change will increase the
economic cost of technologies using steel.
7. The main interview sources for information on
construction materials at the national level were interviews
with the Chief Economist, National Engineering Services of
Pakistan (NESPAK) and with Assistant Director, Economic
Research Unit, Karachi University. The NESPAK publishes a
biannual price analysis of construction materials and
labour.
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indigenous ones. This is because the import-intensive
technologies tend to use more inputs whose prices may be
distorted by trade or domestic ~taxes and subsidies. Whether
economic costs will be greater than financial costs depends
on whether the net effect of the distortion is to raise or
lower prices. Because cement and steel in Pakistan are
taxed, their economic costs are lower than their financial
costs. The true, economic cost of import-intensive
construction technologies becomes lower and closer to that
of the indigenous technologies. On the other hand, because
coal used in trench kilns is subsidised, the economic cost
of coal fired bricks is higher than their financial cost.
The economic cost differential between the coal fired bricks
and the cheaper agri-waste fired ones is therefore wider
than market prices indicate.
4. Foreign Exchange
Border prices expressed in dollars have to be converted to
Pakistani rupees at a conversion rate that reflects the true
value of the dollar. This rate is the shadow price of
foreign exchange.
Until 1982, the official conversion -rate reflected a rupee
that was overvalued relative to the dollar. (This rate was
set partly to make imports cheaper, another policy in facour
of import-intensive technologies.) Foreign exchange
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restrictions. and import-export quotas also distorted the
demand and supply for foreign exchange and therefore the
rupees to the dollar exchange rate. Under such conditions
the unofficial, black market exchange rate is a rough
approximation of the shadow price of foreign exchange.
When the rupee was floated against the dollar in 1982, the
exchange rate for the dollar increased; the official and
unofficial rates converged. The official exchange rate is
therefore adopted here.
However, the floating rate measure does not remove the
effect of the quotas and the exchange restrictions to
suppress the demand for foreign exchange. The official rate
therefore still somewhat overvalues the rupee against the
dollar. Consequently, the correct shadow prices of cement,
steel, coal, and furnace oil are slightly higher than those
recorded in our study; the economic costs of the
import-intensive technologies that use these inputs are
higher than we have shown. By not calculating the exact
shadow price of foreign exchange, we have introduced a
slight bias against the indigenous technologies in our
results.
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5. Labour
In principle, the economic cost of labour, its shadow price,
is the subsistence wage required for labour to reproduce
itself. In practice, the shadow price is the wage the worker
would earn without the project - his alternative earning
opportunity. This shadow wage could range from zero in
areas of very high unemployment to the market rate in areas
of high employment.
Sahiwal is a highly productive agricultural area; it has a
tight labour market during the peak production periods but
has some unemployment at other times. Skilled labour is
seldom unemployed especially with the shortages caused by
labour migration to the Middle East (Chaudry, 1981:24). The
shadow wage for skilled labour is taken as equal to the
market wage. The World Bank estimates of the shadow wage
adjustment factors for rural unskilled labour in Pakistan
range from 0.65 to 0.90 (World Bank, 1981). A factor of 0.8
is applied here because much of the construction occurs
during the slack periods of the agricultural production
cycles. The effective subsistence rates paid to brick
moulders in the trench Rilns (discussed elsewhere) also
indicates that the shadow wage of labour is lower than its
market wage.
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Assigning a low shadow wage to labour, especially unskilled
labour, reduces the economic costs of labour-intensive
activities. Consequently, in our study, this favours the
indigenous technologies over the import-intensive ones.
When tax distortions in cement prices are removed, shadow to
market costs of the import-intensive construction
technologies decrease by an amount roughly equal to the:
decrease in shadow to market costs of indigenous
construction technologies that result when the lower shadow
to market wage of unskilled labour is applied. In our case
therefore the net effect of the economic analysis does not
alter the relative costs of the alternative technologies.
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8. Income Distribution
Economic or project-caused income distribution effects occur
when income is gained or lost by some group because the
project does not pay the shadow value of the good or of the
labour involved. For example, if the project purchases coal
at ten percent less than its true economic cost (because of
government subsidies), income has been distributed from the
government to the project. Conversely, if the project pays
a worker twenty percent more than he would have worked for
in the absence of the project, the project has distributed
income to the worker. Thus the magnitude of income
distribution from a project is related to the difference
between the market and shadow values of the inputs into that
project. This definition of income distribution has two
implications.
First, estimates of the income distributed are highly
sensitive to the shadow values established, which, as we
have discussed, are usually approximations.
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Second, import-intensive technologies (or projects using
more imported goods) will show more total income distributed
than the indigenous technologies. The reason is more inputs
of the former are subject to taxes, subsidies, institutional
wage adjustments, etc., so their market and shadow values
are at variance. We are faced with the apparent paradox of
having a larger percentage of total expenditures on
indigenous technologies are distributed to the low-income as
estimated by cash flow analysis but more income distribution
results from investments in import-intensive technologies as
estimated by cost-benefit analysis. The paradox is resolved
once we note that in the latter case income distributed or
flowing to the low-income groups is only a. small proportion
of the total income distribution taking place. That is, it
is only a paradox if one understands by the term income
distribution, a redistribution to the POO Income
distribution in CBA measures income flows among everyone
involved in the project.
7. Conclusions
A simplified version of CBA is applied here: least-cost
analysis for the construction technologies and a
cost-benefit comparison for the production technologies; the
costs are the expenditures and the benefits, the income
received by the project. The main simplification lies in not
quantifying such benefits as health and productivity effects
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of housing, a task of questionable accuracy and ambiguous in
its results. Otherwise, the CBA applied here follows all the
procedural steps common to it - discounting, shadow pricing,
and income distribution.
The reduced present costs of delayed expenditures
characteristic of discounting along with the assumption that
capital scarcity warrants such high rates are consistent
with the empirical evidence on the type of technologies
low-income people choose: technologies whose costs are
spread out as maintenance over the project's life.
Thus discounting, especially at high rates, presents the
cost advantages of the indigenous, low-income technology in
a more favourable light when compared to import-intensive
technologies. On the other hand, the other procedures of CBA
can favour or disfavour the indigenous technology depending
on the specific circumstances such as the proportion of
taxed and subsidised inputs.
Finally, because marginal income distribution effects in CBA
are measured as the difference between- market and shadow
prices, import-intensive technologies, being more prone to
price distortions, will tend to show greater distribution
effects. This distribution represents income flows to all
involved in the project, not income distribution to the
lower-income groups alone. For a measure of the latter in
CBA, we have to examine the shares of distribution among the
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groups involved - the project, consumer, worker, and
business groups - and the income levels they represent. (The
CFA measures more directly the share of the construction
expenditures distributed to the lower-income groups.)
The above and related factors are further discussed in the
chapter 4 which compares the indigenous and import-intensive
technologies (see Table 5 for a summary of CBA's
characteristics and their effects on evaluating alternative
technologies.)
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TABLE 24 SHADOW PRICING CONSTRUCTION INPUTS
: ----------- ;:-------------------------------------------------------------------------I
CONSTRUCTION INPUTI:Unit Border
Price.
d e f
b/
Cement ::50kgbag: 41.65
d/
Steel Bars ::lkg 3.50
e/
Coal ::M.Ton :292.00
: f/
Fuel (furnace) Oil: kg : 1.05
Diesel: high speed litre
Labour ::manday
(Rural, unskilled)::
:Production !import Federal Sub- Trans- Profit.a/ :Market Shadow :Adjustment:
:Cost :Duties. Tax sidies port a/ Lahore Sahiwal:Price.a/ Price :Factor
g h i j k I a n 0 | 0
1- -- I --- --- 
--- -- I --- ------
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- -------
c/
30 25.00 15.00 2.50 | 72.50 47.5 -0.34
c/
3.2 40% 0.10 0.80 0.38: 4.50 3.50 -0.22
t 276.00 292.00 0.06
2.50 1.05 -0.05
h/ h/
: 1.00 0.88 -0.12
h/ h/
1.00 0.80: -0.20
NOTE:
Production Cost = Market Price - (Tax + Transport + Profit)
Shadow Price = Production Cost + Transport (for goods produced domestically)
a/ Interviews and case-studies. For latter see relevant cash-flow analysis
b/ Export Price, U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics, 1982:47
c/ National Housing Policy, (1982) Draft. Housing Finance section p.9
d/ Export price to Sri Lanka, Pakistan Foriegn Trade Statistics, 1982-83.
e/ After adjusting international price downwards to take account of difference between international and local coal
quality in Btu. Quetta & Hyderabad (large lignite content) coal = to .7 & .3 t international coal quality
respectively. (U.N. Year Book of World Energy Statistics, p:xxiii) Ratio of use in brick kilns;
Quetta:Hyderabad = 1:7. Import price Rs.833. (U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics, 1982:34)
f/ Import Price, U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics. (1982:34) Ex.Refinery price = Rs.1.1/kg. (Pakistan Economic Survey
1982-83: ) Percentage difference between import and refinery price reflects difference between economic and
financial, (market) prices. Adjustment factor taken from this percentage difference.
q/ Rs434/50gall.=Rs2.3/litre. (I litre=.91kg,UN Yearbook of World Energy Statistics.1980.xxviii)=Rs2.5/kg
h/ World Bank, (June 1981:5,26) Shadow Pricing for Project Appraisal, Pakistan. 1. Tsakok. Premiums quoted,
accepted here and directly transalated into adjustment factors.
TABLE 23 EFFECT OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON EVALUATING
INDIGENOUS AND IMPORT-INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES
PROCEDURE II: DISCOUNTING 12: SHADOW PRICINB :3: INCOME DISTRIBUTION
> !!Ibelow increases :2.1: Materials 12.2: Exchange Rate 12.3:Labour
!:with increase in I 1Distribution effect
ildiscount rate) 1 1 !increases with
-------------- - 11 ------ ----------- 
-
----------- differential
EFFECT ON COSTS: 11 1 (between shadow and
Economic (shadow) !:Reduced if costs (Reduced if taxed !Increased if Rupee !Reduced if aarket !market rates of
relative to Financial!are delayed. linputs more than (overvalued relative (wages higher than linputs.
(market) costs: ===) 1 |subsidised inputs. !to the Dollar. |shadow wage.
TECHNOLOGY TYPE (!Whether CBA Favours or Disfavours Technology relative to its Substitute
-- - - - - - - - - - - ---- 
-------- I -------------
A:INDIGENOUS Technology!!Costs delayed:
(IFavours
!Inputs unregulated:llnputs non-tradeable:(Unskilled shadow (Only labour differential.
!Neutral. !Neutral. (wage higher:Favours!Distribution small.
B:IMPORTED Technology !Costs Up-front:
!!Disfavours.
lInputs taxed:
(Favours.
(Inputs tradable.
!Rupees overvalued.
(Disfavours.
||
!Unskilled workers !Labour & materials
fewer: Disfavours. Idifferential:
(Distribution large.
I I
APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AND MATERIALS INDUSTRIES IN THE
PUNJAB PROVINCE
i. Construction Technologies
This section examines the building construction technologies
prevalent in Sahiwal district. Only the technologies for
walls and roof are considered because they make up the major
components and expenditures (seventy-five percent of the
total) in the basic shelter. A description of each
technology is provided including its frequency of use,
spatial distribution, income group of users, implementation,
and typical repair and maintenance patterns.
Nine technologies are prevalent in the district ranging from
the tents and wattle and daub structures of nomadic groups
to the large steel truss wide-span roofs used in factories
and grain silos. These may be grouped into three basic types
as known in the local language: kutcha, uRka-Rutcha,
and pukka. These types correspond to progressive
increases in building standards and cost and may be
considered as indigenous, intermediate, and import-intensive
relative to the sources of their inputs.
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i.1 Kutcha Technology (Indigenous)
Three types of construction technologies come under this
heading. The first are the most rudimentary tents and houses
with cane walls and thatch roofs used by migrant workers or
by a few settled clans as temporary shelters near their
place of work (e.g., the reed mat making clans). The second
type is most common among the poorest groups in the
villages. The walls are of rough earth blocks and roofs of
roughly hewn timber topped with grass and mud. The third
type consists of thirteen- to eighteen-inch walls of
sun-baked bricks and roofs of sawn timber (usually
Accacia) beams and battens with reed mats overlaid with
a four-inch layer of mud and straw. The mud straw overlay
insulates and waterproofs the roof. Floors and finishes are
of mud straw plaster with a thin cow dung finish.
We focus on the third type. The first two types are too
rudimentary for housing and commmunity buildings and have
little impact on the building industry since the users
forage for all the materials and do all the building tasks
themselves.
According to the 1980 Housing, Economic and Demographic
Survey, slightly over half of the total housing units in the
Punjab are of kutcha technology. It is most common in
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settlements of less than 5,000 population where sixty-five
percent of the structures are Rutcha. In settlements of
10,000 to 25,000 population, they constitute thirty-two
percent (GOP-Population and Census Organisation, 1982d).
The Rutcha houses, especially the sun-baked brick, timber
and reed mat variety, are the traditional houses of the area
and are used by most of the rural poor. Some middle-income
groups who have not as yet upgraded their homes to use the
other technologies introduced relatively recently in the
area also have Rutcha homes. Community building projects or
in public sector construction seldom use this technology.
The poorest families or the low-income owner-builder would
produce or collect all the materials and do all of the
construction work themselves, but often the houseowner would
purchase the materials and hire a mason and unskilled
workers to construct the house.
Construction work involves the following: digging the
foundation; laying the brick walls; placing the timber beams
and battens; laying the reed mats over the beams and
battens, and spreading a layer of mud straw mix over the
mats.
The likely repair and maintenance required for buildings of
this type are as follows: annual mud plastering of exterior
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walls and roof; every three years, mud plastering of
interior walls and floor; every ten to fifteen years,
rebuilding half a wall, parapets and one roof bay - one
beam, thirteen battens, four reed mats and mud topping;
every twenty-five years, replacing the whole roof and
rebuilding half a wall.
i.,2 Pukka-Kutcha Technology (Intermediate)
Two types fall within this group: (i) walls of fired brick
facing with sun-baked brick backing laid in mud mortar
(known as Ghilafi type in the local language) and roofs
of timber beams and battens on which clay tiles are laid;
(2) walls of fired brick in mud mortar and steel girder and
T-iron beams and battens with clay tiles. The roofs of both
types are topped with a four-inch mud straw and cow dung
plaster. Occasionally, the exterior wall may be cement
plastered. The roofing appears to be an indigenous solution
unique to parts of Pakistan and possibly India.
A third of the houses in Punjab are built in this
technology. All the materials except steel are produced in
the district, but these are expensive relative to those of
Rutcha technology. In settlements of less than 5,000
population, pukka-Rutcha technlogy is used in only 26
percent of the houses. This technology is most common in the
larger settlements of 10,000 population and over where it
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makes up slightly over half of all units (GOP-Population
Census Organisation, 1982d).
The middle-income groups (small landowners, shopkeepers,
service and craft workers, and lower ranking government
employees) are the most common users of__Pukka-Rutcha
technology. The majority of community-initiated building
projects (e.g., mosques, schools) are also built in this
technology.
The tasks involved and the skills required in construction
are similar to those in Rutcha technology; only the
materials differ. There are more chances for errors,
however, in laying fired bricks in mud mortar (as opposed to
laying sun-baked bricks). A skilled mason and more careful
construction are required.
The likely repair and maintenance required are as follows:
annual mud plastering of the roof; every three years, mud
plastering of the interior walls and roof; every ten to
fifteen years, partially rebuilding the base of wall and
parapets, and every twenty-five years, rebuilding one roof
bay, including replacing fifty clay tiles.
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1.3 PuRka Technology (Import-intensive)
Four types come under this group and are differentiated
primarily by the roof construction: (i) steel girder beams
and T-iron battens with fired clay tiles; (2) reinforced
brick concrete roof slab (RBC); (3) reinforced cement
concrete roof slab (RCC); (4) pre-cast cement concrete (PCC)
beams and battens and tiles. All four have a polythene
waterproofing membrane and a mud topping. Walls are of fired
brick in cement mortar; floors and finishes, of cement
concrete and cement plaster.
Our concern is with the RBC and RCC types since these are
the most common types of pukka construction.
Eleven percent of the housing units in Punjab are of pukka
construction. The cost of construction and the complexity of
the roofing technology puts pukka construction beyond the
reach of the majority in the rural areas. Only five percent
of houses in settlements of less than 5,000 population are
of this type. In settlements of 10,000-25,000 population,
pukka housing units accounted for fifteen percent (GOP-
Population Census Organisation, 1982d).
Nonetheless, pukka technology is the preferred choice of all
those who can afford it. All public buildings, rural
community facilities included, use this technology (usually
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the RCC type) as do most housing and commercial buildings of
upper-income groups in the larger urban settlements.
A contractor is usually hired to do the construction. More
skilled workers are needed relative to pukka-kutcha
technology because most of the roofing tasks demand
specific skills.
Pukka technology differs from the pukka-Rutcha type in the
roof construction. In RBC and RCC, a concrete slab roof has
to be laid, but in RBC bricks are encased in the slab as
fillers. This reduces the amount of steel and concrete
required and, hence, the cost. Otherwise the procedure is
the same in both pukka types.
First, the timber formwork, a supporting base upon which
steel is placed and the wet concrete formed, is
installed by a carpenter. Steel reinforcing rods, cut
and bent to the required length and shape at the
construction site, are then placed at specified
frequencies on the formwork and are tied together to
form a mesh. In RBC, bricks are placed in the spaces
between each rod. Concrete is then poured over to form a
six-inch slab. The concrete must cure - dry with regular
watering - over seven to fourteen days before reaching
its full strength. The timber formwork can then be
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removed. A minimum finish is a four-inch insulating
layer of mud straw over the roof slab. A polythene sheet
topped with mud is more commonly used.
2. Building Materials Industries
This section examines the building materials industries
associated with the construction technologies used in
Sahiwal district. A total of eight industries are
examined ranging from the very small, informal sector
types such as sun-baked brick and reed mat making to the
formal sector, government regulated cement and steel
industries. For each industry, the following information
is provided: spatial distribution, ownership, sources
and types of production inputs (materials, labour,
equipment), production process, production levels
(capacity, output), prices, markets and distribution.
Where relevant, government investment in the industry is
also discussed.
2. I Sun-baked Brick Production
Sun-baked brick making is not included in industrial
surveys, even in that of the Punjab Small Industries
Corporation. The number of these industries in Sahiwal is
not known, but almost every village has sun-baked brick
makers, called Thapairs. Located in the villages they
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serve rather than along main roads, sun-baked brick
industries are less evident than other such rural industries
as brick Rilns and cane mat making. At times, what seems a
sun-baked brick industry may actually be part of a kiln and
vice-versa.
The Thapairs produce bricks either as a primary occupation
or on demand during the slack agriculture season. A local
low-income clan called Muslim Sheik dominates the industry.
Production is organised at the scale of one to six related
households depending on the size of the settlement.
Ownership is collective; profits are shared equitably over
and above any regular wage received.
A single household runs this industry in smaller villages
(500-1,000 population). At this scale, the bricks are
produced on contract for an agreed price per thousand
bricks, for a particular building under construction. The
material inputs are provided by the buyer. Clay is usually
obtained from the building owner's land.
In larger settlements (10,000-25,000 population), two to six
households (six to eighteen workers) may be involved. Clay
is obtained from land leased on the periphery of the
settlement. Bricks are produced and sold at the site on a
regular basis. Our concern is only with the latter since it
closely approximates an industry.
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The raw material inputs - clay, straw and water - are all
indigenous and widely available. The lease on the land
permits digging until clay up to one metre depth is
exhausted (usually within on to three years), after which
the land is returned to the owner for cultivation.
Landowners are paid upon the sale of the bricks. Straw is
either obtained free by gathering it from local fields or
purchased in bales.
The equipment used and the production process are both
simple. Clay is dug using shovels and picks and then mixed
with water and straw. The mud mix is transported to the
moulders. Using hand-held moulds, workers mould the mix into
bricks which are then left in the sun to harden.
Production is limited to ten months in a year when there are
no rains. The bricks are sold mostly to prospective house
owners who have neither the time nor the manpower to make
the bricks themselves. To a lesser extent, bricks are also
sold to kiln owners for baking.
2.2 Fired brick Production
Two methods of brick production are practised: (i) the
trench kiln fired by oil and coal, and (2) the wall kiln
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fired by agricultural wastes - rice husk and cotton waste
(from hereon referred to as agri-waste).
2.1 Trench kilns
Trench kilns are located around their main markets - the
large towns (Sahiwal with 152,000 population, PaRpattan
70,000 population and Ariffwala 44,000 population) and along
the major roads.
The owners are usually upper-income individuals who usually
are either: (i) urban (large town) entrepreneurs who own one
or more kilns, or (2) rural (small towns and village)
residents, medium and large landowners or Pathans, a
northern ethnic group. The latter initially settled in the
district as wood sellers, but some are now entering the kiln
business. The kilns are either owner-operated or run by a
hired manager (munshie).
Bricks are sold at the production site. The kiln and
surrounding buildings are located on agricultural land
leased for five to ten years. A nearby area for making
bricks is leased for one to three years. Buildings are one-
or two-room offices and temporary structures - tents, mud
and thatch hovels - or mud and brick rooms used for the
workers' living quarters.
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The production inputs used are the same as those for sun-
baked brick production except for the fuels used to fire
the kiln: coal, furnace oil, and wood. The fuels are the
major production cost items. Oil and coal are transported
by truck or rail from Hyderabad, Quetta or Karachi; wood is
obtained from local sawmills.
Pakistan has large coalt reserves though of low quality.
Since the oil crisis of 1973, coal prices have been steadily
increasing. Coal production in 1982 was about 1.7 million
tons per year. Brick kilns are the largest users accounting
for ninety-six percent of indigenous coal consumption. Coal
consumption is projected to grow at an annual rate of almost
nine percent over the Sixth Plan period 1983-88 as coal will
be increasingly used when the price increases in natural gas
are implemented (GOP-Planning Commission, 1983:225). The
government is also promoting the use of coal in place of oil
in the processing industry and the substitution of gas by
coal to produce electricity.
Oil is also available in the country but the oil fields are
old and depleting. Ninety percent of the total oil
consumption is imported. The rate of growth in oil energy
consumption for the country as a whole has been thirty-five
to forty percent above real output growth (GOP-Planning
Commission, 1983: 218-219).
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The production process consists of making the sun-baked
bricks as described previously and then firing them in a
trench kiln. The kiln is an oval mound with a moatlike
periphery trench where the bricks are stacked for firing. At
the centre are one or two chimneys connected to the
periphery by underground flues. The bricks are baked in
batches around the trench such that in different segments of
the trench, at any one time, one batch is being unloaded and
another batch is being stacked ready for baking. One cycle
of firing is approximately thirty days.
Nearby, brick moulders make the bricks to feed the kiln.
Thus, fired brick production can be a continuous process.
The kilns' production capacity ranges from 200 to 700
thousand bricks a year. Labour is differentiated into five
to seven groups by task and clan. The largest group are the
brick moulders made up of five to fifteen households or
twenty to sixty persons from the Thapairs and Muslim Sheik
clans. The rest are the following: four to eight workers who
stack and remove the bricks (Bharaiewalas, Nekasewalas and
Rhumaar clans); two to four loaders and unloaders of
brick, coal pourers (Kwelaywala); one to four who fire
thebricks (Jalaywala), and one to two accountants or
managers.
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The labour force can therefore be sizeable ranging from
nineteen to eighty workers, but altogether payments to
labour amount to less than twenty percent of annual
receipts. Labour costs are kept low by the bonded labour
type of arrangements for brick moulders, who are the largest
group. These workers (or their parents) have at some point
incurred a large debt which the kiln owners agree to repay
provided that they work for the owner and make repayments by
accepting a cut in the rates they are paid per 1,000 bricks.
The resulting monthly wage rate is below subsistence
(approximately Rs 200 per month); the workers continue to
borrow, remain bonded to the owner, and make bricks at below
even the lowest market rate.
Many owners provide "free" on-site lodgings, further tying
the workers to the kiln physically and psychologically. The
free lodgings reinforce the owners' image as the benefactor.
The workers move with the kiln site or else are attached to
a new kiln owner who pays the outstanding debt and takes the
workers on under the same conditions thus ensuring the
perpetuity of the workers' bondage.
The market for fired bricks includes *towns, upper- and
middle- income groups, and the government. Fired brick
prices are fixed by the government. Some kilns also sell
sun-baked bricks, brick ballasts, and roof tiles.
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2.2 Wall Kilns
These Kilns were introduced in the district some five to ten
years ago by kiln workers travelling to and from the Sind
province.
Wall kilns are located along main roads, often near small
towns (less than 25,000 population) and along the major
roads. The kilns are owned by a cooperative of four to six
usually former trench kiln workers but are not brick
moulders. The owners themselves work in the kilns.
The production process is like that in the trench kiln but,
instead of the oval trench, two sun-baked brick walls
constructed in a V-shape spreading forward enclose the
stacked bricks. Unlike the trench kiln where bricks have to
be filled in at a constant rate to keep up the firing cycle,
the kiln's wall can be narrowed or widened to increase or
decrease the number of bricks being fired without
interrupting the firing. Rice husk and cotton wast'e are used
to fire the kilns instead of furnace oil, coal, or wood used
in the trench kilns. The agricultural waste, the major
production cost items, are brought by truck from the local
grain silos and cotton ginning factories.
The brick moulders (two to six households) are paid on a
contract basis per thousand bricks. The rest of the
work is done by the kiln owners.
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Production capacity ranges from 50 to 400 thousand per year.
The bricks, which cost less than the trench kiln ones, are
sold largely to the lower-income groups in the surrounding
villages and small towns. The government does not purchase
these bricks as it considers them sub-standard. Upper-income
residents also tend to consider them inferior although
builders feel this view is based more on attitude than on
actual strength of the brick.
3. Timber
Timber, thatch, and reed roofing is extensively used in
informal sector rural construction but hardly at all in the
formal sector because only low quality timber (and thatch
and reed) is widely available and inexpensive. The cutting
of trees is difficult to regulate and, without significant
reforestation programs, the prices of both low and high
quality construction timber are rapidly rising.
Consumption of timber (for all categories of end use
including fuelwood) in 1981-82 was estimated at 2 million
cubic metres. Approximately fifty-six percent of this demand
was met by imports (GOP-Planning Commission, 1983). The
consumption figures are most likely underestimated because
consumption of wood from private farmlands, which supply a
considerable proportion, are unrecorded. Moreover,
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substantial but unrecorded quantities of wood are used
directly for house building and rural activities.
A Forestry Sector Survey done by the World Bank in 1978
found that the consumption levels for industrial forest
products (all forest products excluding fuel wood and non-
wood tree crops) were as much as seventy-five percent below
what might be expected. Inspite of the high level of imorts
(about thirty-five percent of total consumption), the supply
of industrial forest products is considerably less than the
demand. Sharply increasing prices, and substitution in a
variety of end-uses such as concrete railway sleepers, steel
transmission poles, etc., manifest this shortfall (Draper,
et. al., 1978).
The best construction timber in Pakistan comes from the
mountain forests in the northern region, particularly Azad
Kashmir province. These are coniferous woods such as pine
and deodar.
The major forests in the Punjab are the irrigated
plantations, the country's second most important forests
after the mountain forests. These are in the central area
near Chichawatni, Changa Manga, Pirkot and Shorkot.
The main species planted are Dalbergia sissoo (shisam, a
prized furniture timber) and Norus alba (mulberry, used
in the sportsgoods industry. Poplar plantations have been
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introduced recently. Studies done by the Pakistan Forest
Institute indicate exceptionally low productivity for
irrigated forest plantations largely because of pooor
stocking, unduly heavy thinning and the emphasis on shisham
which is relatively slow in volume increment (Draper et.
al., 1978).
The other forest areas of significance in the Punjab include
riverain forests along the banks of the Indus river and
linear planting along roads, canals, and railways. The
riverain forests are largely unproductive because the areas
are subject to seasonal flooding, erosion, and deposition.
Linear planting are convenient local sources of timber.
Because of severe local shortages some of these avenues have
been severely hacked for firewood.
The above forest areas are under the jurisdiction of the
Forestry Department that manages the planting, logging,
sawing, and distribution operations from the major forests.
Within Sahiwal, no construction timber industry as such
exists. For the majority of house builders, the timber
sources are village plantations along water courses or
bordering fields and cooperatively owned village wood lots
(shamlats). The commonly used trees are Acacia
arabica (Reekar) and Dalbergia sissoo (shishum). The
timber "industry" at this level revolves around the local
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sawmill where the timber is cut and shaped into beams and
battens for use in construction.
most settlements above a certain minimum size (above 2000
population) have sawmills (for example, 20/SP population
2,000 had one mill, Qabula population 6,000 had three and
Malka Hans population 15,000 had six).
These enterprises are owned and operated by individuals from
the middle-income groups of the rural economy who can afford
the capital investment of a sawing machine and rent land for
the mill site. Rent can be sizeable depending on the size of
the settlement where the mill is located.
The smallest and most common of these enterprises is a two-
person affair (usually the owner/operator and his son), the
minimum required to run a sawing machine - one pushing and
the other pulling the wood through (as in the mills in 20/SP
and Qabula). Timber sawing services are also provided. The
saws are driven by diesel or electric motors purchased from
cities outside the district (e.g., Lahore).
In larger settlements, the motor is often belted to run a
rice or flour mill as well. Some mills have hired carpenters
to produce doors, windows, and animal food troughs. Formwork
- poles, planks.scaffolding - for reinforced concrete
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construction are also rented in some sawmills. In most
cases, firewood is generally cut and sold at the mill.
Trees become construction timber as follows. A landowner
offers a portion of the trees on his land to the local
sawmill owner. The latter inspects and selects the trees,
agrees with the landowner on a price, and purchases them.
The sawmill owner then contracts' some workers to cut and
deliver the trees to the mill. The workers are paid per
weight of wood delivered.
In the millyard, the timber is sorted into construction
timber (Reekar), firewood (Bairee, neem) and carpentry wood,
i. e., doors, windows and furniture (Shisham). The wood is
then cut in sizes, sections, and shapes appropriate to their
final use. Construction timber are cut into rectangular ten
by twelve feet long beams and six foot battens for roofs.
Two types of labour are involved in the industry: the
contractual tree cutters and transporters who are usually
members of one of the low-income clans, and the regular wage
workers to run the mill. The latter range from two to eight
persons, the owner-operator included.
4. Reed Hat Making
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Reed mats are laid between timber beams and the mud layer of
roofs. This roofing is probably the most common in the
district.
Producers of reed mats in the district are of three types.
The biggest producers are a migrant clan who work in -the
district for only a few months in the year. Land along the
rivers where the reeds grow are leased by the clan who live
and make the mats at the site. The finished products are
sold to building materials supplies shops in the towns.
The second type includes household production units (usually
single households) along the main roads where the mat making
family lives and works. Finished products are sold to either
the direct users or to shopowners for resale in the
large villages and towns.
The third type are small workshops on rented space in the
commercial areas of larger villages and towns. Hats are
produced and sold to directly to users.
To make the mats, the wild growing reed is cut from along
the canal banks. The owner of the adjoining land is paid for
the right to harvest the reed. The payment is either on the
basis of a fixed duration or per amount harvested. The
harvested reed are transported, either manually or by donkey
carts, to the roadside production units and workshops in
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town where these are stripped, woven and bound into mats.
Mats come in sizes of approximately six by ten feet.
Tools and equipment used are minimal: hand tools, simple
manual cutting instruments and string to tie the reeds.
5. Sand and Aggregate
Sand is used in cement mortar; aggregate, in the base for
floor slabs. Both materials are used in reinforced concrete
slabs for floor and roofs. Like cement and steel with which
they are combined, these materials are utilised largely in
public buildings and private buildings for wealthier
clients. Unlike cement and steel, they are locally produced
and can be considered a local industry.
Only low-grade, ordinary building sand or pit sand, is
available within the district from along most of the length
of river banks. Hard drift sand for high quality
construction is available from outside the district on order
through material shop owners who act as agents. Large orders
are delivered by truck directly to the construction site.
Smaller quantities are available by the bag from shops in
the large towns.
Similarly, only low grade aggregate is available locally.
High grade aggregate is brought by truck from outside the
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district directly to the construction site. Stone quarries
are located in Chiniot, Sikhanwali, Kinjana Orders are
placed through the materials shops.
The production and supply of both materials are broadly
similar. Local entrepreneurs lease from the district
government a stretch of river or canal bank where sand and
aggregate may be of building quality and plentiful. Sand and
aggregate are dug using manual labour. For aggregate, the
entrepreneur employs a crushing machine and labour to
process the river stones into aggregate of various
dimensions suitable for construction use. Digging, loading,
and unloading are all very labour-intensive activities.
The materials are sold (by the truckload) directly to
building contractors, houseowners and material shops in
the towns, or to truckers who, in turn, resell these in
the towns.
6. Lime Industry
There is no lime industry in the district nor is it known if
there are local deposits which would make it a potential
industry. There are extensive limestone deposits in several
parts of Punjab - the Salt Range, Potwar Plateau, Margalla
Hills, and Zinda Pir. Big quarries arelocated in the trans-
Indus Salt Range at Daudkhel and in the lower Indus Plain
near Hyderabad (Kureshy, 1978:55).
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7. Cement Industry
Ten cement plants supply the country's needs. Six of these
are located in the Punjab but outside Sahiwal district.
Production is entirely for domestic consumption.
Periodically, cement is imported from Japan, but imported
cement is of lower quality than local cement thus requiring
more careful supervision during construction to ensure
adequate structural strength.
Cement production is a government monopoly. The plants are
under a holding company, a public corporation established in
specialised manufacturing sectors (e. g., cement,
fertiliser), and each enterprise has a Board of Directors.
The major raw materials of cement production - gypsum and
lime - are indigenous and available in large quantities.
Gypsum deposits are mainly in the country's western
mountains. Limestone is widespread but more concentrated
deposits are in several areas in Punjab: Salt Range, Potwar
Plateau, Margalla Hills, and Zinda Pir (Kureshy,1978).
Hachinery is, however, largely imported.
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Natural gas provides cheap fuel for the cement plants..
Pakistan is well endowed with recoverable reserves estimated
at 15.852 trillion cubic feet in 1982, but shortages have
occured since the end of 1980 due to lack of effective
forward planning. The very low producer gas prices (gas
prices were the lowest compared to any other fuel) set by
the government in the past discouraged needed investment to
increase production while demand rapidly increased (World
Bank, 1982).
In 1982, cement production made up almost nine percent of
total demand for natural gas. Because of the increasing
supply constraints, cement factories are being converted to
use furnace oils as fuel during the peak months (November
through March) when heating raises domestic demand. The
conversion of the wet production process currently in use to
the energy saving dry process is also planned (GOP-Planning
Commission, 1983).
The total installed production capacity as of 1983 was 4.125
million tons per year. Production in 1982-83 was 3.9 million
tons, a six percent increase from 1977-78 although per
capita consumption (fifty-five kilograms in 1981-82) is
still among the lowest in the world. Increased production
was sustained by a strong demand in the private construction
sector, chiefly from the increase in ownership of dwellings
resulting from the inflow of remittances from migrant
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workers in the Middle East. This trend is not expected to
continue.
Except for setting up slag cement manufacturing facilities
to use the granulated blast furnace slag from the Pakistan
Steel Mill, public sector investment in the cement industry
over the Sixth Plan Period (1983-88) will be restricted to
the repair, maintenance, and modernisation of existing
plants. The expansion of production capacity will be through
private sector investment. Government projections are that
by 1987 the effective capacity will rise to 6.98 million
tons, a level still insufficient to meet projected demand
(7.31 million tons).
Pricing and distribution of cement is regulated by the
Pakistan Cement Corporation. A system of permits and quotas
complements the distribution network. Fixed quotas of cement
are distributed by truck or by train to citywide dealers and
authorised retailers (depot-holders) in the primary
settlements such as Qabula in Sahiwal (population 6,000).
During the frequent shortages, a permit from the magistrate
(or the District Commissioner) is required to obtain cement.
Inherent in such a distribution system, however, is the
scope for influence-peddling, bribery and blackmarket
activity (Qadeer, 1983). The controlled price has often been
well below the (black) market price.
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8. Steel Production
Local steel production is currently limited to non-flat
products (bars, rods, wire and formed sections); flat
products (hot-rolled, cold-rolled and galvanised sheets)
are imported.
8.1 Ship breaking
The ship breaking industry in Gwadur port at the mouth of
the Persian Gulf, about forty miles from Karachi, supplies
most of the rerollable scrap used to produce non-flat
products. During the period 1979-80 to 1981-82, scrap
obtained from ship breaking averaged 390 thousand tons (GOP-
Planning Commission, 1983).
Groups of local businessmen or multinational companies
(e.g., American Express) buy old ships from all over the
world. These are brought to Gwadur where they are broken and
.the rerollable scrap (and everything else that could be
sold), salvaged.
Ships are bought for $90 per ton and the cost of breaking is
$40 per ton. The best steel in the ship, about 50 percent of
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the tonnage, sells for $240 per ton and the rest for $130
per ton. Profits run to over 300 percent (Reeves, 1984).
Additional income is also obtained from the sale of other
items on the ship: fixtures, cargo, furniture, and so forth.
Ship breaking is very labour intensive. Pathan (a tribal
group from the Northwestern Frontier province) labourers
break the ships almost entirely by hand using crow bars,
sledgehammers, cutting torches and winches. Workers are paid
Rs 30-50 per day (about $2.25-3.75/day in 1983) for a
twelve-hour work day (Reeves, 1984).
8.1 Rerolling Hills
Iron and steel works known as rerolling mills use the
rerollable scrap from ship breaking to produce the steel
used mostly in construction. These mills are well
distributed around major urban centres, such as Lahore. The
mills are privately owned, relatively small, and competitive
enterprises.
The installed capacity of the rerolling mills as of 1983 was
820,000 tons per year (roughly fifty percent in Punjab).
Along with the electric furnaces the rerolling mills supply
seventy-five percent of the country's requirements; the rest
is imported. The bar products account for about sixty
percent of the total rolled products, the wires for about
ten percent, and formed sections for the remainder. Welded
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steel pipes and hoops are also produced in small quantities
from imported raw materials (GOP-Planning Commission,
1983:154).
8.3' Pakistan Steel Hills
The Pakistan Steel Hills is the country's first integrated
steel complex. Located on a coastal site, Bin Qasim, forty
kilometers east of Karachi. The Steel Mill Project covers an
area of 7,540 hectares, including 3,290 hectares for Steel
Town, a. self-contained township for the mill's employees.
The entire complex is estimated to cost Rs 25 billion
($1.9765 billion) when fully completed in 1986; the steel
mill proper will cost Rs 18.6 billion or $1.46 billion
(Zuberi, 1983).
The project is being built with Soviet technical assistance
and loans totalling to $700 million. The Soviets have been
responsible for feasibility studies, designing, supply of
machinery and equipment, installation, technical
supervision, and commissioning of the main plant. Some 900
Soviet experts and technicians are involved in the project.
Civil, mechanical, and electrical jobs at the main plant are
being undertaken by Pakistani contractors under the
supervision of Soviet specialists and local engineers.
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The mill will produce 1.1 million tons of steel annually
with a potential to expand to 2 million. Its products will
include: pig iron, coke, billets, hot rolled sheets, cold
rolled sheets, galvanised sheets, and formed sections.
The basic raw materials,iron ore and metallurgical coal,
will be imported (both materials are available within
Pakistan but are no1t of the right quality required for the
mill). During full operation, the raw material requirements
are as follows: 1.36 million tons of coking coal, 1.93
million tons of iron ore and 50,000 tons of manganese.
Coking coal is being imported from Canada, the USA and
Australia; iron ore, from Australia, Brazil, Canada, India,
and Liberia; manganese, from Australia. Indigenous coal from
Baluchistan will supply about six percent of the total
requirement. The imported raw materials are estimated to
make up half of the total production cost.
The other raw materials obtained locally are: limestone,
dolomite, fire clay (for refractories) and flourite. Except
for the fire clay which is from a private supplier, the
other local inputs are supplied by public enterprises.
The manufacturing process selected for the mill is the blast
furnace technology for iron making and basic oxygen
furnace/Linz Donawitz converter for steel making with
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continuous casting facilities. This technology accounts for
seventy percent of the world's steel capacity.
When fully operational, the plant will require 15,000
employees to operate at optimum capacity. Close to 2,000
engineers have already been sent abroad to train in the
steel producing countries. A Metallurgical Training Centre,
established as part of the project, has also been designed
to annually train 1,600 workers in sixty-nine trades.
Partial production began in 1981. Pig iron, coke and other
by-products are already being produced. Production costs
are, however, very high since economies of scale have not
yet been achieved and overheads are not spread over the
mill's full productive capacity. Full production is expected
by 1986, by then the cost of production is expected to be
more competitive with the production of value added items as
hot and cold rolled sheets (Zuberi, 1983:14).
Production is primarily intended for the domestic market
although recent surpluses of pig iron and coke have been
exported. Based on import figures, average annual demand for
steel over the period 1979-80 to 1981-82 was 837 thousand.
Inclusive of scrap (from ship breaking and other sources),
total average demand over the same period was 1.6 million
tons. Demand is projected to rise to 2.47 million tons by
1987-88, or a growth rate of 8 percent.
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The government has taken steps to ensure that the mill's
projected output will be matched by domestic demand.
Priority has been placed on downstream industries,
particularly increasing the export of engineering goods.
Since steel is the most important input of the engineering
goods industry it will be provided at economic prices (GOP-
Planning Commission, 1983:157). The pricing policy adopted
by the Pakistan Steel Hill Corporation, the government
corporation in charge of all steel projects, strictly
adheres to the landed cost parity concept: consumers get the
mill's products at prices equal to, and sometimes
substantially less than, the prices at which they used to
import these items. With the recession in the world steel
industry, Pakistan Steel products have to be fixed at a
level lower than the cost of production.
The government also recently decided to grant exporters of
engineering goods who use Pakistan Steel products a rebate
equal to the customs duty and sales tax. Related measures
such as simplified procedures for sanctioning private
investment, reduced tariffs for raw materials and
intermediate outputs, and protection of indigenous
engineering industries are also being implemented.
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APPENDIX D
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
Most public buildings in the rural areas are designed at the
provincial level. In the Punjab province, the Planning and
Development Department oversees and coordinates the work of
other departments including their building construction
activities. Implementation of construction projects varies
among the different government departments. Three sets of
public bodies are directly involved in building
construction:
(M) The Buildings section of the Communications and Works
Department designs, supervises construction, and maintains
all buildings required by other departments such as Health
and Education that do not have their own technical section.
Thus all health facilities - hospitals at the district and
tehsil levels, rural health centres and basic health
units at the markaz and union council levels - are
standardised designs with standardised technical
specifications and construction procedures. The same is true
for primary and secondary schools.
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(2) The Housing and Physical Planning (H&PP), Local
Government and Rural Development (LORD), and Irrigation
Departments each have technical sections that design and
supervise construction of their respective buildings. Of the
three, the H&PP Department has the most extensive
construction program, but its projects seldom go below the
tehsil. The other two departments are involved in
building construction down to the union council level. The
LORD Department's building activities are quite extensive.
Besides its own offices and staff housing, it constructs
schools, basic health units, and vocational training
centres included in the Rural Works Programme. The
Irrigation Department's construction activities are confined
largely to the maintenance of their existing buildings
(staff residences), pump buildings, and grain stores; very
little new construction is done.
(3) The local government bodies at the district and union
council levels also construct and maintain buildings. Except
for buildings funded by grants from central government such
as those funded by the Rural Works Programme, construction
projects of the local bodies are funded through relatively
meager local taxes and revenues. Therefore construction
activities wholly funded by the local bodies have been
limited. However, the plans to extend the revenue generating
powers and technical capacities of the local governments
will increase their role in building construction.
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Apart from the above sets of institutions, there are several
other housing and building related institutions.
Building research centres at the federal and provincial
levels have been set up to supposedly assist in building
construction through their research and development work.
These centres have developed several cost-reducing
innovations such as rice-husR cement and soil-cement blocks,
but these have yet to be popularised.
Interestingly, the lone innovative attempt being adopted,
although to a limited extent - the low-cost housing
prototype - is the work of private architects and
consultants. The consultant who developed the prototype,
Kibria, headed the government's appropriate technology cell
for many years. In an interview with this author, he claimed
that he found it more difficult to introduce innovations
into the market while working from within the bureaucracy.
The Housing Building Finance Corporation (HBFC) is the major
source of credit for housing. Analyses of its activities
thusfar show that it is grossly underfinanced given the
level of finance required for housing (GOP-Ministry of
Housing and Works, 1981). Moreover, the bulk of its loans
were made to upper-income households in the four major urban
areas (Zaki, 1981). Forty-one percent of these loans were
disbursed in the city of Karachi where, coincidentally,
forty-one percent of the total housing units financed by the
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HBFC (for the period 1973-78) were constructed (Pakistan
Times, 1982). In effect, the HBFC played no role in
financing rural housing and it is as yet unclear what role,
if any, it can assume. The authors of the current national
housing policy argue for more funds for the corporation and
are naturally an interested lobby but they can also meet
resistance from other sectors competing for funds.
A final set of public institutions involved in rural
building construction are those concerned with the building
materials industries: the Industry and Hines Department, the
Small Industries Corporation, and the Forestry Department.
These agencies could be central in promoting the attendant
industries required to support particular cost-reducing,
rural income- and employment-generating shelter technologies
such as those that utilise timber and lime. The links
between these agencies and those traditionally concerned
with housing have been historically very weak; attempting a
coordinated effort either at the provincial or lower
administrative levels, the markaz for example, may be a
major problem.
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